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Abstract
Chapter 1 studies how asset managers, due to reputation concerns, manipulate perfor-
mance through taking latent risk dynamically. It is found that both skilled and unskilled
managers load on excessive level of latent risk to boost performance even if investors are
fully rational. The equilibrium risk taking by managers has interesting implications on
investors' evaluation of manager's skill under normal market conditions and upon crash.
Excessive risk taking reduces welfare of investor as well as unskilled managers, which calls
for the presence of diligent third-party monitoring. Time required by investors to discover
a manager's ability is also significantly lengthened. Our model yields several unique pre-
dictions about crash losses, which are supported by empirical analysis using hedge fund
data. Besides, it provides complementary explanations for declining returns of large funds
and the high demand for structured mortgage securities before the subprime mortgage
crisis.
Chapter 2 investigates price manipulation in general equilibrium with the only market im-
perfection being the presence of a non-competitive large trader. We propose the notion of
"pure manipulation", in which the large trader manipulates security prices to improve-her
welfare but supported by no genuine trading motive. The existence of pure manipulation
is equivalent to the failure of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference of aggregate security
demand at the competitive equilibrium. We state conditions that prohibit pure manip-
ulation. We also demonstrate that heterogeneity in preferences and endowments, large
trading needs and remaining insurance demand in the competitive equilibrium could lead
to a jointly upward-sloping portfolio demand, which gives rise to pure manipulation that
requires arbitrarily small capital commitment. In addition, we establish a link between
static and multi-period manipulation and show that dynamic trading reduces manipu-
lation power. Different security structures that complete the markets lead to different
equilibrium allocations in the presence of a non-competitive trader.
Chapter 3 analyzes how a risk-averse large institutional investor with price impact trades
dynamically in the presence of momentum traders. The larger investor engages in several
interesting manipulative behaviors. She may conduct "round-trip" trades to profit from
momentum sentiment. She may buy (sell) before planned large sale(purchase) to ma-
nipulate intertemporal demand. In addition, she takes profit less aggressively to let the
momentum sentiment last longer. Besides, with endogenously generated price impact, we
find that higher price volatility does not lead to faster execution.
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Chapter 1
Reputation Concerns and
Performance Manipulation With
Latent Risk
1.1 Introduction
Since the demise of LTCM in 1998, strategies that generate steady returns under normal
market conditions but incur large losses upon occasional crashes have caught researchers
and practitioners' attention. The "Quant Meltdown"' in 2007 provides another vivid
example: several popular statisitical arbitrage strategies, which were supposed to yield
"arbitrage-like" returns with relatively small risk most of the time, suffered tremendous
losses when the whole sector was caught in a wave of unwinding. In 2008, people witnessed
huge losses from senior tranches of mortgage securities and credit derivaties, which had
delivered stable returns before the recession and the collapse of house price. These events
beg for the same question: why causes the proliferation of securities or strategies containing
significant amount of risk that is latent in nature? While it could be potentially due to
neglected disaster risk as argued in Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2011), the collapse
of JWM Partners, a second fund set up by the former LTCM founders, suggests the
possilibity of alternative explanations. This paper attempts to address the question from
the perspective of reputation concerns and associated fund flow.
As Mark Hurley from Goldman Sachs once wittily remarked, "the real business of money
management is not managing money, it is getting money to manage." Indeed, an important
factor to the success of asset management is to grow asset under management (AUM) and
collect fee on a larger base. Several papers2 have empirically documented that money flows
in or out of funds after good or bad performance. As Berk and Green (2004) demonstrated,
such flows can be explained by investors' update of managers' ability after observing fund
'Several famous quantitative players such as Morgan Stanley's Process-Driven Trading group and
Goldman Sach's Global Equities Opportunities Fund posted large losses.
2 Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) have studied mutual fund data and found that
fund flow has been strongly correlated with past returns.
performance, which we shall refer to as "reputation". Reputation concern creates an
implicit incentive for managers, which induce them to behave inefficiently. This paper
focuses on the effect of reputation concerns on risk taking in the presence of securities or
strategies that deliver steady positive returns under normal market conditions but incur
potentially large losses upon market or liquidity crashes. We shall refer to this distinct
type of risk-return profile as "latent risk", which generalizes over strategies that are often
referred to as "insurance selling" or "nickel-picking".
There are several sources that give rise to latent risk. Firstly, it could be simply due to
the pay-off profile. For example, credit default swaps and out-of-money put, by design,
contains significant amount of latent risk. So do structured products such as senior
tranches of mortgage securities, which are termed as "economic catastrophy bonds" in
Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2008). Secondly, latent risk could arise endogenously for well-
known strategies. An inherently good strategy that generates steady return with little risk
naturally attracts many fund managers. When a large player of such a strategy is hit, she
is forced to liquidate to meet the margin constraint. This might engender the "margin
spiral"3 , which underlies the "Quant Meltdown" and the occasional bad performances
of carry trade. Finally, latent risk could be caused by illiquid assets such as bespoke
synthetic CDOs that are marked up steadily but register a sharp fall in value when there
is a liquidity crash.
Latent risk is of particular interest in the context of performance manipulation because its
unique risk-return profile allows managers to boost performance without getting detected
until a rare crash. In this paper, we study the optimal exposure of latent risk taken by
risk-averse asset managers in a Bayesian rational equilibrium with information asymmetry.
An asset manager running a certain type of fund follows a pre-specified strategy stated in
the fund prospectus, the risk-return profile of which is known to the investors. A manager
could be skilled or unskilled, which is only known to herself but not to investors. Skilled
manager can generate an alpha in excess to the pre-specified strategies' expected return.
In addition to following the pre-specified strategy, manager can load secretly on latent
risk, which boost instantaneous return with little volatility at the expense of a large loss
upon crash. Investors cannot observe the level of latent risk-taking by manager but they
can form conjecture about it. What they are able to observe is the overall fund returns.
Thus, they have to constantly update the reputation 4 of a manager during normal times
and upon crash in a Bayesian manner. With fund flow increasing in reputation, it becomes
an important concern for managers.
While it is expected that managers without skill choose to manipulate performance by
taking excessive (relative to the pure risk-return optimal) latent risk exposure, managers
with skill also engage in such behavior, which is puzzling given that they possess genuine
alpha-generating ability. The reason is simple: since the unskilled manager will never
attempt to generate higher expected return than a skilled one, the equilibrium updating
rule by investors always rewards higher realized return with higher reputation. Uable to
3 See Brunnermeirer and Pederson (2008).
"i.e. the posterior probability of a manager being skilled.
convince investors about their skill due to information asymmetry, the skilled managers
optimally choose excessive latent risk exposure to expedite the type discovery. In general,
managers with skill take less latent risk exposure than managers without skill under
concave utility. However, interestingly, when a skilled manager's reputation is sufficiently
low or on the brink of fund termination, the skilled manager may aggressively take even
more latent risk to avoid being nailed down to an unskilled one or forced to shut down
after a few unfavorable return shocks. Thus, a somewhat unexpected implication is that,
when a manager's reputation is already low, a rational investor should not always lower
the manager's reputation upon observing a large crash loss.
Rational updating by investors, especially upon crash loss, is very effective at reducing
the gap between latent risk exposures taken by skilled and unskilled managers. This is
because learning the expected return under Gaussian noise is notoriously slow whereas
the information revealed from a crash loss could be substantial. If the unskilled managers
take on significantly more exposure than the skilled ones, the gain from boosting the
expected return during normal times is outweighed by the loss of reputation revealed by a
large loss upon crash. In addition, unskilled managers do not wish to suffer a reputation
setback concurrent with large financial loss. These lead to a "noisy pooling" equilibrium,
in which the unskilled managers' optimal latent risk exposure is riot significantly different
from that of the skilled ones. Consequently, the equilibrium evolution of reputation is
relatively gradual despite that crash happens rather abruptly. This implies that rational
learning alone may not be able to fully explain the drastic withdrawal commonly observed
after a fund suffers a substantial loss.
Deviation of latent risk exposure from pure investment optimal creates inefficiency in risk
taking. In equilibrium, rational investors can discount the latent risk return from realized
performance qutie accurately given the "pooling" nature of the equilibrium. As a result,
managers cannot gain much reputation although they take excessive latent risk. This calls
for the presence of a third-party, who can monitor the risk position of a fund closely and
certify to investors that the level of latent risk taking is appropriate. This also justifies the
use of investment mandate, which, if effectively enforced, makes performance manipulation
through latent risk much more costly. Such self-commitment implementations are in the
interest of managers and worth up to 8% of AUM for a manager with mediocre level
of reputation. More importantly, the damage to investors' welfare is also substantial.
Depending on the level of information asymmetry, the equivalent welfare loss due to
excessive latent risk exposure could be up to 7% of money invested. In addition, it is
found that latent risk can significantly lengthen the type discovery time by around 30%
since higher latent risk exposure taken by unskilled managers in equilibrium reduces the
differential expected return and, therefore, the information content of fund performance.
This engenders inefficiency in fund flow.
Our model generates a few unique empirical predictions on crash loss, which is related to
the level of latent risk exposure. The optimal level depends on the sensitivity of investors'
updating rule. Higher updating sensitivity increases the incentive to boost reputation
through latent risk exposure. There are a few factors that determine the updating sensi-
tivity. Higher idiosyncratic volatility adds noise to observed fund returns whereas larger
difference in alpha-generating ability between skilled and unskilled managers increases the
information content of fund returns. Thus, the former has negative effect and the latter
has positive effect on updating sensitivity. Furthermore, when investors are certain of a
manager's type (i.e. when reputation is very high or low), they do not weigh much on
new observations of fund return, which lowers the sensitivity. Using the TASS dataset for
hedge fund returns, we test our predictions and show that the data is consistent with our
model predictions.
Besides, previous empirical studies have documented that larger fund has declining return.
It is most commonly attributed to trading cost and decreasing return to scale. Our model
complements these explanations with a novel one: larger funds tend be those with high
reputation and, as a result, take less latent risk, which reduces the expected return during
normal times and overall5 . Our model also provides an explanation for high demand of
mortgage-backed securities, which contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. Mortgage-
backed securities exhibits typical latent risk features. And, with liquidity awash during
the period of 2002-2006, new funds were set up and they demanded latent risk. Also,
as the overall prior reputation decreased due to limited supply of skilled managers, this
further pushed up the demand for latent risk as lower reputation would increase latent
risk exposure in general.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the related literature. Section 1.3
presents the model setup. Section 1.4 discusses the solution of the equilibrium. Section 1.5
focuses on the analysis of latent risk exposures taken by managers in equilibrium. Section
1.6 considers the implications of the equilibrium. Section 1.7 considers a impact on latent
risk exposure if fund termination at low level of reputation is introduced. Section 1.8 tests
several implications empirically. Section 1.9 concludes. Proofs and numerical procedures
are contained in the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
With the rise of hedge fund industry, the presence of latent risk, which is easily accessi-
ble to hedge fund managers, has attracted people's attention. Malliaris and Yan (2010),
Makarov and Plantin (2010) as well as He and Xiong (2010) have approached this issue
from different perspectives. Our paper is closely related to Malliaris and Yan (2010),
which also studies the excessive deployment of latent risk strategy due to reputation con-
cerns in a discrete-time framework. While they only allow for binary choice of latent risk
exposure, we analyze the case where manager can choose the optimal level of exposure
from a continuum. This allows us to study the comparative statics and generate testable
predictions. Moreover, the equilibrium implication on investors' learning process is dif-
ferent. In their model, investors update positively on a manager's reputation regardless
of her true type most of the time until a crash, which is accompanied by a large negative
update. In contrast, investors in our model update on the manager's type in the correct
5 Crash risk carries high premium. The overall expected return of latent risk is positive.
direction gradually over time. Makarov and Plantin (2010) finds that the optimal method
to game convex compensation contract is through taking latent risk and considers various
contracts with commitment to address this issue. He and Xiongs (2010) discusses the
design of optimal investment mandate to restrict the manager from taking unnecessary
latent risk.
Our paper belongs to the growing literature studying the impact of manager's reputation
concerns on investment decisions (e.g., Stein and Scharfstein (1990), Dow and Gorton
(1997), Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008), Vayanos and Woolley (2008)). These studies
focus on how reputation concern distorts the use of private information for trading. Our
paper focuses on the effect of an outside investment opportunity, namely latent risk, on
risk taking.
More broadly, our paper is also related to the large body of literature on managerial
incentive that either takes the form of compensation contract (e.g. Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), Panageas and Westerfield (2009)) or explicitly
specified fund flow function (e.g. Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007, 2008), Basak and
Makarov (2009), Chapman, Evans, Xu (2009)) in partial equilibrium. Several papers
have also considered the asset-pricing implications in a general equilibrium framework
(Arora, Ju and Ou-Yang (2006), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010), Guerrieri and Kondor (2010),
Kaniel and Kondor (2010)). Optimal contract has been designed under specific scenarios
(e.g. Ou-Yang (2003), Cadenillas, Cvitanic and Zapareto (2007), Dybvig, Farnsworth,
Carpenter (2010)) to handle incentive problems.
Finally, performance manipulation against common measures such as Jensen's a or Sharpe
ratio has been analyzed in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007) and Guasoni,
Huberman and Wang (2010). Lo (2001) also considers a simple option-writing strategy
that delivers high Sharpe ratio. Our paper adds to this branch of literature by studying
the effect of latent risk, which has the unusual negatively-skewed risk-return profile, and
endogenizing the performance measure through rational Bayesian updating.
1.3 Model Setup
In this section, we shall formulate our model in a continuous-time dynamic setup. We
shall specify the details of the investment opportunities faced by a fund manager and
investors' learning about manager's ability.
Pre-specified Strategy
A fund manager has expertise in a particular strategy that falls into some well-known
investment style. She states her expertise in the fund prospectus and follows the strategy
of her specialty. We shall refer to this strategy as the "pre-specified strategy". Let Rt
denote the the cumulative fund return per dollar (after fee). Equivalently, it is the value
at time t of an $1 investment in the fund made at time 0. Under the pre-specified strategy,
we assume that Rt follows a geometric brownian motion with jump
d Re
R = pdt + odB + (e-L - 1) dAt (1.1)
fT is the expected return (after fee) of the pre-specified strategy. We assume that p is
known to investors since they are familiar with the investment style, which determines
the expected return of the pre-specified strategy. o is the volatility of the fund return and
Bt is a standard Brownian motion. oBt captures the inherent Gaussian risk in the pre-
specified strategy. It could be a combination of both systematic risks and idiosyncratic
risk. As investors can disentangle the systematic risk component perfectly in continuous-
time by comparing the fund return process with the return processes of systematic risk
factors, loadings on systematic risk factors play no role in investors' learning process.
Thus, for simplicity, we shall assume that uBt is purely idiosyncratic, which depends on
the specific implementation by the manager and cannot be observed directly by investors.
Nt is a standard Possion process with intensity A. If Nt jumps at t, it represents a
market/style-wide crash that affects the pre-specified strategy. It has been well-documented
that the overall equity market carries significant crash risk. In addition, the "quant fund
crisis" in 20076 demonstrates that certain styles of strategies could have substantial crash
risk due to the downward margin spiral of market liquidity and funding liquidity. Upon on
a crash, the fund's cumulative return Rt falls to a fraction e-L-6 of that before the crash:
R = e-LRt- where L > 0 is the mean size (logged) of the crash loss and e ~ N (0, oC)
is the idiosyncratic jump loss. A market/style-wide crash has different impact on indi-
vidual funds. While funds belonging to a certain style suffer a loss of L on averge, the
extent, to which an individual fund is affected by the market/style-wide crash, depends on
what portfolio that particular fund holds at the time of crash. Thus, there is an idiosyn-
cratic component e in the jump loss. Moreover, as market/style-wide crashes are rare and
caused by different underlying problems from time to time, we can treat e's to be I.I.D
over time. Since investors are familiar with the investment style that the pre-specified
strategy blongs to, L is known to investors. However, due to its idiosyncratic nature, e is
not observable to investors.
Manager's Skill
We assume that a manager could be skilled or unskilled in the strategy style she specializes
in. A skilled manager (referred to the "H-type") adds an alpha to fund return on top of
what is generated by the pre-specified strategy whereas an unskilled manager (referred to
as the "L-type") adds nothing. Here, we do not model the source of alpha, which could
come from superior information or ability to identify potential arbitrage opportunities.
Therefore, under the management of a H-type manager, the cumulative return process
has higher drift
dRt
Re=(a+fp) dt +od Bt+ (eL* - 1) dNe
6See Lo and Khandani (2007)
whereas, under L-type, the return is the same as that of the pre-specified strategy. a > 0
is the incremental return contributed by a skilled manager.
In general, we shall write the cumulative return process as
R = pidt + adBt + (e- dNt, i = H, L (1.2)
where
pi = p + a" and aH a,aL 0
We assume that manager knows her type whereas investors cannot observe it. This is
motivated by the fact that manager has substantial knowledge of how her strategy is
conducted and whether it possesses any alpha through simulation and backtesting. Also,
she might have extensive previous trading experience before. Of course, it is possible that
sometimes a manager is overconfident and believes that she has alpha-generating ability,
which, in reality, she does not possess. Nevertheless, it is still quite reasonable to assume
that manager has much better knowledge about her skill level than investors. Thus, there
is information asymmetry regarding the skill type of a manager.
Latent Risk
So far, the return of a fund depends on the risk-return characteristic of the pre-specified
strategy and the type of the manager, which are completely exogenous. This is similar to
Berk and Green (2004), in which manager does not actively control the return process.
We shall now introduce latent risk and the manager can control her fund's exposure to
the latent risk. Furthermore, we shall assume that her choice of exposure to the latent
risk is over a continuous space rather than being confined to a few discrete levels.
Specifically, a unit of latent risk provides extra return of irdt over the time interval dt
during normal market conditions but incurs a loss of A percent when crash occurs (i.e.
when dNte = 1). We assume that 7r < A to emphasize on the skewed risk-return profile.
Here, there are two implicit assumptions made. Firstly, we assume that crash due to
latent risk is concurrent with the market/style-wide crash (both are driven by Nt), which
is usually true. For instance, if an equity-oriented fund loads on latent risk by selling out-
of-money index put options, it is hit by latent risk loss exactly at the same time when the
overall equity market crashes. Alternatively, if the latent risk is achieved through holding
illiquid assets, then the crash loss caused by latent risk is again simultaneous with the
liquidity crash. The same holds true for carry trade, which is known for incurring large
loss when the whole investment style suffers from occasional massive unwinding7 . Merger
arbitrage is also found to suffer bad performance when the overall market condition turns
sour8 . The second implicit assumption is that latent risk generates positive return and
negative jump losses with no volatility. In reality, some assets with latent risk might
be marked to market frequently and, as a result, produce small Gaussian shocks under
normal market conditions. But the Gaussian volatility generated by latent risk is usually
7 See Brunneimeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009).
8See Mitchell and Pulvino (2002).
negligible compared to the volatility of the pre-specified strategy. Besides, if latent risk
is taken through holding illiquid asset, which is not subject to the marked-to-market
procedure, we shall not observe much volatility either. We ignore the Gaussian volatility
associated with latent risk to focus on its distinctive feature that is different from the
usual Gaussian type of risks.
It is worth noting that we should not consider latent risk taking in the narrow context of
hedge fund managers only, who admittedly enjoy greater freedom in their choices of risk
taking. A general pension or mutual fund manager could also access latent risk through
marginal portfolio adjustment. For instance, an international bond fund manager can load
on latent risk by reducing the portfolio weight of Japanese government bond and increasing
the portfolio weight of Australian government bond. The marginal effect achieved is
exactly a carry trade strategy. Similarly, many pension fund managers chose to hold
senior tranches of mortgage securities rather than safer treasury bonds, which yielded
a steady spread of 1-2% annually during years of economic boom and suffered almost
no default loss. However, during the credit crisis, substantial loss was incurred due to
collective default by borrowers as documented in Adelino (2009). In short, being able
to load on latent risk should be regarded as a general phenomena among fund managers
rather than the special previlege of hedge fund managers alone.
Latent risk is of particular interest to managers because usual risk sources (say aggregate
equity market risk) generate greater return at the expense of greater volatility. With
frequent observations of fund returns by investors nowadays (most commonly daily or
weekly), variations in level of volatitlity can be detected by investors. Thus, if manager
loads on the usual sources of risk, higher return will be discounted by investors, who notice
the increase in volatility and understand that extra risk have been taken on. Therefore,
they will not perceive the manager with higher reputation. Latent risk delivers return
with relatively little volatility. Thus, investors cannot detect it unless a rare crash occurs.
As argued in Lo (2007), a simple strategy of selling out-of-money index put options can
deliver a significant positive alpha in an unsophisticated linear regression framework.
Manager of type i can choose her exposure of latent risk # at time t where i = H, L. By
doing so, the instantaneous return during normal time will be incremented by irq'dt and
the cumulative return process will be
dReR p=i ( +r#) dt + odB,
However, upon a crash, she will lose A#' more on top of the crash loss incurred by the
pre-specified strategy:
Rt= I - Ae) Rt-
Due to latent risk Due to pre-specified strategy
Putting together, the overall cumulative return follows
dRt L,
- (pi + 7r#1) dt + odBt + [(I - Ad) e-" - 1] dN (1.3)
Investors cannot observe the precise level of latent risk exposure #1 although they may
form conjectures about it. While SEC requires quarterly disclosure of portfolio holdings
with some lag in 13-F filings for funds with more than 100 million under management,
investors can infer limited information from it. First of all, managers trade at much
higher frequency than quarterly basis. Thus, the 13-F filings provides at most a snapshot
of portfolio holdings, which changes on daily, weekly or monthly basis. This might be
subject to the "window-dressing" efforts undertaken by fund managers as well. Secondly,
short positions and many derivatives contracts are not required to be reported. Thus,
investors cannot gather the full information about portfolio position. Last but not least,
the source of latent risk can be obscured by the vast number of investment positions
and complex financial contracts in the portfolio, which makes the inference problem even
harder.
Learning By Investors
In summary, we have assumed that investors can only observe the cumulative return Rt
but cannot observe:
1. the type of manager
2. Bt and E, which are idiosyncratic to a fund
3. the choice of latent risk exposure #' by manager
Thus, they try the learn the type of manager after observing the cumulative return from
time 0 to t, R[o,t], and update the probability of the manager being a skilled H-type
pt = Pr (i = HIR[o,t]) (1.4)
Et [1{iH}1
where Ef [-] denotes the conditional expectation based on investors' information. Since
there are only two types of managers, Pt fully captures the reputation of a manager.Thus,
we shall refer to Pt, the posterior probability of a manager being skilled, and "reputation"
interchangeably.
Fund Flow and Reputation Concern
We assume that the fund flow rate is an exogenous increasing function f (Pt) to capture
the simple fact that fund flows into hands of managers with greater reputation. The
purpose of introducing fund flow into our model is to provide a simple but realistic chan-
nel for reputation to reward managers through greater asset under management (AUM).
The fund flow is gradual in our model. This can be justified by costly search among
some investors as argued in Sirri and Tufano (1998). Also, not all investors are actively
monitoring the performance of the fund constantly. Moreover, even if investors are com-
pletely sure that the manager is of L-type, they may still invest with the manager for
diversification purposes. Though a H-type manager generates higher expected return,
there is still room for the presence of L-type manager following the same pre-specified
strategy to reduce idiosyncratic risk. Finally, investors are wary of operational risk as
pointed out in Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwartz (2008). They are cautious with
high concentration and will not delegate all of their assets to a few H-type managers only.
This is illustrated by the fact that, when BlackRock acquires Barcap Global Investors,
investors fled to avoid concentration9 . For simplicity, let f (.) be linear and increasing in
reputation Pt. We further assume that f (0.5) = 0 so that higher Pt (> 0.5) induces fund
inflow whereas lower 1t (< 0.5) induces fund outflow.
Let Wt denote the asset under management (AUM) of the fund. With fund flow taken
into account, the AUM evolves as follows
dW 
_ dRt
--- 
--- + f (Pt) dt
Wt Rt
- (pti + 7r# + f (zt)) dt + -dBt + [(1 - A#|) e-L - 1 dANe (1.5)
Part of the growth in AUM comes from investment return. The rest comes from attracting
fund flow with a higher level of Pt. Since a manager wishes to have higher AUM, fund
flow, which depends on Pt, introduces reputation concerns for the manager.
Manager's Objective
We assume that managers receive a management fee as a fraction # of AUM Wt. Managers
try to maximize constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility over fee received.
max Et 00 e~PS " ds
Here we assume that managers consume the fee she receives and abstract away the po-
tential consumption-saving decision. Furthermore, as our focus is the effect of reputation
concern on level of latent risk exposure, we assume that the fee is a simple fraction of the
AUM. In other words, we do not consider the effect of incentive contracts such as sym-
metric fulcrum fee seen among mutual funds or those involves high-water mark, which is
popular among hedge funds. Also, we assume -y > 1 to avoid unrealistic excessive risk
taking behavior. For CRRA utility, # does not matter. Manager effectively solves
*0 W1~Yl
max Et ~PS " ds (1.6)
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Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as #t", , 4 } where $' is an adapted process denoting
the latent risk exposure taken by manager of type-i and b denotes the conjectured latent
risk exposure of type-i by investors (who does not observe #|) such that
9As reported in Wall Street Journal on Jul 22nd, 2010.
1. Manager of type-i's latent risk exposure # solves max~i E ePt W tU dt
2. Investors correctly conjecture manager's latent risk exposure
t= #t Vt, i = H, L
and form their belief about manager's type through Bayesian updating:
it = Pr (i = H I R[o,t])
1.4 Solution of the Equilibrium
With infinite horizon and CRRA utility, we look for a stationary equilibrium that is
Markov with the state variable being Pt. Hence, the choice of latent risk exposure O,"
and #f should only depend on the reputation at time t, pt. In other words, they are
time-invariant. As a result, we may drop the subscript t and denote the choice of latent
risk exposure as #H (.) and #L (.). We shall verify later that this is indeed an equilibrium.
The equilibrium needs to be solved in 3 steps. First, we need to find out how investors
update Pt given their conjectures about manager's choice of latent risk exposure. Second,
we need to find out what is manager's optimal latent risk exposure #' taking as given
the investors' updating rule. Finally, we need to find out the fixed-point equilibrium, in
which manager of a given skill type chooses the optimal latent risk exposure and investors
correctly conjecture managers' strategies.
1.4.1 Investors' Learning
Investors' learning takes two forms: updating under normal market conditions (dNt = 0)
and updating upon a crash(dNt = 1). When they update, they have to form a conjecture
about manager's strategy i for i = H, L. Let the difference between the the investors'
H - L
conjecture about latent risk exposures of the two types of manager be ZA = # -H . The
following proposition states the Bayesian updating rule based on investors' conjecture.
Proposition 1 Conditioning on no jump in time interval [t, t + dtl, the reputation of a
manager evolves as:
dpi=t # () t ( _ E ) (1.7)
where
(1 )El ___i = H] - El $ i_= L]
P 2dt ( (1.8)
Proof. See Liptser and Shiryayev (1977).
U
d-E[ [E ] measures the unexpected return shock for investors, which could be due
to the idiosyncratic Brownian shocks or the difference between the actual drift rate of
the cumulative return process and that expected by investors. The former carries no
information about the manager's skill type. However, investors cannot disentangle the
two sources of shock because of information asymmetry.
measures the sensitivity of updating. Note that # is small when P is close to 0 or 1
and big when Pt is around 0.5. When pt approaches 0 or 1, it indicates that investors are
very certain of manager's type and they no longer update much on the new fund returns.
At p = 0 or ^ = 1, they are completely certain and there is no updating at all. They
are two absorbing states for the reputation process. When P is around 0.5, investors are
least certain about the manager's skill type. As a result, the sensitivity of updating is
high, which reflects the fact that additional piece of evidence is useful for determining
the type of manager. Moreover, the sensitivity 0 is high for low U, which is intuitive.
The less noise there is, the more information the shock carries. Finally, # depends on
E [dRti = H] - E [dRt i = L , which is the difference in expected returns of the two
types of manager. This is a measure of how much information content the unexpected
shock possesses. In equilibrium (investors correctly conjecture), Pt follows a martingale
based on investors' information filtration. However, as the following proposition suggests,
Pt is not a martinagle from a manager's point of view since she knows her type and the
exact drift of d.
Proposition 2 For manager of type i, her reputation follows
dpit = # (lt) (ai + irO + o-dBt - [fit (0 + 1r$H)  (1L (rr )) (1.9)
and
pt 1 -pi)a + 7rE (t)
# t()-lt (= (it)(1.10)
When there is a crash, there is a large amount of information revealed, which requires the
second type of updating. Consequently, this causes Pt to jump. Suppose the after-jump
cumulative return is a fraction X of the before-jump cumulative return: Rt = xRt-. From
investors' perspective, x = 1 - Ao e-L. Without the idiosyncratic loss e, investors
will be able to infer the manager's type from the crash loss by backing out the latent risk
exposure 0 . However, with the idiosyncratic loss, the overall crash loss is stochastic. As
a result, they can only perform Bayesian updating.
Proposition 3 Upon a crash, investors update according to the following rule:
pt = P' t- IX)
(1.11)
in (1- (-) f
9_ 2
+)exp [i
In - 2L,
This has an interesting feature. Rational updating by investors may not imply an increase
in post-crash reputation Pt upon seeing a higher fraction of wealth preserved (i.e. smaller
loss) after jump if H-type manager is conjectured to have higher latent risk exposure:
8P' H L
-- < 0 if ( -)> 0"(t)
This is reasonable because if H-type is expected to load more on latent risk at t, then her
loss upon crash at t is expected to be higher. Thus, higher loss (i.e. lower x) indicates a
higher probability of being skilled.
By law of iterated expectation, for investors, Pt is still a martingale with stochastic jump:
Et [P (Pt-, x)] = Pt-. Manager can decompose x into component from her latent risk-
taking (1 - A$|_) and component from pre-specified strategy e-L". Thus, from the
perspective of the manager, the updating rule by investors becomes
Pt= P (pt-,$,e)
H ~(1.12)
1.4.2 Manager's Maximization
Manager of type i takes investors' conjectures Ot as given and solves
max Et e- ds
Oi1-t
subject to
dW
(p +r# + f (Pt)) dt + odB + [(1 - A#) eLe - 1] dNt (1.13)
dpt = # (z3) (ai +7 ir + a-dBt - t (a +rH + (1 -- ) 1L] (1.14)
+(P (fit-,#0',e -Pt-) dNt
where first equation describes how AUM evolves according to the risk-return profile of
the pre-specified strategy the manager follows, the choice of latent risk exposure # as
well as the fund flow f (Pt). The second equation describes the evolution of the manager's
reputation under investors' conjecture ' (-).
Proposition 4 (1)Manager's optimal latent risk exposure #' is a function of Pt and in-
variant over time.
(2)The value function of type i manager is of the form V' (W, p, t) = -Pt We r U (i9)
(3) #' (Pt) and U' (1Pt) satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
0 =min p+ -p - A + (1 - -y) p + 7roi + f (fit) - Iyo.2) Ui
+1 ((a - apt) + ( 1 - ) .2 + r $i pt H (Pt) + (1 ~-it) L (ft)
+ 0 I 3 Or0 U; + -) (I I\ r(1--)i )]Iu
2 + Ae~-)- Eo [e~ U (P (Pt, i, ))] (1.15)
with # minimizing
[(1 - -y) U' + #U ] 7r# + Ae -(l)L (1 - A#|) 1 ^ Et [e-('7)*U (P (Pt, #, e))] (1.16)
Given the form of value function and our restriction that y > 1, we can easily deduce
that U' > 0 since V' should be increasing in AUM Wt, which implies
- = -e~' Wr-Ui > 0
Also, we can conclude that U. < 0 since V' should be increasing in the reputation of the
manager
OVi 1 W '-?
=_ - e~p t Ui > 0
9t p 1 - P
The terms to be minimized by #' have very intuitive meaning. Loading on latent risk at
level # could boost the fund return by 7r#|. (1 - y) U'7r#5 reflects the direct pecuniary
benefit from the steady return the latent risk factor provides. Also, with return 7r#dt
higher, her reputation increases by #7r#|dt over the time interval [t, t+dt), benefit of which
is reflected in the term #TrOiU,. Since (1 - -y) U' < 0 and Ui < 0, higher #' leads to lower
value of the first two terms of (1.16). Ae-(l)L (1 - Ao') 1' Et [e-(1Y) Ui (P (t, #i E))]
is a positive term, which counterbalances the linear negative effect of the first two terms
and represents the cost of latent risk. A (1 - A$') ' measures the financial loss (after
adjusted for risk-aversion) due to latent risk exposure when crash arrives(with intensity
A). This is combined with the loss due to pre-specified strategy e( 1 Y)L (adjusted for risk-
aversion) and expected investors' updating Et [e*l)eUi (P (pt, #, e))] upon a crash.
1.4.3 Equilibrium
If Pt = 0 or 1, when Pt will no longer change since investors are already completely certain
of the types. So there is no reputation concern at all. Managers will simply choose the
optimal latent risk exposure based on the pure risk-return trade-off. In other words, they
will grow the AUM in an "organic" manner.
Proposition 5 If it = 0 or 1,
L(+ 12
ct~ A (i)(1.17)
U1 (0)
U (1)
p
p+ A + (y - 1) (pi +7r + f (0) - jyo2) - i (1 - A#)
p+A+(y- 1) (pA +r#+ f (1) - jyU2) - I (1 -A#)
(1.18)
(1.19)
with a parametric restriction that
p+A+(y- 1) t+7r + f (0) - YO - (1-A#) > 0
Note that without reputation concern, the level of latent risk-taking is constant and the
same for both types. It is straightforward to see that that the exposure increases in n,
which is the premium of latent risk. Also, under the parametric assumption that y > 1,
it is decreasing in the mean logged loss of the typical strategy L. This is understandable
since manager is quite risk-averse(-y > 1). Given a loss will be incurred by the pre-specified
strategy when a-crash arrives, it is undesirable to aggravate the situation by incurring
further loss from latent risk exposure. Finally, e is decreasing in o,, the idiosyncratic
jump loss due to risk aversion.
Proposition 6 In equilibrium, i (P3 ) = $ (p,). Define A = #OH (fit) - #L ($t). So the
above equations simplifies to a fixed-point problem of differential-integral equations
0 = p+ p-A+(1 -7) pH + " + f UH - 2 
2
+{ae (-)+ (1- ) U2 + 7r (1H - t f) + - 2o2U
+Ae-( -,y)L (igH17E e07""( " )]for i =H (1.20)
0 =p+ p-A+(1-7) P + L t - 7 L
2
+{afit + (1 - _Y) 02 -rpt A (pt)}I UP + 2 2U
+Ae~(~y)L (1 7AL) Et [e-(~7)UL (P (1 3t cLJe))] for i = L (1.21)
0= arg min r [(1 - y) Ui + OUj] # + Ae-(l-)L - Ao) '^ Et [e-(l-)Ui (P)] (1.22)
with boundary conditions at 0 and 1 specified by (1.18) and (1.19).
The fixed-point involves three parties: potential H-type, potential L-type as well as the
investors. We require both types of managers to maximize their utility while investors
correctly conjecture. Due to the non-linearity and the involvement of integral (i.e. the ex-
pectations that appear in the equations above), we have to resort to numerical techniques.
The details are included in Appendix.
1.5 Analysis of the Equilibrium
In this section, we shall analyze the equilibrium solved in the previous section. As the
the equilibrium is a functional fixed-point problem involving three parties (potential H-
type, potential L-type and investors) and two different forms of updating by investors,
we shall analyze step by step to see the effect of each component. We start by analyzing
an open loop case first - manager facing naive investors, who "naively" believe that
managers will simply follow the pre-specified strategy and refrain from loading on excessive
latent risk. This case will yield several basic intuitions, which still holds in fully rational
equilibrium. Next, we shall consider the case, in which investors are semi-rational in the
sense that they conjecture the latent risk exposure #' correctly to perform continuous-time
updating but ignore the information content in jump loss. Finally, we consider the case in
which fully rational investors conjectures #' correctly and perform updating both during
normal market conditions and upon crash. This opens a potentially important channel
for investors to learn about manager's skill type. We shall see that the equilibrium result
is "noisy pooling", in which the difference in expected crash loss between H-type and
L-type is small relative to the idiosynacratic noise.
1.5.1 Naive Investors
As long as investors do not perform jump updating, which applies for both the naive and
semi-rational investors cases, the reputation levels before and after a crash is the same:
P (ft, di, e) = Pt. From (1.16), we find that the optimal latent risk exposure by manager
of type i is
eq 2-y 7r Y +l
1 - e6( F( U
d A (1.23)
Since (1 - ) < 1 and < 0, we have 5--- > 0. Comparing this with (1.17), we see
that
4 (pt) ;>
with equality holds only when Pt = 0, 1. This suggests that managers always take on
excessive latent risk exposure than what is optimal without reputation concern. The
'3U'
magnitude of deviation from # (excessive latent risk exposure) depends on _ which
is determined by two factors: # (pit) and -U /U'. As discussed in section 3.1, the former
is the sensitivity of investors' updating to unexpected return shocks. From the manager's
point of view, # captures the effectiveness of boosting return through putting on more
latent risk. The more sensitive investors' updating rule is to fund performance (i.e. higher
value of 3), the larger reputational gain can be achieved by incremental return obtained
through latent risk exposure. As a result, manager will be more inclined to load on latent
risk given the cost of doing so, loss of A percent upon a crash, remains the same (since
there is no jump-updating).
# has an important effect on the variation of level of latent risk exposure with respect to
level of reputation pt. For naive investors,
(p)= pt(1 - it)
The sensitivity is an inverse-U shaped parabola equal to 0 at the Pt = 0, 1 and peaks at
Pt = 1. Intuitively, this makes sense because, at Pt = , investors are most uncertain of
the type of manager. They put greatest weight on newly observed unexpected shock of the
realized return . At the two ends 0 and 1, investors are completely sure of the manager's
type and they stop updating. In general, the closer Pt is to 0 or 1, the more certain
investors are about manager's type. Their updating is less sensitive to unexpected shocks
of fund return. As a result, the manager has less incentive to take on excessive latent
risk when her reputation fit is very high or low and more incentive when their reputation
is mediocre. This suggests an inverse-U shape relationship between the reputation level
and the latent risk exposure. The magnitude of 3 is increasing in a and decreasing in o.
The former measures the difference in expected returns generated by skilled and unskilled
managers as perceived by naive investors. The latter is pure idiosyncratic noise, which is
unrelated to skill level. Thus, higher a increases the information content whereas higher
o,2 increases the noise level in the unexpected shocks of fund return. As a result, the level
of latent risk exposure is high when the skill difference is large and idiosyncratic risk of
the fund return is small.
We see that both types of managers take excessive level of latent risk. While that is
expected for the unskilled manager, it is somewhat surprising for the skilled one, who
already possess superior alpha-generating skill. This is the due to information asymmetry
between a skilled manager, who knows her true type, and investors, who cannot tell her
types. Unable to convince the investors of skill level, a skilled manager is still incentivized
to load on latent risk to speed up the discovery of her superior skill by investors since
investors' updating rule always favors higher realized return and imposes no reputational
punishment for crash loss (when investors do not perform jump-updating).
Figure 1-1: Optimal Latent Risk Exposure (Against Naive Investors)
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-U /U i /v measures how marginal increase in reputation will lead to a percentage
increase in utility. This captures eagerness of a manager to boost her reputation, which
contributes to her utility through fund flow. Given that manager's utility is concave,
higher fund flow has declining marginal utility for her. Thus, -U' is increasing in repu-
tation p3 at a declining rate. This tends to reduce the manager's eagerness for boosting
reputation as her reputation becomes higher. As a result, although the sensivity # is
exactly symmetric about and peaks at j, the declining marginal utility with respect to
reputation tends to let the maximum level of latent risk exposure peak at reputation lev-
els less than 1. For H-type manager with true alpha, she enjoys higher persistent income
through alpha directly, which is equivalent to having a higher level of effective reputation.
This reduces her incentive to load on latent risk. Given that both types face the same up-
dating rule by investors, this will in general lead to lower exposure by by H-type manager.
But this might not be true for very low level of reputation. When her reputation level is
close to 0, the proportional marginal utility of reputation might be higher than that of
a L-type because, once she is nailed down as an unskilled manager, she forfeits the large
potential benefit of higher fund flow associated with her alpha-generating ability. The
potential benefit is especially large if her alpha-generating ability is high, which delivers
fast ascent in reputation. As a result, she chooses a higher level of latent risk exposure
than a L-type manager in this situaiton.
Fig 1.1 shows the optimal levels of latent risk exposure taken by skilled and unskilled
managers when the alpha generated by skilled type a = 2% and 6%. The optimal from
pure risk-return perspective is the level of latent risk exposure at P = 0, 1 when there is no
reputation concern. As analyzed above, both types of managers take on excessive latent
risk exposure. Moreover, we see that the level of latent risk exposure exhibits an inverse
U-Shape with respect to reputation regardless of the value of a and the type of manager.
In addition, the maximum level of latent risk exposure is skewed towards the left of ,2'
where updating sensitivity is highest, due to decreasing marginal utility of reputation.
This manifests more strongly for the skilled H-type manager. Finally, we see that for
most of domain of Pt, L-type takes on more latent risk H-type. In fact, this is true for all
levels of reputation when a = 2% and investors' updating is not very sensitive. However,
when a = 6%, the information content is much higher and the sensitivity of investors'
updating rule is higher. As a result, H-type takes on more latent risk than L-type does
when Pt is sufficiently low to avoid being nailed down as a unskilled manager.
Figure 1-2: Effect of Idiosyncratic Volatility (Against Naive Investors)
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Fig 1.2 demonstrates the effect of idiosyncratic risk a of the pre-specified strategy on the
optimal latent risk exposure taken by H-type and L-type managers. Higher idiosyncratic
risk u increases the noise level in the fund return. As a result, the sensitivity of updating
3 decreases at all levels of reputation Pt. This creates less incentive for managers to
boost return through taking latent risk, which leads to lower levels of optimal latent risk
exposure. As a increases from 10% to 12.5%, we see that both types of managers lower
their latent risk exposures.
1.5.2 Semi-Rational Investors
In this case, investors are semi-rational. They are fully aware of fact that manager loads
on latent risk to boost return and they correctly conjecture the level #'. We assume that
they take these into account when performing continuous updating based on observed
cumulative return. However, we keep the second channel of updating, which happens
upon a crash, shut for the moment. They are semi-rational in the sense that they do
perform rational updating under normal market conditions but fail to update Pt upon
observing the jump loss during crash. This is a step towards fully rational updating. The
situation is no longer open-looped. Rather, manager takes investors' conjecture and their
updating rule as given and fully optimizes over the level of latent risk exposure whereas
investors conjecture correctly about each type of manager's optimal strategy and form
rational updating rule.
Figure 1-3: Updating Sensitivity (Against Semi-Rational Investors)
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The updating rule by investors is fundamentally changed: once investors take into account
of the latent risk-taking #', the sensitivity 8 is endogeneously determined
ft (1 - 3t) (a + 1ra (ft))
=() (1.24)
where a H = (ft) - # (fLt). The extra term 7ra reflects the adjustment for difference
in conjectured latent risk exposures under H-type and L-type managers. The overall
difference in expected fund return is the sum of the differene in alpha, which is the
inherent ability of managers, and the difference in levels of latent risk exposure, which is
endogenous in the model. Since, for most of the domain of Pt, H-type manager takes less
latent risk than L-type manager, A (ft) < 0 and # is lowered than the naive case. This is
illustrated by Fig 1.3. Lower sensitivity reduces the effectiveness of boosting reputation
Figure 1-4: Optimal Latent Risk Exposure (Against Semi-Rational Investors)
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through latent risk and leads to lower latent risk exposure in equilibrium by both types in
comparison with the naive case. Fig 1.4 plots latent risk exposure 0 against reputation
level Pt for both a = 2% and a = 6%. We see a decrease in latent risk taking by both
type of managers relative to the case, in which investors are naive.
1.5.3 Fully Rational Investors
Finally, let us consider fully rational investors who conjecture the latent risk exposures
taken by managers correctly and perform rational Bayesian learning both under normal
market conditions and upon a crash. As discussed earlier on, crash loss could potentially
contain a signficant amount of information about the level of latent risk exposure if H-
type and L-type's latent risk exposure are significantly different. As shown by Fig 1.1
and Fig 1.4, when a is high, the difference in latent risk taking by H-type and L-type of
managers are large if investors ignore information contained in crash loss (they are naive
or semi-rational). However, as we turn on the new channel of learning through crash loss,
the equilibrium results are changed dramatically. With a moderate level of idiosyncratic
crash loss (a, = 20%), we see that this new channel of learning brings down the level of
L-type's latent risk exposure significantly, which is illustrated by Fig 1.5.
The new channel of learning imposes a new reputational cost upon crash for L-type
manager if she loads on more latent risk exposure than H-type manager in equilibrium,
which leads investors to adjust reputation downward upon observing a large crash loss. It
is well-known that learning the drift of a process with Brownian noise is a slow process.
In contrast, learning upon crash could be fast if L-type takes considerably more latent
risk then H-type, which will be reflected by a much larger crash loss on average. This
suggests that the difference between latent risk exposures taken by the two types of
managers will be significantly smaller than the difference in the semi-rational case because
Figure 1-5: Optimal Latent Risk Exposure (Against Fully Rational Investors)
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of the reputation cost for the L-type manager due to crash updating. In addition, the
convexity of the value function (see Fig. 1.6) as a result of risk aversion plays an important
role. Recall that when manager solves for optimal #| in (1.16), the cost of higher latent
risk exposure is captured by the term Ae-(1-y)L+-(1?y)? (1 - At) Et [e-~)"Us ()].
Ignoring the e-(~7)e (in fact, in appendix, we show that we can formally get rid of it by
change of measure), Et [UL (P)] > UL (Et [P]) by Jensen's inequality. As higher UL
represents lower utility, this shows that the convexity of value function creates more
damage to L-type's utility upon crash than the expected reputation cost alone. Finally, if
L-type chooses to take more risk, the loss of reputation always come at the same time as
large financial loss. This aggravates the total loss in utility, which, given her risk-aversion
y > 1, is very undesirable.
As a result, L-type significantly reduces the level of latent risk-taking in contrast with the
previous two cases. In equilibrium, she still chooses a higher level of latent risk over most
reputation levels. But the gap between her level and H-type's level becomes smaller so
that the expected difference in loss upon a crash is small relative to idiosyncratic jump
loss e. Consequently, crash loss cannot reveal a large amount of information about the
manager's skill type. This leads to a "noisy pooling" equilibrium.
Suppose crash occurs when Pt- = 0.5. Investors are most uncertain about the type of
manager and updating is very sensitive to unexpected return shocks. The post-crash
reputation ft = P (h-, #, e) depends on the realization of E. We plot the probability
density distribution of post-crash reputation Pt for both types in Fig 1.7. The plot on
the left panel shows the density distribution for both type of managers in an equilibrium
with fully rational investors. H-type's density is shifted only slightly highert than that of
L-type's, which suggests that investors cannot infer much from the crash loss. However,
if managers assume that investors do not take their latent risk exposure into account and
follow optimal strategy against naive investors, the information contained in the crash loss
Figure 1-6: Component in L-type Value Function Due to Reputation
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is substantial. This is shown by the large difference in density distribution of post-crash
reputation of H-type and Ltype managers, which is plotted on the right panel of Fig 1.7.
H-type's reputation improves considerably whereas L-type's reputation suffers.
Figure 1-7: Pdf of Post-Crash Reputation when Pt = 0.5
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Such a "noisy pooling" equilibrium suggests that the reputation change upon a crash
would not be drastic. Rather, reputation change is gradual over time. It is often observed
investors withdraw from funds after a fund suffers a large loss upon crash. It seems that
one has to resort to other sources, such as fear of bank run or pure return chasing, to
account for the large magnitude of withdrawal. Also, our model suggests that a manager
who suffers more loss upon a crash may not necessarily be rationally downgraded. A skilled
H-type manager may put on more latent risk than L-type manager if her reputation is
sufficiently low and investors' updating sensitivity is sufficiently high. This implies that,
upon a crash, H-type loses more. Hence, investors should not lower a manager's reputation
simply because of a higher level of crash loss when her reputation is already low.
Other features found in the "naive investors" case remain the same. As a increases from
2% to 6%, we see the levels of optimal latent risk exposure are significantly higher for both
types of managers in the fully rational equilibrium, which is shown in Fig 1.5. Greater
information content in the realized fund return increases the sensitivity of updating by
investors, which leads managers to load on more latent risk. Similarly, as shown in Fig 1.8,
the levels of optimal latent risk exposure in fully rational equilibrium decrease for both
types of managers when idiosyncratic risk o- increases from 10% to 12.5%. The reason is,
again, the same as in the case with naive investors. More noise in the realized fund return
decreases the sensitivity of updating by investors, which leads to lower latent risk taking.
Figure 1-8: Effect of Idiosyncratic Volatility (Against Fully Rational Investors)
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1.6 Implications of the Equilibrium
In this section, we shall analyze the the implication of our equilibrium. We shall analyze
the inefficiencies caused by the presence of latent risk and excessive risk taking. This is
followed by other implications.
1.6.1 Inefficiencies
Excessive latent risk taking in equilibrium engenders several types of inefficiencies. Firstly,
the choice of latent risk exposure taken by managers deviates from the risk-return optimal.
Surprisingly, even L-type managers suffer from latent risk exposure in equilibrium. See-
ondly, latent risk increases the time required to discover the skill level of a manager, which
causes inefficiency in fund flow. Finally, we shall show that excessive latent risk expo-
sure in equilibrium reduces the incentive for skilled managers to seek alpha opportunities,
which aggravates the "slow-moving capital" problem.
Distortion in Risk Taking
As shown in the analysis of fully rational equilibrium, both H-type and L-type managers
take on excessive level of latent risk than what is optimal for pure investment purpose (i.e.
# #), which is damaging to their welfare. In equilibium, L-type chooses to have a level
of latent risk exposure that does riot differ significantly from H-type so as to avoid being
identified upon a crash. As a result, investors' conjecture of latent risk exposure taken by
a manage is very close to the true exposure even though they do not know the exact type
of manager. Consequently, they adjust their updating rule according to their conjecture
and discount the portion of return that comes from latent risk. Therefore, excessive risk
taking by both types fails to boost reputation in equilibrium relative to a situation where
both types load on latent risk that is optimal from a pure investment perspective. But
given a fixed investors' conjecture and the resulting updating rule, managers always have
the incentive to boost reputation and cannot commit not to do so. Therefore, relative to
a situation where both can commit not to take on excessive latent risk, managers' welfare
are reduced significantly. This is true even for the unskilled ones at most reputation levels,
who are supposed to benefit from the ability to mimic a skilled one through latent risk
exposure in the short-term.
This problem echoes the call for third-party certification raised by some asset managers.
Currently, SEC requires asset managers to disclose their holdings to public at quarterly
basis. As discussed earlier, the frequency is too low and what is disclosed are mainly liquid
and long positions, which are, furthernore, subject to the possibility of "window dressing".
The complexity of financial contract as well as the large number of positions proves to be
another source of obscurity. Hence, such disclosure does not provide enough information
for investors to monitor the latent risk exposure e with precision to curb managers from
loading on excessive level of latent risk. One may argue that the SEC could increase the
frequency and the range of disclosed positions to allow better monitoring. However, this
might discourage managers with true skill to spend effort and generate alpha if the alpha-
generating strategy can be replicated easily going forward. Also, disclosure of holding
position to public could lead to other serious problems such as predatory trading"'. Thus,
a third party is needed between managers and the investors to monitor the situation and
provide certification to investors. If such a third-party is allowed for constant monitoring of
manager's latent risk exposure and promises not to disclose anything, the above situation
could be avoided. The third-party could make sure that managers latent risk-taking is
appropriate and certify to investors. And if investors classify managers who deviate from
# as L-type, then none of the types will deviate and take excessive latent risk. In this
scenario, <p =0 = # and investors will update without having to discount performance
for latent risk-taking.
1 0See Brunnermeirer and Pederson (2008), Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein (2008).
We could conduct a welfare analysis based on H-type and L-type's value function. In
particular, we shall follow Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and see how much AUM (in percent-
age) a manager of type i is willing to reduce in order to shift from the equilibrium with
excessive latent risk exposure to the one with a third-party ensuring no excessive latent
risk exposure. Under the equilibrium with excessive latent risk exposure, manager of type
i's future utility is given by her value function
1 Wt -,
VI, p t)=-e0 U, (pit).p 1-y
If managers takes no excessive level of latent risk exposure (i.e. ch = <p) and investors do
not discount their performance, we can calculate the new value function
1 Wtvl, ~17(Wi~t) 1_P U't-V' , ),it ) =y -~ 'O(p,
We find Wt such that V (it ,, pt) = Vi (W, Pt, t) for current AUM Wt and reputation Pt.
Wt represents the equivalent AUM in an equilibrium with no exessive latent risk exposure
that would deliver the same level of utility for the manager holding her current AUM and
reputation fixed. We can compute the percentage reduction in AUM a manager of type i
is willing to accept to avoid the excessive latent risk exposure and investors' discounting
of her performance:
1_W~ 1 _ - ~I. W - W U_
-e- (pt) = -e U' (pt) implies = - 1.S 1-y p 1 -y W i
Figure 1-9: Welfare Loss In Terms of AUM Reduction For Managers
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For -y = 2 and -y = 3, the equivalent AUM reduction for both types of managers at
different levels of reputation is plotted in Fig 1.9. We see the welfare loss due to excessive
latent risk exposure is substantial for both types of managers with different levels of risk
aversion. The loss is higher when risk aversion is low. This is because managers take on
latent risk more aggressively to boost reputation when risk aversion is low. Also, the
loss is higher for L-type than for H-type for most reputation levels as the former takes on
more latent risk. The H-type is always willing to have third-party certification whereas
L-type is willing to have when her reputation is not too high (which is unlikely).
In practice, such a third party must be diligent and trust-worthy. Otherwise, investors
may not treat her certification seriously. Secondly, she must be sophisticated enough to
detect latent risk exposure existing in a manager's portfolio. When latent risk is taken
through certain assets well-known for negetiavely-skewed returns, detection is easy. How-
ever, if latent risk is taken through more complex forms of dynamic strategies, it requires
considerable skill and effort from the third-party. But even if third-party monitoring is not
perfect, it can greatly increase the cost of excessive latent risk exposure and ameliorate the
problem. Besides, the presence of third-party monitoring could enhance proper enforce-
ment of investment mandate that prohibits managers from taking latent risk (0' = 0),
which might not be optimal but often better than the inefficient equilibrium. Most im-
portantly, such a self-commitment implementation is actually in the interest of the fund
managers themselves regardless of skill type. To a certain extent, our analysis explains
the existence of fund administrators, who audits positions of the fund and ensures accu-
rate pricing of some less frequently traded assets. Perhaps, more responsibilities should
be assumed and more incentive for diligent monitoring should be provided.
We can also perform a similar analysis for investors, whose consumption rate is assumed
to be proportional to the AUM. Of course, in reality, investors could leave a fund. Here,
we consider a passive investor, who stays with the fund for simplicity. As a result, her
wealth after withdrawal grows at
dWJ = (yp + 7r$) dt + o-dBt + [(1 - A$') e-L - 1] dNt, (1.25)
wtI
which differ from the manager's only in that there is no fund flow f (p3) in the drift term.
We assume that investors have the same utility function as the manager to remove the
potential probems that arsie from different attitudes towards risk. To a certain extent,
investors choose to invest with funds that suit their risk appetite.
Conditioning on the manager, whom investors invest with, is of type i , investors have
value function
1e = p-e B (1.26)
p -Y
where
if + m+ (n1) (poa + trkexpo und( A#)
if manager takes "organic" level of latent risk exposure under third-party monitoring.
Thus, unconditionally, their value function will be
ti (W, fi, t) 0= 1e-t (W/) g (ft)P 1 - 7 (1.27)
where '(ptf) =BPt+ B (1 - pt).
Without third-party monitoring, manager will take on excessive level of latent risk. Un-
der managers' equilibrium strategy, we can still calculate investors' value functions con-
ditioned on manager's type
V' (wfpt, t) = - Ue () ._ tp 1 - y (1.28)
Notice that though the reputation of asset manager ft does not affect investors through
fund flow, it affects manager's risk-taking, which still feeds back into investors' value
function. Unconditionally, investors have value function
V;I ~ (W/) P on t
p 1l-Y
utf (t) = uj,.' (Pt) t + ULJ, (pt) (1 - pt).
(1.29)
Figure 1-10: Welfare Loss In Terms of AUM Reduction For Passive Investors
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We can perform the similar analysis as we did for managers and compute the equivalent
reduction in investment for passive investors without third-party monitoring. As shown in
Fig 1.10, We see that substantial loss is incurred for investors especially when manager's
, where
15%,
+ 25%p
Table 1.1: Expected Discovery Time
No Latent Risk With Latent Risk
a L-Type (Yrs) H-Type(Yrs) L-Type(Yrs) H-Type(Yrs)
4% 28.3 28.3 40.3 42.7
5% 17.9 17.9 23.7 25.6
6% 12.5 12.5 16.5 17.7
Parameters Used: y = 3, p = 0.2, p = 10%, u = 10%, L = 15%,
o7,= 20%, 7r = 1%, A = 4.35%, A = 0.2, f (it) = -12.5% + 25%p
risk aversion is low, which implies greater excessive risk-taking. Moreover, the loss is most
severe when Pt is in the middle when information asymmetry is most severe.
Type Discovery
Here we shall study the existence of latent risk on discovery of manager's type by investors.
If managers are inaccessible to latent risk, then difference of return drift is simply the true
alpha difference between H-type and L-type managers. This is also the same if managers
commit to, e, the pure investment optimal through third-party monitoring. And this
difference is what investors rely on to distinguish manager's skill. As more and more
historical returns get observed, investors update on the type of manager they face and,
given sufficiently long time, rational updating will converge to the true type
In the presence of latent risk, the difference in the expected return is no longer the true
alpha. It contains the difference in latent risk exposure. For most of domain of reputation
p, L-type takes more latent-risk in equilibrium. This effect will reduce the sensitivity
pt(1 - Pt) (a + 7TA) <t (1 - pt) a (.0/With latent risk -2 02 ONo latent risk if < 0 30)
In addition, the expected outperformance that H-type could generate,
Et [dRtli = H] - Ef [dRt] = (1 - pt) (a + 7rA) (1.31)
,is also reduced if A < 0. As a result, the magnitude of positive drift of pi, for a H-type
manager decreases with both sensitivity of updating and expected outperformance lowered
in the presence of latent risk. This will slow down the speed of discovery and the capital
movement from unskilled managers to skilled managers. Of course, another channel of
updating is the crash loss. But as discussed earlier, since the difference in latent risk
exposure taken by H-type and L-type managers is small relative to the idiosyncratic loss,
there is limited information revealed by the crash loss, which is already rare in nature.
Thus, latent risk will lengthen the process of discovery of managers' true skill levels by
investors. In equilibrium, H-type's latent risk exposure could be slightly higher (i.e A > 0)
when her reputation is sufficiently low. This would reverse the situation discussed above.
But given that this happens only when pt is close to 0 and the sensitivity of updating
"limt-oo pA = 0 or 1 almost surely.
is low, it offers little improvement in the speed of discovery. Thus, in the presence of
latent risk, the speed of discovery is significantly lowered. In Table 1.1, we calculate the
expected time for a new entrant H-type manager with Pt = 0.5 to reach fit = 0.9 (investors
are 90% sure of the manager's type) and a L-type manager with Pt = 0.5 to reach pit = 0.1
(investors are 90% sure of her true type) through simulation. For a = 4%, 5%, 6%, we
find that the expected discovery time is about 30% - 40% longer in an equilibrium with
latent risk. Substantial inefficiency in fund flow is caused as a result.
Slow-Moving Capital
It has been noted that arbitrage capital is slow-moving' 2 , which leaves profitable invest-
ment opportunities unexploited for an extended period of time. Several papers have
attempted to provide explanations behind this puzzling phenomenon. For instance, He
and Xiong (2010) argues that optimal contracts may be designed to elicit effort from
managers by restricting the set of investment opportunities, which leads to slow capital
movement. Malliaris and Yan (2010) argues that managers, who suffers reputation dam-
age, may forgo profitable opportunities for "nickel-picking" strategies. Our results suggest
that the presence of latent risk might aggravate the problem.
When new profitable opportunities arise, it can be exploited by skilled managers. If truly
skilled manager pursues a new strategy with higher alpha a' > a, there might be a fixed
cost associated with such a move. Thus, only if a significant improvement in C could be
attained, would a skilled manager be willing to pay the cost and pursue the new oppor-
tunities. Higher level of alpha increases the sensitivity of investors' updating rule, which
induces higher latent risk exposures. As discussed earlier, this only causes further devia-
tion from the pure investment optimal without having much actual performance boosting
effect since, in equilibrium, investors would expect a higher level of performance manip-
ulation through latent risk and discount more from the observed fund return. Further
deviation from the pure investment optimal leads to lower marginal benefit of higher
alpha. With lower marginal benefit, skilled manager requires larger improvement a' - a to
compensate for the cost of capital movement. She would forgo more alpha improvement
opportunities, which aggravates the slow-moving capital problem.
For instance, in the context of our model, a fixed cost could manifest as a reduction in
reputation, if investors are not sure about a manager's ability to succeed with a new
trading style. Holding fixed the potential increase from a to a higher level a' brought
about by the new profitable opportunities, a skilled manager will only decide to exploit
the opportunities if the decrease in pt is not too large. Fig 1.11 provides a numerical
illustration for the case, in which pursuing new opportunities will increase a from 2%
to 6%. The dashed line represents the minimal level of reputation (after the move) for
a skilled H-type manager to be willing to implement such a move at different levels of
reputations (before the move) when there is no latent risk available. In the presence of
latent risk, the situation is aggravated due to lower marginal benefit of higher alpha as
discussed above. This in general leads to higher level of minimal reputation (the solid line
1 2 It has been noted in Duffie (2010). Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) provides an example by
studying the convertible arbitrage funds.
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in Fig 1.11) required for a skilled H-type manager. Note that the exact form of fixed cost
is not important here. As long as the excessive latent risk exposure in equilibrium lowers
the marginal benefit of higher alpha, we would expect an aggravation of the "slow-moving
capital" problem when there is an associated fixed cost for capital movement.
1.6.2 Other Implications
Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Our study has interesting implications on the subprime mortgage crisis. As argued earlier
on, mortgage-backed securities generate good returns when market is under normal con-
ditions but incur large loss upon market or liquidity crash. This feature fits the nature
of latent risk. Furthermore, subprime mortgage securities are illiqiud, which cannot be
marked to market. Thus, it generates little Gaussian risk. As many of these products
were highly rated, asset managers were not restricted from holding it. Thus, latent risk
became readily availabe for a broad class of asset managers ranging from the conservative
pension fund managers to the aggressive hedge fund managers.
During the period of 2002 to 2006, market was awash with liquidity. Existing funds had
seen AUM growing rapidly and many new funds were set up. This is best illustrated by
the growth of hedge fund industry from around 0.6 trillion to around 2 trillion before the
crisis. As our model suggests, asset managers in general take on positive amount of latent
risk unless their skill is clearly recognized with reputation fit close to 0 or 1. With more
asset under management, this creates a larger demand for latent risk in equilibrium as
demonstrated earlier on. Moreover, with continuous securization effort made by mort-
gage originators and investment banks, the supply of latent risk is also increasing, which
ensures the attractiveness of latent risk premium to asset managers even in the pres-
ence of greater demand. This partially explains the excessive demand and over-supply of
subprime mortgage-backed securities.
Moreover, given the supply of skilled managers is limited, the overall proportion of man-
agers with skill to generate alpha is reduced. This reduces the prior belief of manager
being skilled held by investors. As our equilibrium suggests that the peak of latent risk
taking is very much skewed towards the left (see Fig 1.5)". So a decrease in ex-ante
reputation of new entrants in general will cause them to load more on latent risk to boost
reputation, which further increases the demand. Finally, as our model suggests for most
of domain of reputation Pt, the unskilled L-type takes on more latent risk than the skilled
H-type. An increase in the overall proportion of unskilled managers also contribute to
the increase in the overall demand for latent risk.
In summary, with the latent risk nature of mortgage-backed securities and easy accessi-
bility to a broad range of asset managers, the increase of asset under management in the
asset management industry led to greater demand for latent risk. This was accompanied
by a rise in the proportion of unskilled managers and deteriorating prior reputation, which
further stimulated the demand for latent risk and exacerbated the loss suffered by various
fund styles during the crisis.
Declining Return For Bigger Funds
It has been documented, for both mutual funds and hedge funds, return deteriorates with
fund size". This has been largely attributed to decreasing return to scale as a result
of trading cost, limited arbitrage opportunities or organizational diseconomies etc. Our
study complements these explanations with a novel argument. Bigger funds most likely
have been successful in past performance. Regardless of managers' true skill type, good
past performance led to high reputation. Our study suggests that asset managers with
higher reputation Pt for most of the domain of fi takes less latent risk. Thus, funds that
enjoy high reputation Pt will have lower return drift yielded from latent risk-taking if
crash does not occur. Moreover, since latent risk should carry an insurance premium,
the overall return after taking into account of crash loss is still positive. This provides a
complementary explanation for declining return for bigger funds.
1.7 Fund Termination
In this section, we shall investigate features of managers' latent risk taking strategies
when a shut-down condition is introduced. The motivation behind this is that, in reality,
a manager may not be able to continue her career if her reputation becomes sufficiently
low. Investors might withdraw money, which leads to fund termination. This could
be because the investors are coordinated by the the reputation level and a low level of
"3With fund termination, latent risk exposure becomes monotonically decreasing in reputation level.
See next section.
"E.g. Chen, Hong, Huang, Kubik (2004), Getmansky (2004)
reputation triggers a bank-run on the fund's capital. Alternatively, investors may find it
more cost-saving to switch to passively managed exchange-traded-funds if the probability
of a manager having alpha-generating skills is sufficiently low. If the manager works for a
fund family, she might be fired for low reputation. In our model, we shall assume that the
fund will be shut down if manager's reputation drops to a certain threshold level p > 01.
We further assume that the manager's continuation utility after fund termination is of
the form
1W
P e 1 -7- U
with U' = KU' (p) for some K > 1. The functional form of the continuation utility is
chosen to be similar to the value function of the manager for tractability purpose. The
chosen functional form implies that the shut-down continuation utility is higher for a
manager with higher AUM. This could be interpretted in several ways. The manager
might have a stake in the fund, which would be returned to her upon fund termination.
Alternatively, a manager with experience managing a larger fund will in general be able to
manage more asset should there be an opportunity for her to start a new career elsewhere.
As discussed earlier on, higher U' represents lower utility. By imposing K > 1, we assume
the fund manager suffers a loss from the termination. For a numerical illustration, we set
p 0.2 and K = 1.1.
Figure 1-12: Miniraal Level of Reputation Required
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The level of latent risk taking is demonstrated in Fig 1.12. Latent risk exposure becomes
monotonically decreasing in reputation Pt. Thus, the inverse U-Shape might not hold if
we introduce forced termination. As expected, H-type becomes more and more aggressive
in risk-taking as Pt approaches 0.2, which reflects her eagerness to avoid termination. The
cost for her is much higher than an unskilled manager given her alpha-generating ability
and associated potential to attract fund inflow in the long run. Apart from the inverse
15 See Malliaris and Yan (2010) for similar assumptions
U-Shape, the other properties remains intact. Both types of managers still take excessive
amount of latent risk. L-type has higher exposure except when the reputation level it is
sufficiently low. And the equilibrium difference in levels of latent risk exposure taken by
H-type and L-type is small, which can be regarded as "noisy pooling".
1.8 Empirical Analysis
Latent risk exposure provides small steady return under normal market conditions but
incurs large crash loss. Its risk-return profile naturally leads to crash loss if a manager
decides to load on it to boost performance. It has been well-documented that hedge fund
returns exhibit negative skewness due to rare extreme losses. Among all, the most famous
case is what happened to LTCM in 1998 after the default of Russian government bond.
The collapse of the 9 billion hedge fund Amaranth in 2006 due to an extreme loss of more
than 65% provides another example. Though not as dramatic, hedge funds returns are in
general negatively-skewed. And, given the secrecy of their portfolio positions and flexiblity
of their investment mandates, hedge funds managers have easy access to latent risk and
are, perhaps, most likely to boost reputation through latent risk exposure. Thus, we shall
focus our empirical tests on hedge funds, although as discussed earlier on, performance
manipulation through latent risk exposure is not restricted to the hedge fund industry
alone.
Table 1.2: Dow Jones Credit Suisse Indices Return
Indices Sector Weight Mean(%) Stdev(%) Skewness
Overall - 0.78% 2.22% -0.22
Convertible Arb 3.0% 0.65% 2.04% -2.76
Dedicated Short 0.5% -0.20% 4.92% 0.70
Emerging Markets 9.8% 0.76% 4.39% -0.78
Equity Neutral 3.7% 0.48% 3.07% -11.79
Event Driven 21.9% 0.84% 1.76% -2.44
Fixed Income Arb 1.9% 0.44% 1.71% -4.32
Global Macro 10.5% 1.03% 2.90% -0.03
Long/Short 23.3% 0.86% 2.88% -0.01
Managed Futures 13.8% 0.59% 3.41% 0.00
Multi Strategy 11.7% 0.66% 1.56% -1.76
Table 1.2: Data consist of monthly returns of the Dow Jones Credit Suisse indices starting from
January 1994 until December 2010. The indices tracks about 8000 funds with minimum 50
million AUM. The index returns are weighted by AUM and net of fee.
Table 1.2 documents the mean, standard deviation and normalized skewness of the Dow
Jones Credit Suisse (formly known as the Tremont indices) hedge fund indices returns.
Most of fund style categories exhibits negative skewness with the exception of managed
futures and dedicated short bias, the latter of which has negligible sector weight. The
overall index, which tracks all hedge funds performance, has negative skewness of -0.22,
which is suggestive of the general trait of hedge fund return.
While returns of different hedge fund styles seem to be negatively skewed, one cannot
link this feature to the potential latent risk exposure directly. Hedge funds load on well-
known risk factors and the negative skewness could come from these factor exposures.
Performance variations related to well-known observable factors should be filtered off by
investors when evaluating a manager. Exposures on well-known factors do not help a
manager boost performance and should not be considered as latent risk exposure. Thus,
latent risk should be contained in the idiosyncratic component of fund returns that cannot
be explained by loadings on factors. As our model is about endogenous choice of latent
risk, we shall work on idiosyncratic component of the fund returns after removing factor
exposures.
We shall employ the seven-factor model proposed by Fung and Hsieh (2004) as the bench-
mark for calculating idiosyncratic component of fund returns. Two factors are equity-
oriented: excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio (MKT) of NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks as well as the Fama-French size factor(SMB). Two factors
are fixed-income driven: change in the constant-maturity yield on U.S. 10-year Treasury
bond (YLDCHG) as well as change in credit spread (CRDSPD) between yields of Moody's
Baa corporate bond and U.S. 10-year Treasury bond. Finally, three trend-following strat-
egy factors 16 are included: the return of bond lookback straddles (TFBD), the return
of currency lookback straddles (TFFX) and the return of commodity lookback straddles
(TFCM). An examination of the factors shows that many of them indeed have substan-
tially skewed returns. This is documented in Table 1.3. Thus, depending on the signs of
loadings, these risk factors could contribute to the skewness of fund returns positively or
negatively.
To single out the idiosyncratic component, in which latent risk exposure could possibly
play a role, we shall regress the hedge fund returns on the risk factors to obtain the
residuals. We focus on those idiosyncratic residuals large in absolute value as they are
more likely to be related to the potential latent risk exposure where as the small residuals
are largely produced by Gaussian shocks. Our model generates several interesting predic-
tions. Firstly, the higher the volatility of the idiosyncratic component, the lower the level
of latent risk exposure. This is because higher volatility of the idiosyncratic component
leads to lower sensitivity of investors' updating, which reduces the incentive for managers
to boost return through latent risk exposures. This is illustrated by Fig 1.8, in which
higher a leads to lower # at all reputation levels. Therefore, large idiosyncratic move-
ments should be more positive if idiosyncratic volatility is higher. This is prediction
1.
'Trend-following factor data are kindly made available on David Hsieh's website
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm. See Fung and Hsieh (2001) for a descrip-
tion of these factors.
Table 1.3: Hedge Fund Benchmark Factors
Factors Mean Stdev Skewness
Market 0.47% 4.65% -0.86
SMB 0.21% 3.72% 0.87
YLDCHG -0.01% 0.29% -0.10
CRDSPD 1.17% 0.86% 2.05
TFBD -1.64% 14.78% 1.46
TFFX 0.02% 19.72% 1.40
TFCM -0.47% 13.89% 1.29
Table 1.3: Data consist of monthly return from January 1994 to March 2010 of 7 risk factors
employed in Fung and Hsieh (2004). The seven factors are: excess return of CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio, Fama-French size factor, constant-maturity yield change on U.S.
10-year Treasury bond, change in credit spread between Barcap U.S. Corporate bond BAA and
AAA indices, the return of bond lookback straddles, the return of currency lookback straddles
and the return of commodity lookback straddles.
Secondly, the higher the difference in return generated by skilled and unskilled managers,
the higher the level of latent risk exposure and the higher the loss upon a crash. This
is again due to sensitivity of investors' updating. In our model, the differential return is
captured by parameter a. Higher a suggests higher information content relative to noise
in the unexpected return shocks perceived by investors, which increases the sensitivity of
updating and induces higher latent risk exposure. This is illustrated by Fig 1.1, Fig 1.4
and Fig 1.5 for various levels of investors' rationality. This suggests that large idiosyncratic
movements should be decreasing in the difference in alpha-generating ability between the
skilled and unskilled managers. This is prediction 2.
Finally, our model predicts the level of latent risk exposure is related to the reputation level
of the manager. Without fund termination, we expect that as manager's type becomes
more clear to the investors (f near 0 or 1), they would take less latent risk exposure.
As discussed before, when investors are relatively certain of managers' type, they do not
update aggressively and this lowers the incentive for managers to take on latent risk. With
fund termination, managers with sufficiently low reputation are driven out. Reputation
level is not directly observable. Calculated measures suffer two major problems. There
is no single unanimous measure that summarizes the reputation perceived by investors.
A variety of methds have been proposed. Jensen's Alpha and Sharpe ratio are the best
known ones. But among hedge funds, maximum draw-down is also a key statistic. Also,
in practice, many investors judge the manager by looking at how much her absolute return
beats certain benchmark. Besides, Bayesian approach and measures based on portfolio
holdings shown up in 13-F filings have also been suggested. The second problem is that
any measure of reputation is, by its purpose, is a measure of skill. In addition to alpha-
generating ability, a skilled manager is likely to be good at risk management, which we
do not include in our model. Better risk management reduces loss upon crash. This
will interfere with the relation between crash loss and reputation level. We propose a
solution that uses fund age and asset under management (AUM) as a proxy. As a fund's
age increases, more historical performance becomes available for investors to update on
manager's skill type and a manager's type will be revealed eventually. This is shown by
the fact that, in equilibrium, the reputation level & tends to 0 or 1. Skilled managers
will lower latent risk exposure as the fund age increases. Unskilled managers will increase
latent risk exposure in the beginning to boost performance as their reputation declines over
time. As age further increases, funds run by unskilled managers will either be terminated
or reduce latent risk exposure as investors have pinned down their type and no longer
update. Since skilled managers are scarce, the effect of unskilled manager dominates in
the beginning. Thus, large idiosyncratic movements should decrease in age first. However,
as funds run by unskilled managers are terminated or detected with little uncertainty, lage
idiosyncratic movements should start to increase in age. Therefore, we expect U-shaped
relation between large idiosyncratic movements and fund age. AUM is another proxy.
Large fund tends to do well in history and enjoys higher reputation regardless of the true
skill level of the manager. This is prediction 3.
1.8.1 Data
We obtain hedge fund returns, age and other fund-specific characteristics from the Lipper
TASS database. There are "Live" funds and "Graveyard" funds. The "Live" ones are
active until the last update of the TASS database, which was March 2010 in our data.
"Graveyard" funds are those that stopped reporting to the database before March 2010
due to various reasons such as liquidation or closed to new investors. "Graveyard" funds
were created in 1994 to mitigate "survivorship" bias. As a result, we exclude returns
reported to the database prior to 1994.
We only include funds that are reporting returns net of fee in US dollars at monthly
frequency. This covers the majority of the funds in the database. Besides, an additional
condition on fund size is imposed. We require the average fund size over its history to be
greater than 10 million. Similar requirement is imposed in Hu, Pan and Wang (2010) and
Cao, Chen, Liang and Lo (2010) studying the same dataset". To ensure proper estimation
of loadings on risk factors, we exclude those funds that have less than 36 observations (3
years). The summary statistics for 11 fund styles are presented in Table 1.4.
1.8.2 Idiosyncratic Component
To recover the idiosyncratic component of fund returns, we can regress individual fund
returns on the 7 factors specified above to remove systematic risks. Given the large
autocorrelation of hedge fund returns 18, we shall include the lagged market return in the
regressors as well.
"Other cutoff criterion are also experimented with and empirical inferences remain largely unaffected.
"e.g. Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004)
"We experiment without lagged market return and our results are unaffected.
Table 1.4: TASS Data Summary Statistics
No. of Funds Avg Ret(%) Stdev(%) Skewness Fund Size($M) Age No. of Obs
Total Graveyard Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
All 5553 2796 0.59 0.53 3.02 2.45 -0.68 -0.53 334 60 3.8 3.1 85 73
Convertible Arb 119 87 0.64 0.61 2.44 1.86 -1.23 -0.74 153 79 4.4 3.6 96 85
Emerging Markets 244 100 1.01 0.92 4.83 4.63 -0.75 -0.44 137 52 3.6 3.1 83 72
Market Neutral 172 121 0.58 0.53 2.49 2.10 -0.33 -0.08 94 44 3.5 3.0 81 71
Event Driven 355 234 0.80 0.77 2.50 2.13 -0.65 -0.66 203 75 4.5 3.5 96 84
Fixed Income Arb 132 100 0.61 0.61 2.35 2.05 -1.66 -0.97 220 95 3.8 3.5 89 79
Fund of Funds 1175 596 0.47 0.45 2.32 2.01 -0.93 -0.82 170 61 4.1 3.4 91 81
Global Macro 141 80 0.73 0.72 3.59 3.20 0.16 0.19 259 59 3.9 3.0 80 67
Long/Short Equity 1029 603 0.88 0.85 4.19 3.79 0.02 -0.03 119 51 4.1 3.3 90 77
Managed Futures 177 72 0.76 0.78 4.33 4.14 0.22 0.24 202 51 5.2 4.0 103 85
Multi-Strategy 204 112 0.74 0.68 2.89 2.52 -0.58 -0.53 231 68 3.7 2.8 84 67
Undefined 1776 677 0.35 0.28 2.62 2.12 -1.03 -0.88 699 62 3.1 2.8 74 66
Table 1.4: Summary statistics are calculated for all funds and funds in each fund category. "Avg Ret" and "Stdev" stand for average
fund return and fund return standard deviation. "Skewness"
Management) of a fund over the time span of report. "Age"
stands for skewness of fund return. "Size" is the
is the number of years between fund's inception
report. If inception date is not available, we use the date of the first report. "No. of Obs" stands for number
a fund.
average AUM (Asset Under
date and the date of return
of monthly observations for
Thus, our regression is specified as
ri,t = ai+ / r3 MKTMKT + BLagMKTMKTt-j + fSMBSMBt + /YLDCHGYLDCHGt
+OCRDSPDCRDSPDt + I3TFBDTFBDt + /3TFFXTFFXt(
+ITFCMTFCMt + Ei,t (1.32)
where ri,t is the excess return of fund i in month t and eit is the idiosyncratic component
of fund i in month t.
As it is well-known that hedge fund risk exposures are time-varying20 , we shall resort to
the rolling-window regressions with window size of 36 months. This allows us to compute
residuals si,t and the volatility &S of the residuals i,t. The results are summarized in
Table 1.5. We can calculate the volatility and skewness of the residual errors from the
regression, which measure the volatility and skewness of the idiosyncratic component of
the fund return. The skewness of the residual errors are much less negative than the
skewness of fund returns, which is evidenced by a drop in average skewness from -0.68 to
-0.14. This suggests that a large portion of the negative skewness of hedge fund returns
could be attributed to loadings on risk factors that are skewed. However, the average
skewness is still negative for most of the fund categories. This alludes to the potential
latent risk taking behavior studied in this paper.
Table 1.5: Seven Factor(plus Lagged Mkt)
All
Convertible Arb
Emerging Markets
Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arb
Fund of Funds
Global Macro
Long/Short Equity
Managed Futures
Multi-Strategy
Undefined
Alpha(%)
mean med
0.32 0.24
0.38 0.35
0.68 0.66
0.37 0.31
0.53 0.48
0.45 0.38
0.17 0.15
0.39 0.41
0.54 0.48
0.41 0.39
0.52 0.40
0.12 0.05
Idiosyncratic Vol
mean
1.96
1.48
3.10
1.85
1.60
1.64
1.42
2.62
2.72
3.18
1.96
1.67
med
1.59
1.33
3.06
1.64
1.32
1.36
1.18
2.36
2.49
3.00
1.74
1.35
Regression
Idiosyncratic Skewness
mean med
-0.14 -0.09
-0.26 -0.29
0.00 0.10
-0.27 -0.02
0.04 0.03
-0.78 -0.33
-0.28 -0.21
0.11 0.10
0.16 0.11
-0.07 -0.04
-0.03 -0.01
-0.27 -0.19
Table 1.5: Individual fund return is regressed on 7 hedge fund risk factors and lagged market
returns. Alpha, standard deviation and skewness of
reported.
residual errors of fund-level regressions are
20e.g. Bollen and Whaley (2009)
1.8.3 Testing The Predictions
As managers could have different risk appetites or strategies, funds have different levels
of idiosyncratic volatility. We shall rescale residuals by dividing the volatility &' to make
it more comparable across funds. The scaled residual is (i, = si,t/&. Moreover, as
we are only interested in latent risk that will incur relatively large realized idiosyncratic
component, we shall select large scaled residuals - (1,t's with absolute values larger than
321, which could happen with very small chance for Gaussian noise. This will avoid sample
dilution by small idiosyncratic movements caused largely by Gaussian shocks, which is
unrelated to latent risk exposure.
We shall test our predictions by regressing the large rescaled residuals on several predic-
tors. Prediction 1 suggests that higher residual volatility &' should lead to higher (i,t.
Prediction 2 requires the difference in ability between skilled and unskilled managers per-
ceived by the investors as predictor. As this is not directly observable, we shall infer it
from the data. Specifically, for fund style j listed in Table 1.4, we consider the empirical
distribution of realized Sharpe ratio 6 months ago. Each fund i that belongs to style j has
a realized excess return 6 months ago Ri,t . We divide it by the volatility of the fund to
obtain the realized Sharpe ratio of fund i. Of course, this would be a noisy measure as it
is based on only one observation. However, the empirical distribution of realized Sharpe
ratio would be quite stable by law of large number. Thus, we can measure, ADj,t, the
ability difference between skilled and unskilled managers in style j by the inter-quartile
range of the empirical distribution and assign it each fund i in style j. We use the em-
pirical distribution 6 months ago because it would take time for a manager to adjust her
latent risk exposure. The results are qualitatively the same if we use a lag of 3 months.
Prediction 2 suggests higher ADi,t should lead to lower j. Finally, prediction 3 indicates
that there is a U-shape relationship between i,t and age as well as a positive relationship
between (1,t and AUM. To capture the non-monotonic relationship, we impose a quadratic
functional form and use Agei,t and Age'e as two additional predictors. For AUM, we shall
follow the common practice and take the logged value. In total, there are 5 predictors:
residual volatility &', ability difference perceived by investors ADit, Agei,,, Age t as well
as log(AUMt).
Specifically, the regression is as follows
, = c + $1&[ + $ 2 AD, + 4Agei.t + $4Aget + $6 log (AUMt)
+#6Jnd{Furid Style} + 0 7Ind{Year} + <8Xi,t + ?7 it (1.33)
where Ind{FFund Style} and Ind{year} are dummy variables for fund styles and years and Xi,t
are controls. Dummies for fund styles and years are also included to remove the potential
unobserved style fixed effects and changing economic conditions over time. Percentage
below high-water mark2 ' and contemporaneous Dow Jones Credit Suisse style return are
2
'Different cutoff thresholds (2 and 4) are also examined.
22Percentage below high-water mark is defined as (Current NAV per share - Maximum NAV attained
in history per share)/Maximurn NAV attained in history per share.
included as the main controls. The contemporaneous style return is important because it
controls for the impact of economic fundamentals on a typical fund of a style. We expect
41 > 0 since residual volatility will reduce latent risk exposure. Furthermore, we expect
k2 < 0 as higher expected difference in ability between skilled and unskilled managers will
induce higher latent risk exposure. Since latent risk exposure increases with age initially,
we expect 43 < 0. After funds run by unskilled managers are terminated or identified
with little uncertainty, the overall effect of age on latent risk exposure will flip sign and
we expect 44 > 0. Finally, as large funds tend to have higher reputation, which reduces
latent risk exposure, we expect 45 > 0.
Table 1.6 summarizes the findings. In specification (1), we regress large rescaled residuals
computed from the 7-factors regression (plus lagged market excess return) for each indi-
vidual fund on the standard deviation of the residuals. We get a positive and statistically
significant relation. This indicates that funds with more idiosyncratic volatility tend to
have smaller loss. This is consistent with our model prediction in that when idiosyncratic
volatility is high, investors update less aggressively to unexpected good performance,
which reduces manager's incentive to load on latent risk. In specification (2), we regress
large scaled residual on ADi, the difference in alpha-generating ability between skilled
and unskilled managers of the style that the fund belongs to. We obtain a negative and
significant relation. This suggests that when investors expect skilled managers to generate
high alpha, managers increase latent risk exposure to boost performance. In specification
(3), we test the relationship between large scaled residual and fund age as well as fund
size, both of which are proxies for the unobserved reputation. As expected, we obtain
a negative coefficient on age and a positive coefficient on squared age, which are both
statistically significant. This generates a quadratic U-shape relationship and confirms
the prediction that latent risk exposure is increasing in age initially when the unskilled
managers dominate the population but is decreasing in age as time goes by and unskilled
managers are driven out or identified. The coefficient on logged AUM is also positive and
significant, suggesting that large funds tend to suffer smaller loss. In specification (4), we
put idiosyncratic volatility, difference in alpha-generating ability and age effects together
on the right hand side of the regression. Our results remain robust. All the coefficients
are still significant. The magnitudes of coefficients are stable across 4 specifications as
well.
1.8.4 Robustness Checks and Discussion
One concern is the choice of cutoff threshold. We experiment with different cutoff
thresholds for large residuals. Table 1.7 reports the results for regression (1.27) using
threshold= 2,3,4. For all 3 cases, the mean of large residuals is negative and more so
when the cutoff is higher. . This indicates that large movements are more likely to be
negative, which is consistent with the negative skewness of residuals computed in Table
1.5 and suggestive of the presence of latent risk. The coefficients remain consistent with
model predictions and statistically significant except for the coefficient on logged AUM
with cutoff equal to 2. It is marginally insignificant perhaps to due to sample dilution. As
Table 1.6: Large Residual Tests( > 3 Residual Vol)
Dependent Variable: Scaled Residual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Residual Vol 0.501 0.436
[5.59] [4.97]
Ability Difference -1.38 -1.39
[-6.70] [-6.53]
Age 
-0.415 -0.409
[-5.64] [-5.68]
Age 2  0.016 0.016
[4.17] [4.42]
log(AUM) 0.436 0.463
[2.03] [2.16]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R 2  0.14 0.13 0.15 0.16
No. of Funds 3146 3146 3146 3146
No. of Obs 4676 4676 4676 4676
Table 1.6: Cross-sectional regression on large scaled residual are conducted under various spec-
ifications.
the threshold increases, the economic significance increases as evidenced by larger coeffi-
cients' magnitudes and higher adjusted R2. This is expected because the observations are
more likely to be induced by latent risk exposure. The turning point for the age effect,
which is -- '- is consistently arounid 10 to 15 years.
2(41
Another concern is whether our results are driven by "live" funds or "graveyards" funds
alone. We shall perform the same regression on the two sub-samples of "live" funds
and "graveyard" funds separately. Results are presented in Table 1.8. The number of
observations are roughly equal for the two subsamples. The sign of coefficients remain
consistent and significant with model predictions.
For each individual predictor, we may come up alternative explanation for its significance.
For instance, if, for reasons unrelated to reputation concern, a manager allocates more
portfolio weights to assets or strategies exhibiting idiosyncratic Gaussian risk, she would
have less portfolio weights on latent risk assets. This leads to more positive scaled residuals
and higher residual volatility at the same time. Also, by including the style return and the
year fixed effects as controls, we can largely remove the effects of time-varying investment
opportunities driven by economic fundamentals. This might not perfectly eliminate the
correlation with economic fundamentals, which would lead to spurious significance of the
coefficient on A~~t Moreover, fund with more symmetric idiosyncratic risk might have
moderately large scaled residuals with equal probability of being positive or negative quite
Table 1.7: Different Cutoffs For Large Residuals
Dependent Variable: Scaled Residual
> 2 Res Vol > 3 Res Vol > 4 Res Vol
Residual Vol 0.133 0.436 1.27
[4.46] [4.97] [5.27]
Ability Difference -1.14 -1.39 -1.58
[-13.90] [-6.53] [-3.03]
Age -0.155 -0.409 -0.662
[-7.23] [-5.68] [-3.68]
Age2  0.007 0.016 0.022
[6.56] [4.42] [2.17]
log(AUM) 0.121 0.463 1.17
[1.81] [2.16] [3.37]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Style Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R 2  0.12 0.16 0.29
No. of Funds 5500 3146 1079
No. of Obs 23399 4676 1217
Mean(Scaled Residual) -0.40 -0.68 -1.12
Table 1.7: Regression results with different cutoff thresholds.
early in its life. In comparison, funds with more latent risk would incur large negative
scaled residuals much later due to the rare occurrence. This could produce a negative
coefficient on age (but no effect on Aget). But none of these can explain the joint
signficance of 5 predictors across different subsamples. Thus, we believe our results are
robust and consistent with what our model suggests.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impact of latent risk when asset managers are incentivized
to manipulate performance in order to attract fund inflow. By solving a Bayesian rational
equilibrium, in which investors correctly conjecture managers' manipulation strategy and
manager correctly conjecture investors' evalution rule, we find that both skilled and un-
skilled managers take on excessive latent risk to boost peformance and engage in "noisy
pooling" even if investors rationally update on crash loss. This leads to large welfare
loss to both investors and managers and calls for third-party certification to investors
or strictly enforced investment mandate. Also, wasteful excess risk taking reduces the
marginal benefit of higher alpha, which discourages skilled manager from seeking costly
alpha-generating opportunities and aggravates the slow-moving capital problem. It also
significantly lengthens the time required by investors to discover a manager's ability. Fi-
Table 1.8: "Live" and "Graveyard" Subsamples
Dependent Variable: Scaled Residual
(Live) (Graveyard)
Residual Vol 0.372 0.397
[3.38] [2.92]
Ability Difference -1.32 -1.34
[-5.54] [-3.29]
Age -0.230 -0.518
[-3.09] [-4.70]
Age 2  0.010 0.020
[2.30] [3.39]
log(AUM) 0.024 0.818
[0.41] [2.57]
Controls Yes Yes
Style Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Adj-R 2  0.16 0.21
No. of Funds 1568 1578
No. of Obs 2404 2272
Table 1.8: Regression results for (1.27) with "Live" and "Graveyard" subsamples.
nally, we show that the incentive for asset managers to take excessive latent risk could
be an important factor that leads to the subprime mortgage crisis and provide a comple-
mentary explanation for declining return to scale in fund management industry.
There are several directions to extend our analysis. In our current model, the intensity
of crash is fixed. It would be interesting to see the effect of endogenous choice of crash
intensity as, in reality, managers do have freedom along this dimension. It might be
possible that the skilled managers choose to have zero crash intensity to signal investors of
their type. Also, our model abstract away from risk management. It is plausible to assume
that a skilled manager may be good at both alpha-generation and risk management. In
this case, she might be able to reduce the loss size upon crash. This could lead to higher
latent risk exposure taken by the skilled managers than that taken by the unskilled at
all reputation levels. Also, one would wish to know that if excessive latent risk taking
can be handled with optimal contract design. Finally, asset pricing implications could be
explored in a general equilibrium framework that endogenizes the latent risk premium.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Conditioned on no jump
Et[ dR| Ii = H] = E,[ + 1r H (pt) dt + adBt] = (H r$ dt
Similarly,
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Proof of Proposition 3:
From investors' point of view, conditioned on i = H, E = In - AH) - In x - L. Since
N (0, o-) , this occur with probability exp (e Similarly,
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Proof of Proposition 4:
Write the value function as V (We,
subject to
dWt
wt
Pt, t) = max Et [J'0 e~PS(-ds
= (pi +tr$ + f (Pt)) dt + adBt + [(1 - A$) eL- - 1] dNt
dpt = 8(zt)(a + rp + odBt - p (_+r + (1-- pt) (L))
+(P (pt-,|,e) - Pt---) dNt
Then the HJB equation is
W e -
0 = ma xe- -dt +VOdt + V Et [dWt| +VEt [dfit] + V&dWtdit + 2V4, (dWt) 2
+ PVri (dpi) 2 + AEt (Vi ((1 - A$') eLeW, P (pt-, $|,e) , t) - Vi) dt
Conjecture that the value function is the form V' (Wt, Pit, t) = Ue-P t  (it) and sub-
stitute into the HJB equation above
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-
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which simplifies to
0 = minp- p+.A-(1- 7)
# a (1 - 7) a. + rd - [pt a + rH) + (1 - t 7r Ui +
22
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Collecting terms related to #', we have
= arg min 7r [(1 - Y) Ui + #U ] #i + Ae_) (1 -A#) E [e-)6U' (P)]
Proof of Proposition 5:
Using results from proposition 3, and since # = 0 and P (fit, #, e) = pt (0 or 1) the
minimization over # becomes much easier.
#= arg min 7r [(1 - () U] # + Ae(1y)L+(1) 2 '( - U?
F.O.C gives
0 = ir (1 - -y) - AA (1 - -y) e- -)L±2(1 yo (I - -)
which yields
1-e L+ 
(1.34)
Also, we have
AA (1 - 2) e=y)+- (- = r (1 - 7)
Since / = 0, we have
0 = p- p+ A -(1-y) p -YO yo+ 7r + f (0) U (0)
+Ae (-y)L (1 - AO) ^E [e-(-U (0)]
and
A - (1 - -) p - yo, +2 7r + f (1)) U (1)
+Ae ~lY)L (1 - Ab) 1 B [e--)"U~ (1)]
= p -p +
p - YO, + 7r#|t,+ f (fit) U +
These imply that
UT(0) =
p + A - (1 - 7) (p -y 2 + wr#+ f (0)) - Ae-(l- (1 - A1_) e -
P (1-35)
p + A + (7-1 p+ 7r# + f (0) -7r2 -j( A#)
Similarly,
U( (1) =-) (1.36)p + A + (7-1) (pi + jr + f (1) -y72) - (1 - A#
Numerical Procedures For Solving The Fixed-Point:
We shall solve the fixed-point problem through discretization and iteration, which is
similar to Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Since the state variable pt E [0,1], we shall
discretize state space into equally spaced vector po, p, , Pk, ..., PN] [0, J, 2J, ... , 1 -, 1 ].
Then denote Ui (Pk) as Uk with k = 0, 1, ..., N.
Since the differential equations (1.20) and (1.21) contain integral parts (expectations), we
shall discretize and transform the integral into summation.
1. Change of Measure
Before we can do that, we need to remove the e-(~) that appears inside the expectation
through change of measure. More specifically,
Et [e~(-Y)EUi (P (it-, # ,) E)
1 92
= e 2l e-lY2eUe (P (p3-, #_, e)) de
-o 27Iro-
[00 1 E 2 +-2(l -- y)a2 C+(, -Y)2 , 4 e(1 P (it ))d/F 4 1 ,2+2__,b) 2p
2 E ei-foU (P (-,#,E)) de
2
I ~ o (,_)a + C - ( _Y))2
= 1- 2 el(-a) '?U (P (pt-, # ,e)) de
- elu~ 2 5§ [U' (P (pr-, # , e))] where E ~ N ((7 - 1) o o ) (1.37)
2. Change of Variable
The state price ^t is between 0 and 1. Notice that fixing pit- and #-, P (it-, # , e) maps
e E R into [0, 1]. Thus, temporarily treating Pt- and # as constants, which are already
fixed at the time of jump, we can let q := P (e). The density of q and density of e are
related through the change of variable formula:
(P-1 dPi1 (q)f, (q) = fe ( (q))
where fq and f, denotes the density functions for q and e.
Since P (e) is given by
Pt-
Pt- + (1-pt-) exp in - )In
we have
= P- 1 (q)
Pt- 1)+In -q .2
= In - +-n -*
-Pt- q G-
where = ln 1-A -In (1-A~t-
0+ = In(1-AS.) +In(1-A#
dP' (q) 0 o2  1
dq ~ -q(1-q)
This allows us to fully characterize fq (q).
3. Approximating 5 [Ui (P (Pti-, #- ,]
We let q fall onto the same grid of fit. Then, we can write
5 U (P)] ;Z fq (qk) U
EZ fA(qk)
bearing in mind that fq depends also on Pt- and #>, which
at the moment of jump.
S--+In(1-A# 
-)2 (1.38)
(1.39)
have been treated as constant
4. Discretize the differential-integral equation
Once we are able to express the integral part in a sum, discretizing the differential part
is standard. Here let us take #* (-) to be a given function first. We approximate
U p k SUk+1 - Ui _ 1
Uk+1 - 2Uk + -i1
U4 (pk) * 62
The ODE becomes a system of linear equations: for each k
U-+1 - U_ 1  U K+1 - 2U + U_ 1  E fq (ge;p,i ()) U
-p=K1 gUk + K1 +K2k2+KK-~k  1,k 26 + 2.k 62 'Kik E, fq (qk;pai () -
(1.40)
where
Kok = -p-A +(- ) + i (A)+ f (p) - 2
K' = 3 (Pk) [a (1- Pk) (+-y 2±+<7-Pk)(p)
K = U22
1,k = (Pk) [-aPk +(1 yc1PkA (Pk)]
K2,k =~ - 03(Pk)
K3k = Ae- )(y) (1 - Ao (pk)) 1 -
This allows us to solve for the (N - 1) x (N - 1) linear system and find out Ui, ... , =
U' (0) and UN = U' (1) are known boundary conditions).
5. Policy Iteration For Fixed-Point
In step 4, we take #' (-) as given. The value function computed U' is the value function
of type-i manager in the situation where investors conjecture 0* (.) and manager of type
i follows #' (.) (not necessarily optimal of manager). To find the fixed-point in which
investors conjecture #* (.) and manager of type i follows #' (.), which happens to be optimal
for him, we need to employ policy iteration with slight modification. Standard policy
iteration for dynamic programing should fix investors conjecture 0 (-) first and iterate
manager's policy through calculating U' and computing the optimal policy based on U'
in an alternating manner until convergence. Then use the converged #9 (-) as the next
conjecture by investors. But this is too time-consuming. Here, we follow the steps below:
(0) Start with a conjecture #'0) (-) and set iteration number n = 0
(1) For a given conjecture # n) (-), calculate the value function U(,, if manager follows
01(n(n)#i(n) (-)
(2) Based investors' conjectre #(m) (.) and value function Ufan, find the optimal policy
9(n+1) (Pk) by numerically minimizing
7 [(1 - -Y) Ui (Pk) + #Uj (Pk)j #9 + Ae~( 1 -y)L (1 - Ao) 1 _"5 [Ui (P (Pk, #i, e))]
(3) If # - 4 in+1) is less than some specified error, we can stop. Otherwise, we use
the weighted Jacobi procedure by choosing a w < 1 and setting
#n+1) = W 9n) + (1 - w) P(in+l)
to ensure smooth convergence. With #n+1) calculated, go back to step (1).
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Chapter 2
Price Manipulation In General
Equilibrium
(This is joint work with Jiang Wang)
2.1 Introduction
With the rise of delegated asset management over the past several decades, the presence
of large institutional investors with significant price impact is well-recognized. While
price impact has been largely considered as a curse in the studies of optimal execution
strategies, the associated power to move prices has also captured researchers' attention.
Indeed, quite a number of price manipulation schemes have been proposed featuring a
large trader with no genuine trading needs, who simply tries to extract a postive ex-
pected profit by mimicking an informed trader, exploiting behavioral biases or sabotaging
market-clearing/trading rules' etc. According to Allen and Gale (1992), they are broadly
classified into "action-based", "information- based" and "trade-based". However, in these
manipulation schemes, price-setting power is always coupled with additional market im-
perfections such as elaborate market structure or information asymmetry. One naturally
wonders could price-setting power alone lead to successful manipulation?
To address this question, we study price manipulation in a general equilibrium frame-
work, in which the only market imperfection is the presence of a non-competitive large
trader. Competitive traders are fully rational and there is no information asymmetry
about future payoffs or the identity of the large trader. Market-clearing and trading rules
are also standard: the large trader determines the security prices and clears the market.
Surprisingly, we find that, even in a static framework, there could be price manipulation
that is "malicious" in nature.
A large trader may have genuine trading need that allows for potential Pareto improve-
ment. They manipulate security prices only to seek better transaction prices and take a
greater share of the risk-sharing benefit. This type of manipulation is "benign" as argued
1 For instance, market cornering and short squeeze.
in Kyle and Viswanathan (2008). To distinguish malicious manipulation from benign
ones, we start with an intuitive notion of "no trading motive". There is no trading mo-
tive if a large trader would not trade were she to behave competitively. If the large trader
possesses no trading motive but still wishes to trade (necessarily improving her welfare),
she is considered to be engaging in "pure manipulation". "Pure manipulation" is ma-
licious in the sense that, with no trading motive, there is already no room for greater
allocative efficiency through risk-sharing. While a large trader behaving competitively
cannot improve her welfare through trading, a non-competitive large trader manages to
do so. The only source of the large trader's welfare improvement is her manipulation
power.
We begin our investigation by proving the existence of a "large trader equilibrium" in a
static framework under no further assumptions that are needed to ensure the existence
of a competitive equilibrium. We then find that the possibility of pure manipulation
is equivalent to the failure of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) for the
aggregate security demand of competitive traders at the competitive equilibrium without
the large trader. Such a failure essentially means that, under some other security price,
the competitive traders in aggregate would hold a portfolio worth negative value priced
using the competitive equilibrium prices. If WARP at competitive equilibrium price holds,
there is no pure manipulation whereas, if it fails, a sufficiently risk-tolerant large trader
can conduct pure manipulation. By definition, pure manipulation requires no trading
motive, which implies that the large trader's marginal utility valuation of the security
payoffs (without any trading) is the same as the prices in the competitive equilibrium. If
WARP at competitive equilibrium fails, the large trader can manipulate security prices
to a new one and squeeze out a change in portfolio holdings by the competitive traders
that has negative value and, therefore, leads to an utility improvement for large trader.
A sufficient condition for the failure of WARP at competitive equilibrium prices is that
the local security demand is jointly upward-sloping in some portfolio of securities. Most
interestingly, this also guarantees the possiblity of pure manipulation of arbitrarily small
scale. In reality, even a large institutional investor has capital constraint and, therefore,
limited power to move market prices. Also, under SEC regulation, one has to report
within 10 days any ownership of an equity security greater than 5%. Price manipulation
achieved through large trade would be quickly under the scrutiny of the regulators. Pure
manipulation of arbitrarily small scale circumvents these issues and is, therefore, hard to
eradicate.
Our analysis links price manipulation to a rich literature in general equilibrium theory.
Based on the existing results and some new findings of our own, we identify three im-
portant factors that leads to pure manipulation. Firstly, we need heterogeneity in risk
preferences and endowments of the competitive traders. Secondly, we need large trading
needs in the competitive equilibrium among competitive traders. Finally, we need large
remaining insuring needs even after competitive risk-sharing. These three factors con-
tribute to a positive aggregate wealth effect that dominates the substitution effect, which
always keeps the demand for any portfolio of securities jointly downward-sloping. Under
the broad set of expected-utility preferences, we find that there are abundant cases that
lead to jointly upward-sloping security demand.
With CRRA utilities, "peso problem" that involves a disaster state in aggregate endow-
ments could lead to pure manipulation. Heterogeneous endowment allocations lead to
heterogeneous wealth effect of consumption demand with respect to changes in relative
prices. Heterogeneous risk preferences and large remaining insurance needs ensure that
the aggregate wealth effect is positive. Large trading needs guarantee that substitution
effect of aggregate consumption demand is dominated by the aggregate wealth effect. This
gives rise to a jointly upward-sloping consumption demand and potential pure manipula-
tion opportunities.
Finally, we extend our setup to a multi-period economy. The transformation of a multi-
period problem into a static one is well-known in competitive equilibrium studies. Indeed,
if the large trader is able to commit to a price manipulation plan in the beginning, the
multi-period economy is no different from a static one. However, in general, the large
trader is unable to commit if there is dynamic trading over time, which is a typical problem
faced by a intertemporal monopolist. Rather than choosing manipulation plan freely as
in a multi-period commitment equilibrium, the large trader is constrained by the time-
consistency requirement placed by the multi-period dynamic equilibrium. Thus, "going
dynamic" only reduces the manipulation power as the large trader effectively chooses from
a subset of price manipluation plans. This suggests that we could always use manipulation
in the static framework (equivalent to commit equilibrium in multi-period economy) as a
upper bound for the severity of price manipulation. Moreover, an implication is that while
it is commonly thought that different security structures that complete the markets give
rise to the same equilibrium state prices and allocations, this no longer holds when a large
trader is introduced with no commitment ability in a multi-period economy with dynamic
trading. For instance, a multi-period economy with contingent claims traded only in the
beginning is equivalent to a commitment equilibrium, which yields greater manipulation
power for the large trader than other security structures that involves tradings at different
times2.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 reviews related literature. Section 2 studies the
large trader equilirium in a static economy. Section 2.1 discusses the model setup. Section
2.2 studies the existence and welfare properties of a general large trader equilibrium.
Section 2.3 focuses on pure manipulation and elaborates on conditions that give rise to it
in complete markets. Section 3 extends our analysis to a multi-period economy. Section
3.1 introduces further notations for a multi-period setup. Section 3.2 analyzes the impact
of different security structures with the same asset span. Section 3.3 shows that results
in a static economy carry over to a multi-period large trader commmitment equilibrium
with some minor modifications. Section 4 concludes.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Price manipulation by a non-competitive investor has been studied before. On the "be-
nign" side of price manipulation, Kyle (1985) provides a classic example of how a large
2For e.g. dynamic trading of a long-lived stock and a short-term bond.
trader with genuine informational trading motive splits her trades over time to reduce
price impact. Vayanos (2001) studies how a large trader with risk-sharing motive trades
against competitive traders. With information asymmetry about endowment shocks, his
study also touches on the potential "round-trip" trades that aims at misleading com-
petitive traders. Basak (1997) analyzes the behavior of a large trader sharing risk with
competitive traders in a complete markets general equilibrium framework and focuses on
how the endowment risk of the large trader gets incorporated into the pricing of a risky
asset. These studies involve a large trader with genuine trading motive and, therefore, do
not fall into the class of pure manipulation, which our paper focuses on.
On the more "malicious" side of price manipulation, many mechanisms have been pro-
posed. Allen and Gale (1992) categorizes these into "information-based", "action-based"
and "traded-based". "Informed-based" manipulation requires potential information ad-
vantage and is implemented by misleading investors through false signal (Vila (1989),
Benabou and Laroque (1992), Van Bommel (2003)) or trade-disclosure (Fishman and
Hagerty (1995), John and Narayanan (1997)). "Action-based" encompasses actions that
change the actual or perceived value of the underlying firms. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996)
considers a fake take-over bid. Goldstein and Guebel (2008) studies a case, in which
the large trader, through short-selling, misleads the firm managers to forgo positive NPV
investment opportunities. Among "trade-based" manipulation schemes, a classical ex-
ample is Allen and Gale (1992), which demonstrates how an uninformed large trader,
by mimicking an informed one, could extract a positive expected profit from competi-
tive traders, who cannot tell the identity of the large trader. Allen and Gorton (1992)
finds, with more liquidity-driven trades among sell orders than buy orders, asymmetric
impact on prices leads to manipulation opportunities. Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) shows
that a large trader can exploit the disposition effects among competitive traders to gen-
erate positive manipulation profit. Kumar and Seppi (1992) formulates a manipulation
scheme targeted at liquidity difference between derivatives and spot markets. Jarrow
(1992, 1994) analyzes mechanisms such as non-synchronization across security markets
and market cornering with subsequent short squeezes that engender manipulation op-
portunities. Khwaja and Mian (2005), Aggarwal and Wu (2006), Allen, Litov and Mei
(2008) and Eom, Lee and Park (2009) provide several interesting empirical studies on
price manipulations in financial markets of developed and developing countries. We find
that additional market imperfections such as information asymmetry, behavioral biases or
malfunctioning market-clearing mechansims are not necessary. Pure manipulation could
happen under standard trading and market-clearing procedure with fully rational and
symmetrically informed competitive traders. Instead, a new mechanism involving het-
erogeneity in preferences and endowments, large trading needs and significant remaining
insurance demand is proposed. Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) defines "illegal manipula-
tion" that hinders both informational and allocative efficiency. Pure manipulation is less
restrictive in comparision.
Our paper is related to the studies in the security structures (Hart (1975), Kreps (1982),
Duffie and Huang (1985)). While these studies focus on competitive equilibria, we intro-
duce a large trader with price-setting ability. In particular, we show that security strutures
that allow dynamic trading opportunities over time reduce the manipulation power of a
large trader due to the commitment problem. In addition, our paper is related the general
equilibrium theories. A branch of this literature has studied non-competitive producers,
who engage in Betrand or Cournot competition to maximize profit (see Hart (1985) and
Bonanno (1994) for a survey). We prove the existence of a large trader equilibrium and
analyze the welfare implications under general security structures. With incomplete mar-
kets, each security is a bundle of consumption (possibly negative) at different states and
financial markets differ from goods markets fundamentally. Stahn (1998) and Giraud and
Stahn (2003) study the generic existence of non-competitive equilibria with incomplete
markets. However, their work requires more elaborate set of assumptions whereas ours
require no assumptions beyond those that guarantee the existence of a competitive equi-
librium. Finally, our work touches on the security demand curve (Shleifer (1986)) and
heterogeneous risk-aversion (Wang (1996), Chan and Kogan (2002)). We show that, with
sufficient heterogeneity in risk preferences and endowments, the security demand curve
might not be downward-sloping.
2.2 Static Economy
In this section, we shall investigate into a 2-period pure-exchange economy with a single
consumption good. Trading takes place at time-C and assets pay off at time-1. As will
b discussed in greater details in the next section, results in this section will largely carry
into a multi-period economy when the large trader is able to commit to her strategy at
time-0, which happens to deliver the greatest manipulation power.
2.2.1 Model Setup
There are K + 1 states of nature. wo is the time-0 state and {wi, w2, ---, WK} are K
time-1 states, uncertainty of which will be revealed at time-1. We assume that Wk will
occur with probability Pk = P (Wk). As a result, we must have po = 1 and Zk=1 Pk = 1.
Securities
We assume that there are M proper securities available for trading at time-C indexed
by {1, ..., M}. Security r pays Xkm in state k for k = 0, 1, ..., K. Hence, its payoff
vector is Xm = (0 Ximn X2m, ... XKm)T. For convenience, we shall treat 1 unit of time-C
consumption itself as a security indexed by 0. Its payoff vector Xo = (1 0 ...O)T. By
making such a treatment, prices of securities are no longer in terms of time-C consumption.
They become completely nominal and can be scaled up or down by any positive constant
without affecting the portfolio choices. Putting all the securities together, we have the
augmented asset payoff matrix of dimension (K + 1) x (M + 1):
X+ = (XO X1 X2 .... XM)
3The first entry is 0 for the M securities since they do not pay anything at time-0. It is slightly
unconventional to include time-0 payoff. But it turns out to be more convenient in our analysis.
The nominal time-O prices of securities are determined endogenously (up to a positive
scaling constant) in equilibrium and denoted as S = (So S1... SM)T where Sm is the price
of security m. Given that we treat time-O consumption as a security on its own, SO might
not be 1. However, we can always scale the price vector S so that So = 1 without creating
any changes to the equilibrium quantities. By doing so, we come back to the conventional
setup. Also, note that, at this stage, we do not assume complete market. As a result,
there is no restriction on the number of available proper securities relative to the number
of states in time-1.
Agents' Preferences and Endowments
We assume there are two types of agents in the economy. The first type are N competitive
trader, who are price-taking. The second type is a large trader, denoted as L, who is non-
competitive. For i = 1, 2, ... N, L,trader i has von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
U' over time-O and time-1 consumptions. Given trader i's consumption c' = (c' c ... c)T,
her expected utility is
K
Us(ci =Us (CO +( E u (ck) Pk
k=1
with u' (.) being the Bernoulli utility function. For simplicity, we ignore the intertemporal
discount factor. Trader i is assumed to have endowment e' = (ei ei .. .ei )T. We do not
require e' to lie in the span of asset payoff matrix.
There are three conventional assumptions imposed on the utility function and endowments
of competitive traders i = 1, ..., N to ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium
without the presence of the large trader4 :
(1) u (c) : R+ -+ R is continuous and infinitely differentiable on R++, u' > 0 and
ucc < 0
(2) if c E RKfl, ( c' E RK+1 : Ui (c') > Us (c)} cR
(3) e' E R"K+
Assumption (1) specifies the ususal properties of utility function: agents have to consume
non-negative amount at each state and their preferences are strictly monotonically increas-
ing and concave. Assumption (2) prevents the solution of the agent's maximizing problem
from occurring at the boundary. Assumption (3) asserts that each competitive trader's
endowment at each state is positive. Furthermore, let us assume that uL (c) is smooth
and increasing. Also, UL (eL) > -oo, which suggests that the large trader is able to "sur-
vive" without having to trade with competitive traders. We shall denote the absolute and
relative risk-aversion of trader i as oz (c) = -u e (c) /u' (c) and -'y (c) = -uc (c) c/u' (c)
respectively.
Trading Mechansim and Market Clearance
We assume that large trader has the freedom to set the price of securities but is under
the obligation to fufill aggregate security demand by competitive traders. Specifically,
the trading mechanism at time-0 is as follows: the large trader announces to security
"See Magill and Quinzii (1996) and Debreu (1972).
prices S to competitive traders. Competitive trader i submits her security demand
0' (S) e RA+1 with 0' (S) being her demand for security m. The aggregate security
demand by all competitive traders is 9 (S) = EN 0 (S). The large trader has to take
the opposite position 0 L = -0 (S) to clear the market. Price-setting ability could be
achieved by submitting market order5 . Indeed, "price-setting" and "submitting market
order" can be viewed as the two sides of the same coin if the market demand curve by
competitive traders is monotonically downward/upward-sloping. However, if there are
multiple market-clearing security prices that correspond to a market order by the large
trader, the "submitting market order" approach becomes problematic. For simplicity, we
shall assume that the large trader sets the securities prices and act as the trading counter-
party to fulfill competitive traders' security demand. This is closer to the reality with a
large market-maker quoting prices to small investors and absorbing the aggregate order
flow. With a few exceptions such as small-cap stocks, complete power to set price at wish
is impossible. However, it is not difficult to imagine that certain institutional players with
enormous amount of capital such as prominent investment banks or large pension funds
do enjoy the freedom to locally move the price to their desire. We shall discuss local price
manipulation later on as well.
Equilibriurn
We shall define the set of security prices that will lead to arbitrage opportunities for
competitive traders as
A-= {S E RM+ 1 : 30 E RM+1 s.t. X+O--_ (STO 0 ... 0)T > }
Clearly, the large trader will never pick a security price vector S that belongs to the set
A. By doing so, she will have to fulfill arbitrage positions taken by competitive traders
and incur infinite amount of loss. This leads us to conclude that any redundant security
can be removed from the set of securities since its price would have to be the price of
the replicating portfolio so as to avoid arbitrage. Therefore, we can assume, with loss of
generality, that there is no redundant security among the A1 proper securities:
dim (X1,..., XM)= M
Competitive traders take security price vector S as given. As a result, they solve a utility
maximization problem:
max U (ei + X+0s) s.t. ST i < 0 (2.1)
With endowment ei and security demand 0*, competitive trader i's consumption will
be ci = e + X+02 . But she must satisfy her budget constraint: the nominal value of
her total securities demand (including the time-0 consumption) must be non-positive.
Assuming that such an optimal portfolio 0' (S) exists (the existence shall be discussed in
the next subsection) in response to a given security price S, the total security demand by
competitive traders is 0 (S) = E= 8' (S), which the large trader has to fufill by trading
"See e.g. Basak (1997), Vayanos (2001) etc.
a portfolio 0 L (S) = -0 (S). The resulting consumption by the large trader is
cL = eL + X+OL (S)=eL X+O (S)
Taking the aggregate security demand function 0 (-) as given, the large trader solves
max UL (eL - X+O (S)) (2.2)
SER^1+1\A
The large trader always stays away from the security prices that generate arbitrage.
With competitive traders' aggregate security demand function in mind, she optimizes
over security prices to obtain the aggregate security demand that delivers the highest
utility for herself. Thus, a "large trader equilibrium" is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A "large trader equilibrium" is defined as the equilibrium price S such that
(1) Competitive trader i submits optimal demand 0' $ to maximize utility
(2) The large trader trades ($ = -$1 Oi (S) to fulfill aggregate security demand by
competitive traders.
(3) S maximizes large trader's utility
The existence of the "large trader equilibrium" will be shown in the next subsection.
Besides, we shall introduce two hypothetical equilibrium notions that serve as compar-
isons to the "large trader equilibrium". The first is a competitive equilibrium with N
competitive traders alone in the absence of the large trader, which we shall refer to as
"competitive equilibrium without L". The second is also a competitive equilibrium with
N competitive traders as well as the large trader, who were to behave competitively. We
shall refer to this equilibrium as the "competitive equilibrium with price-taking L".
We shall introduce a few notations. Let c = E ci and e = E 1 e be the aggre-
gate consumption and endowments of competitive traders. The excess consumption
demand by competitive trader i is defined as z' = c' - el, which is the difference between
her consumption and endowment. The aggregate excess consumption demand is defined
as z = EN zi = c - e. Additionally, we shall write the indirect utility V' (0') for trader
i=l, ..., N, L as a function of her security demand O . Hence, V' (0) = Ui (ei + X+Oi).
We shall denote equilibrium quantities in the "large trader equilibrium" as ^ in general0 .
Similarly, equilibrium quantities in the "competitive equilibrium without L" is denoted
as ~. Lastly, for any multivariate differentiable function f (x) : R1 -+ R', we shall denote
its s x r matrix derivative as Of.
6For instance, equilibrium security price vector in the "large trader equilibrium" is denoted as S.
2.2.2 General Manipulation
In this subsection, we shall study on the existence of a "large trader equilibrium" and some
general properties under the "large trader equilibrium". "Pure manipulation", which is
the most interesting special case of "large trader equilibrium", shall be analyzed in the
next subsection.
When large trader chooses the optimal security prices to set, she needs to take into full
consideration of the aggregate security demand 0 from the competitive traders, which
she has to fulfill by taking on the opposite position OL = -0. Thus, the existence of a
well-behaved aggregate security demand 0 (S) as function of security prices S needs to
be explored before we can embark on demonstrating the existence of the "large trader
equilibrium". Fortunately, earlier studies have extensively analyzed the aggregate security
demand. The key results are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given the three assumptions about competitive traders' utility functions,
endowments as well as the assumption about the non-redundancy of traded securities,
the optimal security demand 0' by each competitive trader i exists and is unique if the
security prices S does not present any arbitrage opportunities (i.e. S A). This ensures
that 0' (S) is well-defined on RM+1\A. Furthermore, 0' (S) is smooth on R+1\A.
Proof. See Magill and Quinzii (1996) for a proof. m
The existence of a well-defined and smooth security demand function for each competitive
trader on the set of no-arbitrage prices will lead to a well-defined and smooth aggregate
security demand function for competitive traders 0 (S) (as well as OL (S) = -0 (S)) on
the set of no-arbitrage prices. With a well-behaved aggregate security demand function,
large trader's optimization problem is well-defined. And the existence of "large trader
equilibrium" hinges on the existence of a optimal security price vector that attains the
highest utility for the large trader and is bounded in each coordinate.
Proposition 2 Under previous assumptions, large trader equilibrium exists.
The intuition for its existence is straightforward. Large trader can easily avoid trading
with competitive traders by setting the security prices to be the equilibrium prices in the
"competitive equilibrium without L", which yields zero aggregate security demand. As
we assume that the large trader can survive without having to trade with competitive
traders, this provides a feasible security price vector to set. By manipulating security
prices, the large trader can at most take away all of the endowments of the competitive
traders. This gives an upper bound on the attainable level of utility for the large trader.
As a result, the highest attainable level of utility should exist and can be achieved by
some security price vector. This particular security price vector will be the large trader
equilibrium price, Of course, this price will not incur any arbitrage, which provides "free
lunch" to competitive traders and results in infinite loss for the large trader.
The interesting question is how the large trader equilibrium is different from the com-
petitive equilibrium with price-taking L. In a similar setup, Basak (1997) proves, under
complete markets, that (1) the equilibrium quantities will be different as long as there is
trading between the large trader and the competitive traders (2) whenever the equillib-
rium quantities in the large trader equilibrium is different, the large trader equilibrium is
inefficient. We shall conduct similar analysis under general security strucuture (possibly
incomplete) that will yield (1) and (2) in Basak (1997). Surprisingly, we shall demonstrate
that the presence of the large trader will never be so detrimental to competitive traders
that it yields a Pareto disimprovement from the competitive equilibrium without L.
We shall employ the notion "constrained efficiency"7 when market is incomplete. More
specifically, we have the following definition:
Definition 2 Efficiency (if market is incomplete, then constrained-efficiency): An allo-
cation (c CL) with c' N , c+1 is efficient if
1. ci = e' + X+O for some 0' (Feasibility under the security structure)
2. Zi=1,..,N,L < i=1,...,N,L e' (Feasibility under endowments constraint)
3. There doesn't exist any allocation (, ... , xI xNL) such that U' (x') > U (ci) Vi with
strict inequality for at least one i
It has been well-known that any competitive equilibrium is efficient (or constrained effi-
cient) in a 2-period economy8 . The efficiency of a large trader equilibrium is investigated
in the following propositions.
Proposition 3 If there is trading between large trader and competitive traders (i.e. L #
L0) in the large trader equilibrium, the allocation is not efficient. Otherwise (i.e. 9 = 0),
the allocation is efficient.
The above proposition suggests that the involvement of a large trader always leads to
inefficiency unless her presence is muted by her own choice (i.e. 0 L = 0). The next
natural question is when is a large trader's presence is not muted. Proposition 4 presents
a simple sufficient condition.
Proposition 4 If there is trading between the large trader and competitive traders in
the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L, there is always trading between the large
trader and competitive traders in the large trader equilibrium.
7 See Diamond (1967).
8Competitive equilibrium may not be efficient for a multi-period economy if market is incomplete.
Proposition 3 and 4 allow us to characterize the effficiency implications of the large trader
equilibrium in the Table 2.1. If the large trader trades in the competitive equilibrium with
price-taking L, she will trade in the large trader equilibrium, which results in an inefficient
allocation. If the large trader does not trade in the competitive equilibrium with price-
taking L, she may or may not trade in the large trader equilibrium. If she trades, the
allocation is inefficient; if she does not, the allocation is efficient. (1) in Basak (1997)
can be seen from the fact that the large trader will trade in the large trader equilibrium
if she trades in the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L. Since the allocation
is inefficient when she trades in large trader equilibrium, the equilibrium allocation will
certainly be different from the efficient one if she were to behave competitively. (2) in
Basak (1997) follows directly from the fact that when the large trader trades in the large
trader equilibrium, the allocation is inefficient.
Table 2.1: Efficiency Implications
Competitive Equilibrium with Price-Taking L
Large L Trades No Trade
Trader L Trades Inefficient Inefficient
Equilibrium No Trade Impossible Efficient
While the comparison with the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L serves as an
indication of the detrimental effects of large trader manipulation, a comparison with the
competitve equilibrium without L shows that the large trader's presence will not be so
detrimental that the equilibrium allocation is a Pareto disimprovement for competitive
traders, which somewhat bounds the severity of the manipulation problem. This is stated
in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Not all competitive traders will have lower welfare in the large trader
equilibrium than in the competitive equilibrium without L.
To conclude this section, we state a trivial observations in the following corollary without
proof.
Corollary 1 Whenever there is trade by the large trader in the large trader equilibrium,
at least one of the competitive traders has lower welfare and the large trader has higher
welfare relative to the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L.
2.2.3 Pure Manipulation
As shown in Table 2.1, it is possible that the large trader (behaving competitively) trades
in the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L. In this case, the underlying reason
for her trade is genuine risk-sharing with the competitive traders. As Proposition 4
suggests, when she behaves non-competitively, she will still trade although the equilibrium
allocation under her manipulation will be different. By behaving non-competitively, she
engages in price manipulation. However, this form of manipulation is "benign" in the
sense that it is undertaken to share risk and the presence of the large trader might benefit
all competitive trader relatively to the competitive equilibrium without L. Manipulation
simply serves to obtain better transaction prices and procure a greater share of the overall
economic benefit generated. Such manipulation is similar to the form of large trader
manipulation studied in Kyle (1985) or Vayanos (2001) with genuine informational or
risk-sharing trading motives behind.
However, there exists the possibility that if the large trader were to behave competi-
tively, she would not trade with the competitive traders. In this case, the prices in the
competitive equilibrium with price-taking L would be the same as in the competitive
equilibrium without L. By behaving non-competitively, the large trader may be able to
move the prices away from those in the competitive equilibrium in order to induce trading
for her own welfare improvement. We shall refer to this type of manipulation as "pure
manipulation", which is not motivated by genuine risk-sharing trading motive.
First of all, we shall define what we mean by "no trading motive" formally.
Definition 3 Suppose that the prices in a competitive equilibrium without L is S. If the
large trader"s endowment is such that DUL (L) X+ = AST for some A > 0, the large
trader has no trading motive with respect to the competitive equilibrium without L.
Otherwise, there is trading motive.
If the large trader were to behave competitively, aUL (eL) X+ = AST would guarantee that
large trader will submit zero security demand under the prevailing equilibrium prices 5.
The equilibrium prices in the competitive equilibrium without L, S, would prevail because
the security structure does not allow further risk-sharing between the large trader and
competitive traders. If market is complete, the definition of "no trading motive" implies
that aUL (e) = ABU' (c-), which means that the marginal utilities of all traders including
the large one are completely aligned and proportional to each other. If aUL L) X+ #
AST, the marginal utility valuation of the securities by the large trader is not the same
as the competitive traders. This allows Pareto improvement through risk-sharing under
the existing security structure, which is a genuine trading motive. With genuine trading
motive, the large trader can always improve her utility through local manipulation, which
we shall define below.
Definition 4 There exists local manipulation with respect to S if, for arbitrarily small
e > 0, there exists a price vector S E RM+1 such that S - | < E and the large trader
improves her utility by setting security price vector to S.
In reality, even a large institutional investor has capital constraint and, therefore, limited
power to move market prices. Also, under SEC regulation, one has to report within
10 days any ownership of an equity security greater than 5%. Price manipulation of
large scale would be quickly under the scrutiny of the regulators. Local manipulation
allows arbitrarily small scale. It circumvents these issues and is, therefore, more relevant
practically and harder to detect.
Proposition 6 If the large trader has trading motive with respect to 9 (i.e. DUL (eL) X+ #
AST), there is local manipulation.
The proposition above justifies our definition of "trading motive". With that, we can
define pure manipulation as follows.
Definition 5 If the large trader has no trading motive with respect to S but can manip-
ulate the price to improve her utility, there is pure manipulation.
If there are multiple competitive equilibria (with different equilibrium prices) without L,
then there would always be pure manipulation. Suppose there are two equilibrium prices
S and S' with S # S'. Since the large trader can only have no trading motive with respect
to at most one competitive equilibrium, say S, she always has trading motive with respect
to 5'. Thus, if the prevailing equilibrium security price vector is 5, setting price to 5'
will always improve her utility. But the existence of multiple competitive equilibria does
not guarantee the possibility of local pure manipulation because, generically, equilibrium
prices are finite.
It is important to note that pure manipulation can never lead to a Pareto improvement
for the competitive traders relative to the competitve equilibrium without L. The reason
is clear: if the large trader were to behave competitively, then she would not trade, which
would leave the equilibrium comsumptions of competitive traders unchanged. This is
the competitive equilirium with price-taking L. Since the competitive equilibrium with
price-taking L is efficient, we cannot find a Pareto improvement. Pure manipulation
involves trading between the large trader and competitive traders, which suggests that
it is different from the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L. Therefore, this is
certainly not a Pareto improvement for the competitive traders. Since the large trader
gains from pure manipulation, some competitive trader must have lower utility under pure
manipulation than in the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L, which implies that
the same competitive trader has lower utility than in the competitive equilibrium without
L. This contrasts with the case with trading motive, which allows for the possibility of
Pareto improvement for all competitive traders relative to the competitive equilibrium
without L.
This observation leads us to conclude that pure manipulation is a form of "malicious"
manipulation. In this sense, it is similar to the action-based, information-based or trade-
based manipulation schemes studied in previous literatures, which also tend to extract
benefit through trading with no genuine trading motive. However, it is important to note
that pure manipulation does not require positive expected return, which is the objective
of previous manipulation schemes. It is much milder in that it only requires the possiblity
to improve the utility of the large trader. With pure manipulation defined, we shall study
under what conditions it is possible for the large trader to conduct it. It turns out that the
possibility of pure manipulation is equivalent to the failure of the weak axiom of revealed
preference (WARP) of the aggregate security demand at the competitive equilibrium
without L. WARP is an important property of aggregate demand, which has been well-
studied in the field of general equilibrium theory.
Definition 6 Aggregate security demand function 0 (S) of the competitive traders is said
to satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference if, for any pair of security price vectors
S and S' such that 0 (S) k 0 (S'),
STO (S') 0 implies S'T 0 (S) > 0
The underlying motivation is best understood at the level of individual trader. ST0' (S') <
0 suggests that 0' (S') is a feasible portfolio choice when the security price vector is S.
However, since the optimal security demand submitted by trader i is 0' (S) / 04 (S'), this
implies that portfolio 0' (S) is more desirable than 9' (S'). When security price vector is
S', the fact that trader i chooses 0' (S') rather than 9' (S) implies that 0' (S) must not be
feasible under the new security price vector S' (i.e. S'T9 (S) > 0). WARP holds for every
rational individual with consistent portfolio choice decisions and it certainly holds true in
our case. However, it does not necessarily hold at the aggregate level since heterogeneity
in preferences and endowments prevent the the aggregate security demand from behaving
as if it were rational decisions by a single individual.
Proposition 7 If Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) for aggregate security
demand 9 (S) of competitive traders holds at the security price vector, S, of competitive
equilibrium without L, pure manipulation is not possible. Conversely, if it fails at S with
strict inequality (i.e. there exists a price vector S such that ST 0 (S) < 0), there exists
a sufficiently risk-tolerant' large trader, who can conduct price manipulation to improve
her utility.
9By "sufficiently risk-tolerant ", we mean ||8 2 UL|| (taken under the matrix norm) is sufficiently small
uniformly.
Proposition 7 links pure manipulation to the aggregate property of the security demand.
By definition, pure manipulation requires no trading motive, which implies the marginal
utility valuation ny the large trader (without any trading) of the security payoffs is the
same as (up to a positive scaling constant) the competitive equilibrium security price
vector S. If WARP fails at S, it essentially means that the large trader can find another
price S such that the aggregate change in portfolio holdings by competitive traders is
worth a negative value priced under S. The aggregate holdings by the large trader, which
is the opposite to the aggregate change competitive traders' security demand by market-
clearing, has a positive value under S. Since S is the same as marginal utility valuation
by the large trader, the trade induced by moving security prices from S to S will improve
her utility as long as her marginal utility does not change too much when the associated
consumption change takes place. This will be true for a sufficiently risk-tolerant large
trader.
Note that we do not need WARP to hold everywhere to avoid pure manipulation. Rather,
we only need it to hold at S, the security prices of the the competitive equilibrium without
L. Also, if WARP fails at S, the large trader can set a price to improve her utility provided
she is sufficiently risk-tolerant. Proposition 7 allows us to connect our analysis to a rich
body of literature in general equilibrium theory, which we shall discuss in more details
later under complete markets. However, the failure of WARP at S does not guarantee
local pure manipulation opportunities. We shall specify a suffcient condition for local
manipulation to exist in the proposition below.
Proposition 8 If DO (5) is NOT negative semi-definite, WARP at S fails locally with
strict inequality, by which we mean
Ve > 0, 3S E RM+1 such that ||S - $|1 < e and gT (S) < 0
This allows a sufficiently risk-tolerant large trader to conduct local pure manipulation of
arbitrarily small scale.
Since DO (5) 5 = -0 (5) = 010, (o (5) is never negative definite. But it could be negative
semi-definite. Proposition 8 suggests when it is not negative semi-definite, the large
trader can set a price arbitrarily close to S and improve her utility through local pure
manipulation. The interpretation of non-negative semi-definite DO (5) is straightforward:
non-negative semi-definiteness implies that there exists a direction of price change A E
RA1+1 such that ATBo (5) A > 0. DO (5) A is the first order effect of aggregate security
demand change in response to the price change. Define a portfolio of securities T =
DO (9) A. The change in portfolio value caused by security prices change is AT T > 0.
Hence, after we change the security prices so that the portfolio T's price is higher, the
aggregate demand for this portfolio is also higher. This indicates a locally upward-sloping
demand for portfolio I. A simple illustration is given by the following corollary for a
single-security portfolio .
"See Mas-Collel (1985) for a simple proof.
Corollary 2 If
80m($)
max >0
mE{O,1,...,M} OSm
there can be local pure manipulation.
Proof. If a diagonal entry is positive, the matrix is not negative semi-definite. *
This is equivalent to the demand curve of a particular security m being locally upward-
sloping at S. However, it is worth emphasizing that we do not need upward-sloping
demand for any single security. Rather, the demand can be downward-sloping for every
single security but still upward-sloping for a certain portfolio. The corollary below gives
a two-securities portfolio case.
Corollary 3 If
m 48O0ml (5e) 60m (5s) j0mi 5) 82() 2min 4 +oM ')0720m on < 0
mi,m2E{0,1,.M} 9Smi 8Sm2 (9Sm2 + SmI
there can be local pure manipulation.
Proof. (0 + &0T is symmetric. And for a symmetric matrix to be negative semi-definite,
any submatrix (with the omitted row and column indices being the same) must be negative
semi-definite. If the condition in this corollary holds, there exists a 2 x 2 submatrix
2__'"_ am' + a8m2
as" 8Sm 2  aSt 19m bma 2m 0 I
. rSm2  as 1 aSmr2I
with eigenvalues of opposite signs. So it is not negative semi-definite, whicih implies
DO (5) is not negative semi-definite. m
A. Pure Manipulation In Complete Markets
Here we shall investigate pure manipulation in complete markets. By restricting ourselves
to complete markets, the analysis becomes more tractable. Furthermore, in complete mar-
kets, consumption in each state of nature can be treated as a separate good. This allows
us to make use of many results developed in the field of general equilibrium theory, which
shed light on the potential reasons that give rise to the failure of WARP at competitive
equilibrium without L.
It is well-known that, with complete markets, the exact security structure no longer mat-
ters for competitive equilibrium since all security structures can be reduced to contingent
claims. We shall demonstrate that this is still true for the large trader equilibrium in
the static economy. However, we shall show later that this is no longer the case for a
multi-period dynamic economy.
Proposition 9 Given two different security structure X+ and X+' that are of rank
K + 1 (i.e. complete markets), the large trader equilibrium (equilibria if non-unique) con-
sumption allocations are the same.
The underlying reason is straightforward. With complete markets, any non-arbitrage se-
curity price S (E RM+1\,A will imply a particular state price vector # E RI K1 together with
security structure X+. Effectively, competitive traders' aggregate excess consumption is
determined by the state price vector #. Hence, the large trader maximizes her utility by
picking the best state price vector #, which can then be implemented by a corresponding
security price vector $ = T X +. Thus, security structure does not matter and we can,
without loss of generality, assume that the traded securities are contingent claims and the
large trader manipulates state price vector # directly. As a result, the security demand
and excess consumption are the same: O' (4) = z' (q). The transformation of the problem
establishes a connection to some well-known results that guarantee WARP at #, the state
prices in the competitive equilibrium without L.
Proposition 10 WARP holds at $, the price in the competitive equilibrium without L, if
1. There exists a representative consumer", which can be satisfied if
" Agents are homogeneous in preferences and endowments
e All competitive agents have preferences of the HA RA form
ui (c) - (c - with the same -y and possibly different ai 's
or
u, (c) = - exp (-aic) with possibly different a's
2. Aggregate excess consumption z (qp) exhibits monotonicity condition:
[z (4) - z (#')]T (# - #') < 0 with strict inequality if z (#) / z (#')
which can be satisfied if maxrCR K+I 'y'(c) - minCER K1 i' (c) < 4 Vi and endowments
are collinear2 .
3. Aggregate excess demand z exhibits gross substitution:
If #1 > 4' and #k = #' Vk # 1, Zk (#) > zk (')V k # 1
which can be satisfied if -yi (c) < 1Vc E R KC 1
" Representative consumer's consumption choices coincide with the actual aggregate consumption
choices at all prices.
12By "collinear", we mean the endowments of any two competitive traders i and j are proportional:
c' = ke-? for some constant scalar k > 0.
4. There is no trading among competitive traders in the competitive equilibrium without
L.
5. Complete insurance is reached without the large trader (regardless of preferences
4 endowment heterogeneity):
For all competitive traders, c' = c- for any two states k and I
A necessary and sufficient condition for complete insurance is there is no aggregate
risk: ek = el for any two states k and 1.
Proposition 10 lists several sufficient conditions for WARP to hold at #, which prevents
pure manipulation. The breach of these conditions are necessary for pure manipulation
opportunities to arise. Proposition 10.1 suggests that if competitive traders are sufficiently
similar in terms of preferences and/or endowments so that there exists a representative
consumer that rationalizes the aggregate consumption choices, there cannot be pure ma-
nipulation. Note that the requirement for a representative consumer to exist is much
stronger than the requirement for a representative agent, which can be constructed for
any competitive equilibrium. The key difference is that the representative agent's con-
sumption choices coincide with the actual aggregate consumption choices (arising from
summation of individual consumption choices) only at the equilibrium prices whereas the
representative consumer's consumption choices coincide with the actual aggregate one at
all prices. Proposition 10.1 indicates that we will not have pure manipulation with CRRA
(Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function of the same relative risk-aversion or
CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions.
Proposition 10.2 suggests we will not have pure manipulation if competitive traders' rel-
ative risk aversion does not vary too much and, more importantly, their endowments are
proportional. The typical asset-pricing setup in finance literature with CRRA agents'
and endowments as shares of a dividend stream falls into this category. Under CRRA
utilities, 7Y (c) is a constant. Thus, maxce+, (c -min, K1 i' (c) = 0 < 4 is automat-
ically satisfied. If agents' endowments are shares of a dividend stream, their endowments
are collinear. These two pieces together prevent pure manipulation. The monotonicity
condition essentially requires the uncompensated demand curve to be downward-sloping.
Proposition 10.3 introduces another condition that guarantees no pure manipulation.
Gross substitution requires that a rise in one state price #1 (holding state prices at the other
states fixed) will lead to higher demand for consumption at other states. By homogeneity,
we can actually show that gross substitution also implies that such a price change will lead
to a drop in consumption in state 1: z (#) < z, (#') 13. In some sense, this is another version
of downward-sloping demand (with substitution among consumptions at different states
in addition). It guarantees WARP at # rather than globally. The sufficient condition for
'
3 See Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) for a proof.
gross substitution, -yi (c) < 1, restricts competitive traders' relative risk aversion to be
between 0 and 1, which again points towards sufficiently similar risk preferences.
Proposition 10.4 specifies that if the original endowments of the competitive traders are
Pareto-optimal, WARP holds at 4 and there is no pure manipulation. This is intuitive:
since a competitive trader can always consume her endowment at any given prices, the
large trader cannot lower any competitive trader's utility through price manipulation.
But, as we have shown in Corollary 1, whenever the larger trader trades, at least one of
the competitive agent will have lower utility. So the large trader will not trade and there
will not be any price manipulation.
The intuition for Proposition 10.5 is illustrated by Fig 2.1 below with two competitive
traders (i and j) and two states of nature. With any budget line under manipulated prices,
competitive agent i could trade to (', a riskless consumption plan. Since the gradient
of indifference curves under expected utility are all the same at riskless consumption
plans (45 degree line) regardless of utility functions or consumption levels, the gradient
of indifference curve of agent i will be the same as the gradient of indifference curve at L9
(also on 45 degree line), which has the same gradient as the budget line in the competitive
equilibrium without L. Because the budget line under manipulated prices has a different
gradient, it is not tangent to the indifference curve going through (. This implies that (
is not a optimal choice. So both of them will trade to a more favorable consumption plan
than ( , which requires higher wealth evaluated under e. But e = Z '. So if large
trader manipulates e so that the budget line changes, competitive traders' aggregate
consumptions will be worth more than their endowments evaluated at q. Therefore,
WARP holds at # and there is no pure manipulation.
Figure 2-1: Complete Insurance
State 2
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in Aggregate
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Proposition 10.1-3 all hinge on the requirement of similar competitive trader (either in
preferences or in endowments) for WARP to hold at #. Proposition 10.4-5 offer a different
angle: trading needs and remaining insurance demand. Proposition 10.4 suggests that
pure manipulation has to require trading among competitive traders without the presence
of the large trader. The security markets have to be vital for competitive traders. Propo-
sition 10.5 puts forth the role of incomplete insurance in the origin of pure manipulation.
If there is no aggregate risk, which allows riskless consumption plans to be attained by
competitive traders without the large trader, pure manipulation is impossible. Remaining
demand for insurance across states in the competitive equilibrium is necessary. Putting
together, we see that heterogeneity among competitive traders, trading needs as well as
remaining insurance demand in the competitive equilibrium without L are necessary con-
ditions for pure manipulation to exist. Their presence allows the large trader to disrupt
the allocative role of the security markets through price manipulation and gain benefit
without genuine trading motive.
Proposition 8 specifies a sufficient condition under general security structure for local pure
manipulation to exist. Under complete markets, this condition is equivalent to Oz (R)being not negative semi-definite. Complete markets allow us to re-write a competitive
trader i's optimization problem as
max U (ci) s.t. #T ci < Wm (2.3)
C?
where w = #Tei is the wealth of trader i.Thus, c(#) = (, #Tei) where (, w) is
trader i's consumption under state prices # with wealth w' = $Te'. Thus,
?zi = 09(i ($, $Tei) + 8.(i (#, #Tei) eiT
= 4(i (#, #Tei) + 8w(i (#, #Tei) ci T  -8,(i (#, #Tei) Z (2.4)
Substitution Effect Wealth Effect
Substitution matrix measures the effect on excess consumption with respect to price
changes when wealth is compensated to make the consumption plan before price change
still on the budget line. It is well-known from demand theory that the substitution matrix
is always negative semi-definite". As 8z = EN zi, it is clear from this analysis that
what prevents 9z from being negative semi-definite is the second part of (2.4) in aggregate
E -8 (l (#, #Tei) ziT, which is a measure of wealth effect induced by price changes. If
there is no trading needs, z' (3) = 0 and the wealth effect is completely muted. If
complete insurance is reached across states, it can be easily shown that 8 i (, ,Tei) -
(1 Pi ...PK)T for all i. Since, in equilibrium, z (E) = E z' (e) = 0, the wealth effect is
fully cancelled out among competitive traders. The conditions in Proposition 10.1-3 is
about homogeneity among competitive traders, which again leads to 82(i (4, #Tei) to be
close to each other and cancellation of wealth effect among competitive traders to a large
extent. We shall further explore the above decomposition later for competitive traders
with CRRA utilities in greater details.
Local pure manipulation of arbitrarily small scale is possible when az ( ) is not negative
14 See MasCollel, Whinston and Green (1995).
semi-definite. Complete markets allow us to find explicit expression for the derivative of
the excess consumption with respect to state price vector. Since Bz (#) = ENJ 0zi ($),
we shall find the derivative of excess consumption of each individual competitive trader
first.
Proposition 11 For competitive trader i, the derivative of her state-k consumption with
respect to state-j price is:
a01 Z j ,
4 = if j # k (2.5)
at (c i)
1
0z iZai c z
-- )= ) 
- if j = k
a#k K 4 0 ck
ai (ck ) l ei(i
= - ) (2.6)
ai (c) f 46,
Note Proposition 11 holds at all state price vectors 0 E R++ We do no need the
equilibrium market-clearing condition E z = 0 to reach it. Also, interestingly, (2.5)
and (2.6) do not involve probability directly. Hence, heterogeneous beliefs do not have any
effect on az once consumption and state prices are fixed. It is easy to see that there is little
restriction on the derivative of individual competitive trader's excess consumption since
a' (c) = -uc (c) /u' (c) can be chosen arbitrarily. The first order condition of individual
optimization imposes that
BUi (ci) = (1? (c) u' (ci) ...u' (c')) = A7rT
where 7r is the vector of state price density. This only places restriction on the value of
the first derivative of ui at her chosen consumptions. However, other than being negative,
there is no restriction on the second derivative of ui at any given level of consumption.
This gives us tremendous freedom to define the absolute risk aversion function a (c). It
can be any smooth function that takes positive values. Therefore, local pure manipulation
arise easily. We shall study local pure manipulation with the following two examples: one
with general preferences and one with more specific CRRA utilities. The former allows us
to see the abundance of local pure manipulation opportunities with the freedom to arbi-
trarily define absolute risk aversion function for competitive traders. Of course, one would
question the existence of local pure manipulation opportunities with more restrictive set
of utility function and the exact behavior of the aggregate excess consumption of com-
petitive traders. These shall be addressed by the second example using CRRA utilities.
The tractability of CRRA utilities also helps us gain insights into causes of non-negative
semi-definite Oz ( ) that leads to pure manipulation.
General Preferences
We know from Corollary 2 that local pure maniplation exists as long as a diagonal entry
of &z is positive, which corresponds to a upward-sloping demand for a single security. We
shall consider a simple case with 2 competitive traders(i = 1, 2) and show that demand
could be be locally upward-sloping. The derivative of the aggregate excess consumption
for diagonal entries evaluated at 3 is
00j ~i=1,2 j
z ' + j2 (E ( +
(2.7)
ai ~1 EK a 2 (E2 ) (>:K
The denominator is always positive. Thus, it is the numerator that determines the sign
of . In particular, for a'j > 0, we want the numerator to be less than 0. The scaling
property of z suggests that, without loss of generality, we can let the equilibrium price
$j = 1. Also, note that j + = 0. Upon simplifying, the numerator becomes
+ ( ( 1) - ( (22)
where pj (ci) = (( ... ) is the vector of ratios of risk aversion at state-j to
risk aversion at state-k for k = 0, 1, ..., K. Since p) (E1) -- 1 = E (ZOO' > 0, the
first two terms are positive. The third term could be negative, which requires fz f and
p3 (E2) - p (il 2 to be large. In addition, zj3 and (p; (52 i)) - 5 need to have
opposite signs. In the two competitive traders case, I -zl = z is the trade amount.
This echos our previous analysis that large trading needs are needed for upward-sloping
demand. Large |pj (E2) 1 ( 1l2 requires sufficiently different risk attitudes for trader
1 and trader 2 as well as sufficiently different consumption levels across the states for
each of them". These again reflect the need for preference heterogeneity and remaining
insurance demand across states.
For a simple numerical illustration, assume that there is no actual consumption at time-0
1 In the extreme case that the levels of consumption are the same across the states, p (E') = (1 1 ... 1)T,
which leads to perfect cancellation.
and there are two states at time-1(k = 1, 2) with equal probabilities pi = P2 = . We can
let j = 1 and further reduce (2.8) to
- [PI (e12 2 + 1 [p (E2)12 02 + 1 1-1\IE1
~2(Z2) a IPI ('0 J +ikL1I) 2 -[iC2)J
where [pi (c-)]2 is the second coordinate of the vector of ratios of risk aversion. We start
with endowments el = (2 3)T and e2 = (6 1)T. The two competitive traders' marginal
utilities u' (-) are smooth functions as plotted in Fig 2.2.
Figure 2-2: Numerical Illustration With General Utility Functions
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We can infer from Fig 2.2 that trader 1 and 2 have the same marginal utilities at con-
sumption levels 2 and 4: uc (2) = U2 (2) = 5, ul (4) = u2 (4) = 10. To exploit the fact that
we can set the second derivative arbitrarily without violating any fundamental axiom of
expected utility hypothesis, we let ul (2) = -50, u e (2) = -25, u (4) = u2 (4) = -100.
This gives rise to an equilibrium with consumption allocation and price vector
Ze = E2 = 4, ' = E22 = 2, 7 (1 2 )T
So in equilibrium, trader 1 sells 1 unit of consumption in state-2 in exchange for 2 unit
of consumption in state-1: -1 = 2 and -2 = -l = -1. One can verify that
aI (51) = a1 (71) = 10,*a2 ( 2) 5a 2 ) 10
and the expression in (2.9) is negative. We have9 > 0. This implies Oz is not negative
semi-definite and there exists pure manipulation opportunities. In addition, we can also
compute
9zl (9 ) 13 1z (3) 9
a4 15' 841 10
So agent 2 causes the upward-sloping demand. This shows, with general preferences, local
pure manipulation could easily arise.
CRRA Utilities
In this example, we shall consider competitive traders with CRRA utilities: u' (c) =
T_7 where -y is trader i's relative risk aversion. Recall that c' (#) = (Q(, #Tei) where
(, w) is the optimal consumption under state price vector # and wealth level w'.
For an endowments economy, wi = #Tei. It is well-known that CRRA utilities exhibits
homotheticity16 , which implies linear scaling in wealth:
(' (#, w') = w'h (#) (2.9)
where h' (#) = (' (#,1) is trader i's unit wealth consumption demand. With wealth w',
trader i will simply scale up her optimal consumption under unit wealth by a factor of w'.
CRRA utilities allow us to characterize h' (#) easily and decompose (9z' into substitution
and wealth effects as in (2.4).
Proposition 12 With CRRA utility function of the form u' (c) = the unit wealth
consumption demand of trader i is
h 7r() =- - (2.10)
where 7r = ... P1 is the state-price density vector17 . Moreover,
azi = wsi (#) - h' (#) zi ($) T  (2.11)
Substitution Wealth Effect
where wi = #Tei is trader i's wealth under # and s' (#) is her Slutsky's substitution matrix
with unit wealth
hM (#) /#0 ... ... 0
0 h' 0
si ( ) = , .. .. -h' (#) h' (#)T
0 .. .. i(#) /#K
From the proposition above, we see the unit wealth consumption demand h is propor-
tional to 7 and, as a result, the actual consumption c = W , which is the unit
wealth consumption scaled by trader i's wealth. Therefore, the larger the variation of the
state-price density across states, the higher the variation of consumption across states.
16 A utility function is homothetic if U (Ac)= AkU (c) for some k > 0.
" We denote ir~,' as the coordinate-wise exponential 7ro 7 , i r .
Moreover, trader with higher risk-aversion coefficient T' has consumption demand less
sensitive to the variation of state-price density. This is because she is very unwilling to
suffer low consumption in any state and aggressively smoothes consumptions across states
We also have a tractable decomposition of the derivative of excess consumption demand
9z'. The first component in (2.11) is the Slutsky's matrix captures the substitution effects.
It measures the change in her consumption demand with respect to change in state prices
if her wealth were compensated in a manner that would make her consumption demand
before the price change just feasible. It is well-known from classical demand theory that
the substitution effect is always negative semi-definite. With CRRA utility function, this
component is simply the substitution effect under under unit wealth s (#) scaled by the
wealth level w. The higher the wealth level, the more pronounced the substitution effect,
which leads to more negative semi-definite (z'. To generate non-negative semi-definite
Bzi, we can only rely on the second component -hziT, which is due to wealth change
caused by the price change. Its interpretation is intuitive: the j's column is -zjh', which
measures the change in consumption across states due to a unit increase in state-j price
#3. Again, the scaling property of CRRA utility implies that 89( (#, wi) =h (0): a
unit change in wealth (keeping price fixed) will always cause the consumption to move
by the unit wealth consumption h' (4). To undo the compensation in wealth included in
the first component and take into consideration of change in market value of endowment
when state price #j increases by 1 unit marginally, a reduction in wealth by c - =
is needed. Therefore, the combined effect of a marginal increase in #j on consumption
demand is -zh.
To fix ideas, let us assume there are two traders i = 1, 2 with -y1 > 7y2 18 and two states
k = 1, 2 at time-1. This is illustrated by Fig 2.3. Equilibrium state prices # determines the
gradient of the unit wealth budget line. Suppose that #1 < #2 and Tri < 7r2 , which could
possibly be caused by low aggregate endowment in state-2. These are reflected by the flat
budget line and the fact that hl and h2 are all tilted towards state-1 consumption axis.
As discussed above, h2 will respond to variation in state-price density 7r more sensitively
since trader 2 has lower risk aversion. Therefore, as shown in Fig 2.3, h2 tilts towards
more towards state-1 consumption axis than h'. In equilibrium, z' () +z 2 (3) = 0, which
implies
8: (e) = 6z_ ( ) + (z2 (3)
w si ( ) + w2S2 (5) - h' (p) z' (a)T - h2 ( ) z2T ()T
[wIs1 (0) + v2s2 (5)] - [h' ( ) - h2 Z()} z (4)T (2.12)
To have pure manipulation, we need Dk ( ) to be non-negative semi-definite. This means
that vTzi v > 0 for some unit vector v E R2. We have already known that the substitution
"
8 As shown in Proposition 10.1, if yi =, 2 , a representative consumer exists and WARP holds at p.
To have local pure manipulation, we have to have different -yi' 1 -y.2 Wio.g, let us assume yl > 2.
effect is always negative: VT {w1 s1 + w2s2] v < 0. The aggregate wealth effect is
vT (h1 - h 1) ZIT] V - [T (h1 - h2)] (VTZi)
-- jh - h2 12 l|zI|2 CsO9VZ COs 'Ovh
where 79v2 and '0 vh are angles between v and z2 as well between v and h1 - h2 . To have large
overall positive wealth, we need large ||hI - h2112 and 11z112. Furthermore, we need z' and
hi -h 2 to be in opposite direction so that - cos7,2 cos 0 vh > 019. To have large ||h 1 - h2 ||2
we need (1) the relative risk aversions -y' and y 2 to be sufficiently different so that hl and
h are sufficiently different despite the same rankings of consumption levels across states
and (2) variation in state price density 7r is large so that difference in risk aversions
matters20 . Moreover, we need (3) the trade amount |Iz 1 |2 to be large. Additional, we
must ensure that the direction of trade along the budget line by trader 1 is opposite to the
difference in unit wealth consumption demands h1 - h2 . Since competitive equilibrium
with traders having CRRA utilitiy functions allow linear scaling, we can fix the scale of
trade a" = -z 2. To have minimal effect of the substitution effect [w1s1 ( ) + W2 ws 2 (a)]I
which prevents Oz from becoming non-negative semi-definite, we would want to give
traders as little wealth wi as possible under a fixed equilibrium price 4. As we shrink wi,
consumption ct = wt h' will scale back along h' as illustrated in Fig 2.3. With z' fixed, we
are constrained by the requirement ei = ci - zi E RKf. Thus, the substitution effect is
minimized when either e' or e2 has a coordinate that is about to hit zero. As shown by Fig
2.3, this leads to very different endowments with e' rich in state-2 consumption but poor
in state-1 consumption and e 2 diametrically opposite. Thus, we need (4) heterogeneous
endowments among traders. In summary, (1)-(4) corresponds the conditions we analyzed
earlier on: heterogeneity among traders (both preferences -y's and endowments e'), large
trading needs (large |z1|112) and large remaining insurance demand (7r with high variations
across states). These give rise to non-negative semi-definite &z ( ), which allows local pure
manipulation.
The above intuition generalizes to more realistic cases with more than two states of na-
ture. We shall demonstrate using a concrete case with time-0 consumption (state-0) and 3
states at time-1 (state-1, state-2, state-3). In order to have a volatile state price density 7r,
we let the probability vector be p = (1 0.001 0.499 0. 5 )T. Furthermore, let the equilibrium
state prices be # = (1 40 0.52 0. 4 8)T. Trader 1 is more risk-averse with -y = 6. She has
endowment el = (0.0001 0.0404 0.0001 0. 00 01)T. Trader 2 is less risk-averse with Y2 = 3.
She has endowment el = (0.4981 0.0001 0.4926 0. 5 037 )T. In terms of aggregate endow-
ment, state-1 is a "disaster" state, which happens with a rare probability 0.1%. State-2
is a "bad" state with aggregate endowment falling by 1.1% relative to state-0 aggregate
endowment and state-3 is a "good" state with aggregate endowment growing by 1.1%.
State-2 and state-3 happen with about equal chances. The state-price density at state-1 is
very high due to its "disaster" nature. Trader 1 has almost 100% share of state-1 aggre-
gate endowment but is poor in other states. Trader 2 is exactly in the opposite situation.
'In a 2-states case, z t and h' - h2 are always proportional.
21If 7r c (1...1)T, then y' $ y2 cannot lead to different hi's.
Figure 2-3: CRRA Utilities
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She has almost 100% share of aggregate endowment in all other states except state-1,
in which she has little endowment. In the competitive equilibrium without L, they will
trade to share risk. The equilibrium price is # as stated above and the consumption al-
location is c = (0.1827 0.0312 0.1814 0. 1839 )T and c2 = (0.3155 0.0092 0.3112 0.3199)T.
The trade amount is z = -z2 = (0.1826 - 0.0091 0.1813 0. 1 8 3 8 )T. Essentially, the
two competitive traders trade to consume more in states, in which they are poorly en-
dowed. The unit wealth consumption demands are h = (0.1131 0.0193 0.1124 0. 1 139 )T
and h2 = (0.3155 0.0092 0.3112 0. 3 199)T respectively. We can numerically verify that
az (k) is not negative semi-definite with a positive eigenvalue of 0.015 and the asso-
ciated eigenvector is (1 - 0.0382 0.5463 0. 5 076 )T, which is the portfolio that is most
upward-sloping in demand. This portfolio is very much similar to the trade portfolio
between the two competitive traders. In this example, the demand curve for the "disas-
ter" state consumption is also upward-sloping. However, we can construct many examples
with downward-sloping demand curve for all indidivual state consumption but upward-
sloping for a certain portfolio of securities. For instance, this can be achieved by setting
e' = (0.0001 0.0676 0.0001 0, 66 42)T and e2 = (0.6575 0.0001 0.6509 0 .000 1)T.
The economic intuition is as follows. We have a "Peso problem" that involves a disaster
state in aggregate endowments. Trader 1 is more risk-averse and her endowment is rich
in the disaster state but poor in other normal states. Trader 2 is less risk-averse and her
endowment is exactly opposite to trader l's. The difference in preferences and endowments
lead to large trading needs in the competitive equilibrium without L. Moreover, the
disaster state in aggregate endowments leaves large remaining insurance demand for the
disaster state even after trading. If we reduce the normal state prices #0, #2 and 43
relative to the disaster state price #1 , trader 1 is relatively richer and trader 2 is relatively
poorer. Ignoring the substitution effect for the moment, the wealth effect causes trader
2 to reduce consumptions along h2 in every states especially the normal ones. This is
because trader 2's low risk-aversion leads her to respond 7r sensitively and she consumes
much more in the normal states that are "cheap". Trader 1 gains in wealth and consume
more in every states along hl. However, her high risk-aversion and, therefore, strong
desire to smooth consumption across states leads her to spend much of her incremental
wealth in the disaster state consumption, which is "expensive", and less in the normal
states consumption. The reduction in normal states consumption from trader 2 outweighs
the increase from trader 1. Therefore, the overall wealth effect is a reduction in normal
states consumption demand. Substitution effect is linear in wealth wl and w 2 whereas
the wealth effect is linear in the trading needs |z1 112. With wealth minimized holding
trading needs fixed, the substitution effect, which is opposite to wealth effect here, is
subdued. Overall, we will see a reduction in demand for consumptions in normal states if
state prices in normal states are reduced relatively. This gives rise to pure manipulation
opportunities.
B. Pure Manipulation With Price-Dependent Beliefs
In the preceding analysis, we have studied pure manipulation that arises due to strong
risk-sharing needs, heterogeneous preferences and endowments and remaining insurance
demand even after substantial trading. Most importantly, our mechanism does not re-
quire any information advantage possessed by the large trader about either the underlying
fundamental or her identity, which has been the focus of many previous studies of ma-
nipulation. A key element of these earlier manipulation mechanisms is that competitive
traders' belief about the probability distribution of states of nature is dependent on se-
curity prices they observe as a result of actual or potential informational inferiority of
the competitive traders. Here we shall show that this element could also be captured
in our framework. For simplicity, we shall maintain the assumption of complete mar-
kets and, in addition, assume that competitive traders are homogeneous in preference
and endowments. While we have demonstrated that pure manipulation is not possible
against homogeneous competitive traders earlier on, the incorporation of price-dependent
belief opens a new channel for price manipulation to affect competitive traders' excess
consumption demand function and allows pure manipulation to exist.
We assume a general form of probability distribution dependency on prices. In particular,
let the probability of state-k perceived by competitive traders be Pk (#, ep), which is
a function of the actual probability distribution p, the state price vector / in the com-
petitive equilibrium as well as the new state price vector # set by the large trader. The
interpretation of this functional form is straightforward. Competitive traders start with
the actual probability distribution p. They observe the change of the state price vector
# relative to the competitive equilibrium one q brought by the large trader and update
their belief to f. They update because they believe the large trader may have a different
probability distribution, which is more accurate than their own. The functional form
Pk (#, , p) is left to be specified exogenously. It could be interpretted as a behavioral
assumption or a reduced form of equilibrium results. Of course, we must impose that P
satisfies:
K
Po (#, , p) = 1,p (#, , p) = 1 and k (#, /, p) > 0 (2.13)
k=1
which are basic conditions for an equivalent probability measure. With homogeneous
competitive traders, we know that the competitive equilibrium without L is unique. We
shall fix #e = 1 to avoid multiple equilibrium nominal state price vectors. Besides, since
P should be homogeneous in # of degree 0 as scaling all state prices by the same constant
should not have any actual effect:
Pk (A#, , p) = P (#, , p) VA > 0 (2.14)
To isolate the effect of large trader manipulation, we assume that, under the state price
vector of competitive equilibrium without L, competitive traders' probability distribution
vector is the actual one:
P ( , 0, p) = p (2.15)
Again, to have local pure manipulation, we need Oz to be non-negative semi-definite. So
the following proposition gives an explicit characterization of Oz (b). With homogeneous
competitive traders, we may assume that there is a single representative competitive
trader and drop the index i.
Proposition 13 In competitive equilibrium without L (or price-taking L),
(9ckW 1 bj K 9 In fk pA .)00k C1) _ k 1 j [ ? + ~ b l 0 1P]/P h j , k
- - + = 0 , 0 b j
1 b, otherwise
0k a(ek) l=,k k. ~6k)]
where b, = /|
Similar to Corollary 2, we have local pure manipulation if the excess consumption demand
is upward-sloping for a state.
Corollary 4 There is local pure manipulation if
K a n ( kll I k
max b ,)> 0
For a solid example, consider the following updating rule for competitive traders
max /E A
pk (0,p) m [ k 01l - for some 3 > 0, 0 < E < 1
E 1 p max / ,
Clearly, this satisfies our assumptions (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15). A natural interpretation
is that if competitive traders see a state price #k set to be higher than #k, they believe
that the large trader thinks state-k is more likely to happen than the actual probability
Pk and is willing to pay a higher state price #k in order to induce competitive traders to
sell. If they also believe that the larger trader's probability distribution is more accurate
than theirs, they will update accordingly. The sensitivity of updating is determined by
#. Larger # leads competitive traders to place more probability on state-k when they
see the large trader sets #k > k. Conversely, if #k < k, competitive traders will reduce
probability on state-k until hitting a small lower bound e, which is introduced to prevent
zero probability. One can easily verify that = (. Thus, if # > 1, we will
have locally upward-sloping demand curve for each state at , which gives rise to local
pure manipulation.
2.3 Extension To Multi-Period Economy
In this section, we shall extend our setup to a multi-period economy. Interestingly, al-
though price manipulation has most often been considered under a multi-period dynamic
setup, we find that being dynamic adds nothing to the large trader's price manipulation
power. In fact, it only reduces her price manipulation power due to the typical commit-
ment problem faced by an intertemporal monopolist. This interesting observation suggests
we should consider manipulation by a large trader in a static setup, the success of which
is necessary for manipulation in a dynamic setup. Moreover, although it is often thought
that different security structures do not matter for allocation in competitive equilibrium
when market is complete, they do make a difference with a large trader present. We shall
also outline a condition that allows pure manipulation to exist for a multi-period security
structure that is in the same vein as Proposition 8.
2.3.1 Model Setup
The information revelation process we shall consider is a typical event-tree structure
with t = 0, 1, ..., T. For brevity, we shall focus on the notations rather than a rigorous
formulation. A node in the tree is denoted as (. $o is the time-0 state and the root of the
tree. Let (+ denote the set of immediate offspring nodes of (. Furthermore, let D (() be
the set of nodes that are the descendents of node ( including ( itself. Hence, D ( ) is the
subtree originating from node (2. We say ( precedes (' if (' E D (i). A node is associated
with a time of occurence, which we denote as t (c). With this, we can define the set of
nodes ocurring at time-r Q, = {{ : t ($) = r} for r = 0,1, ..., T. Thus, the set of terminal
nodes QT is the state space. As the subsequent analysis involves collapsing the event-tree
into a sequence of nodes, we shall define an order of traversal here so that the kth visited
node will correspond to the the kth element in the sequence. First, we shall assign an
order 1,2, ..., 1fl "to the the offspring nodes of ( if j > 0. This allows us to draw
2
'Therefore ID (,) is the whole event-tree.
22We shall denote the number of elements in a set A as JAl.
the event-tree with time increases from left to right. Our order of traversal will be to go
down the column of nodes of time-t from top to bottom and then move on to the next
column of nodes of time-t + 1.
Let P be a probability measure defined on Qr and IF0 C F1 c ... c F7 be the natural
filtration associated with the event-tree. We shall write p () =PEng ) P ({w}) as
the probablity of occurence of node . Furthermore, we shall write the probability of
occurence of node (' conditional on reaching a node ( preceding r' as p (') = P/pg
where (' E D (f).
Traders i = 1, 2, ..., N, L have time-additive von Neumann-Morgenstern utility U' (c') =
p (() u' (c' (c)) where c' (() is the consumption at node ( and u' is the Bernoulli
utility function satisfying the earlier assumptions. The endowment of trader i at node (
before any trading is e' (i). After each trading, trader i's endowment at node ( may be
changed. With some abuse of notation, let us write the endowment of trader i at node
', just before trading at a preceding node ( takes place, as e ((,(') where (' E ID ().
Therefore, the original endowment without any trading is ei ((, ).
There are M securities (security 1, 2,..., M) in total. They could be long-lived or short-
lived. Security m begins trading at time 0 < Ttart < T and vanishes at time 0 < Ted < T.
Security m pays dividend 6m (() at node ( if Tstart < t () < rend. Let the set of tradable
assets at node ( be M (c). We do no need to assume that security m must be traded
at every period between rtt and ren2. Suppose security m is traded at node (. Let
r/(m, ) denote the node, at which security m is tradable last time. The security prices
are determined endogenously. The price of security m at node ( is Sm ( ) (if n E M (c)).
Also, let vector S ( ) of dimension IM ( )| x 1 denote the the prices of securities tradable
at node . We can summarize the prices in a vector S of dimension E IM ()| x 1.
Each coordinate in S corresponds to the price of security m at node ( (m E M (()).
Thus, we can use the pair (n, () to refer to the coordinate position. Coordinate (Im,() is
before (m', ') if ( is before c' in the event-tree traversal order or, when =', n < m'.
The payoff matrix X (S) is a matrix of dimension ID (O)| IM ()1. Each column
corresponds to the consumption payoff at all nodes of buying 1 unit of security m available
for trade at node ( (i.e. m E M (c)) and holding it until the next node where m is tradable
again (if there is a node (' E D (() and mn E M ((')). These columns are arranged in the
same order as coordinates of S. Along each column, the coordinates are arranged in the
same order as event-tree traversal.
The security demand of competitive trader i is denoted as 0* of dimension | M () x
1 14 where each coordinate (M, () of 0' represents buying 0'm ( ) units of a security m at
node ( and holding them until the next node (' E M (() where m becomes tradable.
The large trader has price-setting power but has to clear the market by absorbing the
competitive traders' aggregate security demand 0 L (S) = - EL O' (S).
2 That is to say r"("r < t (() < rgd does not imply n e M(().
24Coordinates are arranged in the same order as S.
There are two large trader equilibrium concepts for a multi-period economy. In a com-
mitment equilibrium, the large trader annouces a security price vector S at time-O
and is able to commit to set prices for tradable securities M ( ) at each node ( according
to S over time while competitive traders choose security demand O'(S)'s to maximize
utilities. The equilibrium price $Com maximizes the large trader's utility. In a dynamic
equilibrium, when a node ( is reached, the large trader sets prices of security available
for trade S ( ) while competitive traders take S ( ) as given, conjecture about security
prices at subsequent nodes of (, Se ((,(') V' E ID (() \(, and form optimal security demand
0' ((, S ( ))'s. For equilibrium price vector SDYn, we require SDYn to maximize utility for
the large trader taking competitive traders' conjecture as given and competitive traders
are fully rational: Se ((, (') = 5Dyn (i') Y(,(' such that (' E D ().
2.3.2 Security Structures
In a commitment equilibrium, given a security structure X (S), the large trader can choose
any security price vector S as long as it does not cause any arbitrage. However, she does
not enjoy the same freedom in a dynamic equilibrium. The large trader's commitment
equilibrium price-setting plan becomes time-inconsistent as remarked in Basak (1997) in
the sense that she has an incentive to deviate from the time-O price-setting plan when a
later node ( is reached, which is similar to the durable-good monopolist's problem. In
other words, if competitive traders believed that large trader would follow the optimal
commitment equilibrium price-setting plan and trade accordingly, the large trader would
chooose different priced S ( ) at ( since the endowments of competitive traders e' (, (')'s
are already changed after the initial trading. Thus, this leads us to the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 14 Given a security strucutre X (S), the large trader yields higher or equal
utility in a commitment equilibrium than in a dynamic equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a dynamic equilibrium. Full rationality requires that competitive
traders' expectation about future prices never change as time evolves and are the same
as what the large trader actually sets. Thus, effectively, the competitive traders' security
demand 0' would be the same as that in a commitment equilibrium with 5Dyn being
the chosen security price vector. But since SDyn is not necessarily the optimal one in a
commitment equilibrium, UL (eL + X ($Dyn ) 0Dyn )< UL (eL + c (Com) goo)
The proposition above leads us to consider whether security structures that give rise
to the same asset span are the same in a dynamic equilibrium. For simplicity, let us
consider complete markets. Markets can be complete with contingent claims traded only
at time-0. Since there is no further trading beyond time-0, this allows the large trader
to commit. Thus, the equilibrium would be the same as a commitment equilibrium.
However, there are many others ways to complete the markets. We can have sufficient
number of long-lived securities" traded every period. Alternatively, we can also have
2
"By "long-lived", we mean the security will not vanish until terminal time T.
short-lived securities" traded every period. When all traders behave competitively, it is
well-known that complete markets yield the same equilibrium allocation regardless the
underlying security structures. However, this is no longer the case for a large trader
dynamic equilibrium. Trading at later times causes the commitment problem for the
large trader. As a result, trading only contingent claims at time-0 will yield higher utility
for the large trader than other security structures that complete the market dynamically.
The equilibrium allocations are, therefore, different. We shall illustrate with the following
example.
3-Period Economy With No Uncertainty
Consider a 3-period economy with t = 0, 1, 2 with no uncertainty. Let us denote the three
nodes in this simple event-tree as (0, and 2. The large trader is risk-neutral and com-
petitive traders have log-utility with homogeneous endowments e = (e ( O) e ((,) e ( 2)) =
(1 g 9 2)1 where g > 1 can be interpretted as the gross growth rate of the endowment
stream. We shall study 4 security structures:
1. Contingent claims traded at time-0 only
0 1 2
2. Only short-lived bonds traded at time-0 and time-1
0 1 2
3. Long-lived zero-coupon bond traded at time-0 and re-traded at time-1
0 1 2
Since our focus is the intertemporal commitment problem for the large trader, we leave
out uncertainties for simplicity. Under all three security structures, we have complete
markets. However, the security structures are different.
In security structure 1, we have contingent claims traded at time-0 only. As there is
no retrading later on, this will deliver the same results as a commitment equilibrium.
Therefore, let the associated state price vector be 1 ( # (to) #2 ( o))T. The large
26By "short-lived", we mean the security will exist for only one period.
trader sets #. Competitive traders solve
max log c ( ) + log c ( 1 ) + log c (( 2 ) s.t #T c < #Te (2.16)C
It is easy to show tha c = o'3 OT T. Since the large trader is risk-neutral, she
sets # by solving
2
max e(( ) - c((t) (2.17)
t=o
CO)) Therefore,Upon solving, we have > I = (1 Eg-o e1/2 
-1TT.2There
1+ gi/2 +9 g1/ 2 )T
2 (91/2+2 g-2 g1/ 2 +g 3/2 -2g g+ g3/ 2  2g2) T
. Clearly, 2 ( O) > 0 and 2 (1) - g'/ 2 (1/ 2 _ 1)2 > 0 but 2 (p2) < 0. So competitive traders
sell consumption at 2 for consumption at (o and (1. This is expected as their endowment
is highest at 2. And the large trader improves her utility by 2 (1 + g2 - p1/2 _ g3/2) > 027.
Under security structure 2, a short-lived bond is traded at time-0 to exchange consumption
between (o and (1. Its price is #1 ((O). Another short-lived bond is traded at time-1 to
exchange consumption between (1 and 2. Its price is 42 (i). As there are two rounds
of trading, the large trader cannot credibly commit to the optimal price-setting plan. To
solve for the equilibrium, we shall use backwards induction. At (i (after trading at (0),
the competitive traders endowments at (1 and 2 are e (1, (1) and e ((1, 2) respectively.
At (1, competitive traders solve
rnax log c ((1 )+ log c ( 2 ) s.t C ( +1)  #2 ( i) C (2) < e ( 1, (1)+ e ((1 2 #2 ( 1) (2.18)C
It can easily to shown that c (2 ) e)2() and c ( 2) = ' '20
The large trader sets # (1) by solving
2
max e (() - c (() (2.19)
which gives
#~2(f i) = e ({1'~ (2.20)
e(1, 2)
27This can be seen by noting that gf is a convex function in x.
Her continuation value function is
V L (( ) = J eL ) L 1, 2e ( J _I) - e(( ,(
Going back to (0, the large trader sets the price of short-lived bond, #1 (() that ex-
change consumption at O for consumption at (1. Competitive traders have a expected
price for the short-lived bond at (1, #' ((O, (1) (abbreviated as #"). The effective state
prices # = (1 #1 ((O) #1 ((O) #p)T .They conduct the same optimization as (2.16) and their
consumption demand is
#Te #Te #Te T
3 3#1 ( O) 3#, ((O) #'
This implies that they need to buy -e ((O) units of consumption at (O and, in exchange,
sell (±e - e ((O)) g units of consumption at (1. Hence, the after-trading endowment
of competitive traders is e ( () = e (() ( - e ( O) and e( 1, 2 ) = e( 2)-
But since competitive traders' expectation is rational, we need #' =2 (i). This implies,
in equilibrium
0e e( ,i
e(I i, (2)
- e (() - - e ((o)) ~)(.1
=3 (2.21)
\ e (p2)
Large trader solves
max e ((o) - c ((o) + V (1) (2.22)
0=(1 1(40) 01 (W)*
taking #' as given. Rational conjecture by competitive traders dictates that
e (1) - e ( O) -# 3 )(2.23)
\ e ( 2)
Notice that in contrast with (2.17), the large trader loses 1 degree of freedom since she
cannot set #' directly. The constraint arises because the large trader can only set the
price for short-lived bond at (O and is unable to commit to a price of the short-lived bond
at (1, which is left to competitive traders to conjecture. As the large trader is optimizing
within a subset of choices allowed under security structure 1, we expect the utility of the
large trader to be lower.
Under security structure 3, a long-lived bond is traded at O and again at (1. The trade
at (O allows competitive traders to exchange consumption at o for consumption at 2-
The second trade at (1 allows them to exchange consumption at (i for consumption at 2-
By symmetry, the dynamic equilibrium would be the same as under security structure 2
with (j and 2 swapped. Thus, we expect that the utility of the large trader is lower than
under security structure 1 due to the commitment problem. The main purpose of trading
for competitive traders is to smooth consumption intertemporally. In particular, they sell
consumption units at (2 in exchange for consumption units at o since their endowment is
highest in 2 and lowest in (o. Security structure 3 does allow the large trader to commit
to the ratio of state prices at (O and 2 directly as oppose to security structure 2. This
mitigates the commitment problem. We expect the large trader's utility is higher under
security structure 3 than under security structure 2.
For a numerical Illustration, let g = 105%. Under three different types of security struc-
tures, the large trader's profit, competitive traders' utility and effective state prices are
presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Dynamic Equilibrium Under Various Complete Markets Security Structures
Effective State Prices L's Profit Comp Traders' Utility
Security Structure 1 (1 0.976 0.9 52 )T 0.0013 0.1470
Security Structure 2 (1 0.985 0. 9 5 1)T 0.0012 0.1469
Security Structure 3 (1 0.980 0.9 65 )T 0.0012 0.1471
It is interesting that security structure 2 leads to a Pareto disimprovement relative to
security structure 1. Although dynamic trading reduces manipulation power of the large
trader under security structure 2, it does not necessary imply that competitive traders will
fare better. In the above example, competitive traders' main trading needs is to tranfer
consumption from (2 to G. Security structure 2 does not allow them to do so directly.
The only viable way is to transfer consumption from (1 to (O first and then from (2 to
(1. However, if the after-trading (at time-0) endowments at (j and (2 are widely apart,
competitive traders expect the large trader to set a high price for consumption at (
will be low). As a result, they are not willing to subsidize consumption at o heavily
knowing that they would have to transfer consumption from (2 to (j at an unfavourable
term. This leads to overall insufficient intertemporal consumption sharing between the
large trader and the competitive traders and results in a Pareto disimprovement.
2.3.3 Pure Manipulation In Commitment Equilibrium
In this subsection, we shall consider pure manipulation in a multi-period economy. For
simplicity, we consider the commitment equilibrium. If there is no pure manipulation in
a commitment equilibrium, Proposition 14 suggests that there is no pure manipulation in
a dynamic equilibrium either.
The notion of no trading motive in multi-period economy is the same as in the static
economy: the large trader is introduced so that she would not trade in the prevailing
competitive equilibrium without L if she were to behave competitively.
Definition 7 Suppose the security prices in the prevailing competitive equilibrium without
L is S. If aU L (eL) X (g) = 0, there is no trading motive between L and the rest.
The notion of pure manipulation is exactly the same as in the static economy: if the
large trader has no trading motive with respect to the prevailing competitive equilibrium
without L but still can improve her utility through price manipulation (locally if there
are multiple equilibria), then it is considered as pure manipulation.
By the same token as Proposition 4, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 15 If &UL (eL) X (S) 0 (S) > 0 for all S, there is no pure manipulation.
Otherwise, there is pure manipulation with a sufficiently risk-tolerant large trader.
Again, we have a sufficient condition for local pure manipulation to exist. Let DL be a
diagonal matrix of dimension Z D( O) IM (01 x E O IM (0)1. The vector of diagonal
entries has the same order as S with the entry corresponding to security m tradable at
node being uL (eL (c)). DL is a scaling matrix consisting of the large trader's marginal
utility at each node. Also define B as the shift matrix of dimension I jM ( )I x
EL D( O) IM ( ) 1. Consider security m tradeable at node (. If there is an immediate preced-
ing node (' = r/ (m, () such that m is traded, let the entry corresponding to [(m, ) , (m, i')]
of B be 1. All other entries of B are zero. We have a proposition similar to Proposition
8.
Proposition 16 If (I - B) DL&0 is NOT negative semi-definite, then there is local pure
manipulation.
When the large trader sets price for a security that has been traded before, not only does
it indicate the amount of consumption a buyer needs to pay to gain the payoff delivered
until the next tradable node (this is captured by I), it also determines the capital gain for
a buyer who bought this security at the previous tradable node. This re-trading effect is
captured by B. Trading takes at different nodes and the large trader's marginal valuations
of each unit of consumption at these nodes are different. Utility improvement brought
about by a bundle of consumption at different nodes as a result of manipulating the price
locally needs to take into account different marginal valuations, which is captured by the
scaling matrix DL. If we have a static economy or contingent claim traded only at (0,
B = 0 and DL (L 0)) I. This allows us to go back to Proposition 8.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study price manipulation in general equilibirum with no other markete
imperfection than the presence of a large trader. We show that this simple setup still
allows pure manipuation, which is malicious in nature, to exist. We also discover that
an important criterion for pure manipulation to exist under a general security structure
- failure of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefence at the competitive equilibrium in the
absence of the large trader. The failure is associated with heterogeneity in preferences
and endowments, large trading needs and remaining insurance demand in the competi-
tive equilibrium, which causes the joint security demand curve to be upward-sloping for
a certain portfolio of securities. In comparison with mechanisms proposed in earlier stud-
ies, ours does not require any form of information asymmetry, behavioral biases among
competitive traders or malfunctioning security markets. The only imperfection needed is
being large and able to move prices. Moreover, it is worth noting that, our mechanism
often requires only local price-setting ability and, therefore, small capital commitment.
These two features suggest that our mechanisms might be more ubiquitous and harder to
detect by the market regulator. Besides, we find that security structures matter in the
presence of a large trader even if the effective asset spans are the same, which forms a
stark contrast with the case with all traders behaving competitively. The main reason is
that security structures that allow dynamic trading reduces manipulation power. Hence,
more illiquid products like corporate bonds, exotic options or bespoke CDOs might be
more susceptible to price manipulations.
There are a few interesting directions that are worth further exploration. In particular, we
assume that competitive traders all have the same belief. Heterogeneity in beliefs could
also lead to pure manipulation even if we remove certain factors such as heterogeneous
preferences that are important to pure manipulation in our current analysis. Moreover,
we do not feature a production side and endogenous security design in our analysis. In
reality, a large trader could control the supplies of assets. Large mortgage issuers like
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae control both the supply of mortgage products and have
significant pricing power. How the origination of securities interacts with pricing power is
a question out of the scope of current analysis. Besides, it is often the case that security
structures are not exogeneously given. Financial innovations are actively undertaken by
investment banks who also possesses significant pricing power. As discussed earlier on,
security structures matter in a multi-period economy. Therefore, it would be interesting
to analyze how a large trader designs a security structure to maximize her manipulation
power. Finally, as a caveat, we restricit to a single large trader in our study. While
in certain markets of limited capitalization, such a dominant player may exist. More
generally, there could multiple non-competitive traders. Their competition, in either
Cournot or Bertrand form, should reduce manipulation power to a certain extent. How
conditions for pure manipulation in the presence of multiple large traders differ from our
current ones would be left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the set
VL = {VL (OL (S)) > -oo : S E RM+1
Our assumptions about competitive traders' utility functions and endowments ensure that
the "competitive equilibrium without L" exists (See Magill and Quinzii (1996) Chapter
2 for details). By setting S equal to S, the market-clearing price of the "competitive
equilibrium without L", the aggregate security demand 9 (5) = 0. Since we have as-
sumed that the large trader can survive without having to trade with the competitive
traders (i.e. UL (eL) > -oo), S E VL. So VL is non-empty. By the non-negative
consumption condition for competitive traders, trading will result in at most all the
endowments of competitive traders being transferred to the large trader. Hence, VL
is bounded above by UL (cW + e). Since R is complete, every non-empty set bounded
above has a supremum. Let VL denote the supremum of set VL. Hence, there exists a
price sequence S), S(2) (n) ... such that VL (OL (g(n))) is strictly increasing and
VL (OL (g)) < VL (OL (S(n))) -+V iL as n -+ oo.
Since security prices are nominal, we can normalize all non-zero price vector S by its
Euclidean norm and consider its equivalent price vector in
S={S E RM +1 2 II 2 =1}
We may assume that S(4) C S since Sln) is the price of time-0 consumption and should
greater than zero (otherwise, it will lead to VL (OL (S)) = -oo as competitive traders
demand infinite amount of time-0 consumption for free). S is closed and bounded. There-
fore, it is compact, which implies any sequence has a converging subsequence. There is
a subsequence of S), S(2), . S(n)... in S that converges. Let this subsequence be PO),
p(2) .which converges to the limit 5 E S.
Proposition 1 suggests that 0 (S), 6L (S) and c (S) are well-defined smooth functions on
RM+1\A. If 5 ( A, by continuity,
limn 6L (g(n))=L
This suggests that VL ( = 9L and 5 is the large trader equilibrium price.
We shall prove 5 ( A by contradiction. Suppose 5 E A. Firstly, we must have
ci (P(n)) 12 -+ oo. This is because if c (P(r")) 1 < M Vn for some constant M, c' (P("))
lies in a compact set B (M) where B (M) denotes a closed ball in R'+1 with radius M
in Euclidean norm. Then there is a converging subsequence ci (P(nh)), ci (p(n 2 ), ... such
that c' (P(n)) -+ El E B (M). Note that F.O.C for competitive trader i's optimization
problem gives
&Us (ci (p(n))) X+ p(n)T
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Taking limit, by continuity of BU and convergence of P(n), we have
BUg (ti) X+ = lim Ai(I) lim p(n)T
Since 6' is finite, aU' (84) > 0. aUi (6i) X+'s first entry is u (6) : 0, which suggests
0. BU (a') /a' is a positive state price vector that prices all securities. This implies
no arbitrage, which contradicts 5 E A. Hence, |Ici (p(n)) ~* 00-
However, by non-negative consumption assumption, we know that c' (p(n)) > 0 for k =
0, 1,..., K. If ||ci (p(n))|| ~* 00.
lim max ck (p(n))
n-oo k=0,1,...,K
which implies that
lim min cL (p(n)) = -o
n-*oo k=0,1,...,K
This suggests that, for large n, VL (OL (p(n))) <VL (OL (5)), which is again a contradic-
tion. Hence, S cannot be a price vector that allows arbitrage.
Proof of Proposition 3:
L solves maxs VL (-0 (S)). F.O.C suggests that the large trader equilibrium price vector
S satisfy -89VL (0 ($)) ($) = 0. By Walras law, one can show $T9(0 --O
(see Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995)). As long as 0 / 0, 9VL 3 A$T for some
A. This implies inefficiency (See Magill and Quinzii (1996)). Conversely, if 9 (5) =
0, it implies that the optimal portfolio is still OL = 0 if large trader were to behave
competitively. Hence, the allocation in the large trader equilibrium is the same as that
in the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L, which is efficient.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider the competitive equilibrium with price-taking L, in which the large trader were
to behave competitively. She optimizes her security demand OL under budget constraint
STpL ; 0 where S is the equilibrium price vector. If she trades by submitting security
demand 0L / 0, it implies that VL (' > VL (0) since no trade is always a feasible choice
for her. Returning to the large trader equilibrium, she will still trade (bL =L 0) since no
trade is dominated by 0 L, which can be implemented by settting the price to be S.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose all competitive traders have lower welfare under the large trader equilibrium
price S set by L. Then we must have
$§T > 0 (Previous equilibrium portfolio no longer attainable)
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where 0 is the equilibrium security demand of competitive trader i in the competitive
equilibrium without L. Summing over i, we have
N
ST5 > 0
But E 0 = 0 (competitive equilibrium requires market-clearing). So
N N
>3S' T >3 =0
i=1 i=1i
Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6:
It has been proven that, generically, the rank of &9 (5) is M (see Mas-Collel, Whinston
and Green (1995)). This suggests that, for any vector v E RM+1 such that v f k5 for some
k / 0, vT&O (5) f 0 (i.e. the only direction that will lead to vT&O (5) = 0 is the direction
of equilibrium prices, which has to be the case by Walras' Law). If OUL L) X+ f AST,
this implies that (UL eL) X+&O (5) / 0, which implies the F.O.C of the large trader's
optimization is not satisfied. Hence, there exists some direction of perturbation on security
price vector S that leads to improvement of the large trader's welfare.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Let us denote the second derivative of the indirect utility function of the large trader with
respect to her security holding 0 L as O2 V (0 L). By definition,
O2 VL (0 L) = (X+)T &2UL (eL + X+OL) X+ (2.24)
Note that
U (cL) ... ... 0
82U) (ci) 0 (2.25)
0 ... .. uC (cO)
is negative-definite. Hence, VL (-) is also negative-definite, which implies that it is concave.
Thus,
VL (OLL () L (L VL (L (L L
- VL (0) 0 L (S) =UL (L) X+OL (S)
ATOL (S) = -A51O (S)
< 0 (2.26)
by WARP at S. Therefore, by setting price to be different from the prevailing one, the
large trader achieves a lower utility. Thus, she will not manipulate.
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Conversely, if WARP fails to hold at 5, there exists a price vector S such that STO (S) < 0
(STO (5) = 0 is automatically satisfied as 0 (5) = 0). By no trading motive, we have
&VL (0) = aUL (L) X+ = AST (2.27)
Thus, STO (S) < 0 implies 8VL (0) 0L (S) > 0. Consider
VL (0 L (S)) - VL (0) / VL (gL (S) t) 0 L(S) dt (2.28)
If the large trader is sufficiently risk-tolerant at eL, ||82UL (eL) is small, which implies
that ||82VL (0)1| is small. So &VL (OL (S) t) 0L (S) > 0, which implies
VL (OL (g)) > VL (0)
This suggests that the large trader could manipulate price to S and improve her utility.
Proof of Proposition 8:
A similar proof is given for goods market in Mas-Collel (1985). Walras' Law gives that
VS, ST6 (S) = 0
So we have
(5+ 77)T (5+) = 0
Therefore,
5gT (5 + r) --7T (5 + ) (2.29)
By Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have
0 (5 + r/) = 05) + J0aQ (5 +r/t)rdt
= ,6 (5 + 7t) r/dt (2.30)
This suggests that
STO (g ; -?, 1To (3 + 71)
= - ?T (5 + r/t) rdt (2.31)
Making use of the condition that 90 () is not negative semi-definite, there exists a v E
RM+1 such that |v112 = 1 and vTBO (S) V > 0. Since 90 (S) is continuous by smoothness
of 0 (S), there exists an open ball B (S, r) around S with radius r > 0 such that
vT89O(S)v > OVS E B (5,r)
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Choose n = min (, r) v. We have
rTo(59+ ?It) 7 > OVt E [0, 1
Plugging back into the integral, we obtain
-15TO(5+r) =] - ITC (3 + 7t) ?dt < 0 (2.32)
Therefore, by setting S = 5 + 77, WARP fails at 5: STO (S) < 0 and ||S - 5|12
min (, 'r) < e. By Proposition 7, a sufficiently risk-tolerant large trader can improve her
utility through local manipulation of the security price vector.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Since X+ and X+' are complete markets security structures, for all corresponding security
prices S and S' that do not lead to arbitrage, we have state prices # and E ++1 such
that
#TX+ = S and 4'TX+' = S1
From competitve traders' point of view, they optimize consumption allocation using state
prices implied by the security price vector. As a result, their aggregate excess consumption
is a function of the state prices. The large trader maximizes her utility by picking the
optimal state prices #, which can be implemented some security price vectors S = #X+
and S' = #X+'under security structures X+ and X+' respectively. Since 4 leads to one
particular consumption allocation, the exact security structures do not matter.
Proof of Proposition 10.1:
See Brennan & Kraus (1978).
Proof of Proposition 10.2:
Monotonicity implies WARP is straightfoward: suppose #Tz (#') < 0 and z (#) f z
we need to show #'T z (#) > 0 to ensure WARP. From monotonicity, we have
[z (#) - z (#')]T (0 - #') < 0 (2.33)
(strict inequality since z (#) f z (#')). But
[z (4) - z (0')]T (# - #') = z(#)T 4 - z (#')T# - z (O)T 6' + z (#')T #'
= -z(#')T # z (#)T 4' (since z (#)T# =z (#)T ' = 0P.34)
Thus, [z (# - 2 ($')]T (# - #') < 0 implies z (#)T 0' > -z (#')T # > 0. WARP is satisfied.
To obtain monotonicity condition, we need individual excess consumption z (6) to sat-
isfy monotonicity. Then, summing over all the individuals, we have aggregate excess
consumption z (#) also satisfy monotonicity. A sufficient condition for monotonicity of
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individual demand with constant wealth is maxcERK+17 F(c) - mincER K1 -Y (c) < 4. (See
Quah (2003) for a proof). If endowments are collinear, we can scale the state prices by
the same constant for all individuals to keep their wealth levels unchanged under different
state price vectors, which allows us to apply the above result with an endowment economy.
Proof of Proposition 10.3:
Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) shows that global gross substitution implies WARP at
e. Hens and Loeffler (1995) shows -y (c) < 1Vc implies gross substitution.
Proof of Proposition 10.4:
If there is no trading in the competitive equilibrium without L, each competitive trader's
excess consumption zi () = 0. Since WARP holds at the level of individual trader,
#'T Zi ----- # 0 implies that T z(#') > 0 if z (#') # ze (q). Summing over i, we
have
N N
Tz(#') = zi (#') = ZTzi () > 0
i=1 i=1
WARP holds at d.
Proof of Proposition 10.5:
Suppose L sets a different state price vector # # e. For each competitive trader i, there
exists a consumption bundle * with = k'1 such that #T(* = #Tei (i.e. (* is a riskless
consumption bundle attainable under state prices #). Expected utility preference implies
that BL 2 (ii) = u' (k) (1 pi ...pK)T and BWj (E) = u' (co) (1 pi ... PK)T . Thus, BU' (ii) is
proportional to BU' (E). But BU' (E) is proportional to e in complete markets. BU (Wi)
is proportional to 0 as well. Since # # q, BUO (ci) is not proportional to #, which
implies (2 is not agent i's optimal consumption under state price vector 5. So the optimal
consumption c' (#) delivers higher utility than (i: U (ci (#)) > U (ii). By supporting
hyperplane theorem, we have BUO (i) ci (#) > BUO (i) (.
Since B9U (p2) - BKUi (r) = AO for some A' > 0,
N N
STc(#) = qT [ci (#)> t T  (2.35)
i=1 i=1
Next, we want to show 1(i = EN &. Since =T1 T
N N
#T E 
-i e i = 0(i=1 i =1
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But
sharing without L
(ZN ki) 1 kel and
N '
= e] (k
ke) (lTJ) = 0 (2.36)
This implies kg = ke since 4I > 0. So we have Ni = N 1 = e. As a result,
N
STc () > e
i=1
(2.37)
which suggests that WARP holds at 4.
The equivalence between complete risk-sharing and no aggregate risk is known for a long
time. See Malinvaud (1972) for a discussion.
Proof of Proposition 11:
F.O.C of competitive trader i's utility optimization problem gives:
(2.38)7rkut~~,T (c = e=Ut cUC K C (CO
Note that here state-0 is used on the right-hand side. However, this is not necessary. We
can use any other state and obtain the same result.
Differientiating w.r.t #4 and re-arranging:
aci
k&g
a& (cs) 8c
.(C- O for j 4 0, k
ai (ci )8
a' (ci) ac6
a0 (ct) 84c
a (ci) &c0k
1 1.
.
- for j = 0
ai (cO ) #
1 1
.__ - for j = k
ai (cO Ok
(2.39)
(2.40)
(2.41)
Competitive trader's budget constraint is always tight given non-satiation. So we have
(2.42)( 4kck = 4kek
k=O k=0
Differentiating the budget constraint w.r.t. #j:
i /i
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ST z@ - 7T (c ()e) >0
( EN N ci = kel1 (complete risk-
N
OT i ) 
-
K
Ok Ock00.
k=O i
Substituting 2 L into the above equation, we get
1
- for jk
&i (ci) ( I= )
aci
-k
0#k
Proof of Propositior
1K 4
a C (c E) )
1 1 otherwise
a NO ()k
With unit wealth, trader i's consumption demand
K 1-
h' (#)=arg max E Pk s.t.
k=O
#Tc < 1
F.O.C gives
(h')-"= A tir
which yields
h' = (A\)~ r -!
Substitute into the budget constraint, which binds by non-satiation:
#Th' = (Ai)~- (pT t = 1
which gives
(Ai)~N = 1 ,(_rt
Hence,
7r Y%
(hT ()=)
To show the decomposition, note that ci (#) = (, #Tei)
But (1 (#, #T ei) = (#T ei) h' (4). So
i = (#Tei) Bh' + hieiT
Thus, we have azi = Oci = a~i.
(2.49)
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(2.43)
(2.44)
(2.45)
(2.46)
(2.47)
(2.48)
Upon differentiation, we have
1 1 1
= -i- ( 1 2 7 f ) -fi k
= - (1---h h
1 k pk 7r
~ _jk ) 2(OIT Y
1 k p 
.
-if = k
1 N1.
- hh - h
k 'ikI
(2.51)
In matrix form, we have
ahi = (-1-) hi hr -T diag (h/q) (2.52)
where h'/ is a vector formed by coordinate-wise division and diag (v) transforms a vector
into a square matrix with diagonal being v and 0 elsewhere. Substituting into (2.48), we
have
Bzi = wi 1 hih T - -diag (h'/#) + hieiT
= w - 1 -) hi hiT - idiag (h'/#) + hi hiT ]
= wi (diag (h/h) - ih) - hi (c' - e') T
w s (#) - hiz IT
- wi lihiT + hieiT
(2.53)
Proof of Proposition 13:
For competitive investors, F.O.C is still
Uc (Ck) = A7rk = u, (cO) -
70r
Different iatin g w.r.t #,, we have a new term that is engendered by the dependence of
109
and
(2.50)
ah"k
00k
probability distribution on state price #
_Ck
&#5i
a (co) OcO
a(ck)8 a
1 aPk
a (ck)p&#3
19 Ck 0 & O(co9CO 1 Pk 1 1
C)O a (ck)4k + a (ck) Pk a$j a (ck) @k
Differentiating the budget constraint w.r.t. #j, we still have
E pk = e3 - c3 =-z3
k=0 p
In equilibrium, c =e, z = 0 and P = p. This gives
aCk R) a---U- 2P11=0 ot(el') a0l
K -01-)
a (ek) (E1=0 Q(ej)
1 OPk
a (ek) pA (9p-j '
c-(ek) , 1i:=0 a~l (9kW
-1 1 &pk
ae (ek) ( K 0 o(ek) Pk 8ij
-K 01 (&1nk/ } 1L=0,1$k a(ei) 8k
Proof of Proposition 16:
Define A := S - 5 and expand aUL (e L)T X (S)a (S) around S:
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(2.54)
(2.55)
(2.56)
1 1
o' ek cNk
(2.57)
EK 0,1 kk 01 O1n(Pk,/Pt)Q(el)
K
a (ek) (F-,l=o Ck(el)
oc9C
490k
aBUL (CL)T X (S) 0 (S)
= OUL (eL) T [X (5) 0 (5) + m(z)( (oArn () ax
+X (5) +X (5 E Am ( a [0] A +
(mEM(),E D(O)m Sm
First Order 2 ,%
Second Order I
+ ( E (()mEM')
Second Order 2
2 E Am ( O) 00A+.]
(mEM(E),(ED((O)
Second Order 3
As aUL (eL)T X () = 0 (no trading motive), the first order effect 2 and
effect 1 are all 0. Since S is a market-clearing equililibrium price, 0 (5) = 0.
effect 1 and second order effect 2 are all 0.
For each security rm tradable at (, there are 2 cases:
1. It is the first time that m gets traded
2. There is a preceding node 6', at which m gets traded directly before
determines the payoff of holding 1 unit of security m from ' to ()
(2.58)
(2.59)
second order
So first order
(then Sm ( )
ax
aSm~ (0
0 0 ...
0 1 ...
0 0 ...
L (m,')
there is an '1' in case 2 because Sm (w) also determines
of holding 1 unit of m from the last trading period '.
the payoff (including capital gain)
Hence,
in case 1
0
-1
0
(?n,()
0
-1
0
(m,C)
(2.60)
in case 2 (2.61)
Bsm, (() aSm', () )Am ( ) Ami (W)
Hence,
IBaUL (eL)T X (S) 0(S)2 ~ UL (eL)T ( :
(meM( ),CE D(Co)
Am (m) 0 OAOSm (()
MM(Wn$ , a Am ( ) aUL (eL) T ax
= AT (B - I) DOA m (2.62)
Therefore, if (I - B) DL06 is NOT negative semi-definite, can find a direction A such that
moving the security price vector S along this direction will lead to BUL (e) T X (S) 9 (S) <
0. By Proposition 15, this gives rise to pure manipulation.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Trading With Price Impact
In The Presence of Momentum
Traders
(This is joint work with Jiang Wang)
3.1 Introduction
Large institutional investors often need to trade in markets that offer only limited liq-
uidity. For instance, an U.S. domestic equity fund may trade small-cap stocks to load
on size premium. Alternatively, an international equity fund may seek good investment
opportunities or diversification from emerging market stocks. When they trade in such
markets with small turnover, their trading may generate considerable price impact. Vari-
ous studies have been performed on optimal trading with price impact in general or partial
equilibrium frameworks before1.
This paper adds an unique element to this problem by noticing that such small markets
are often populated with investors following momentum strategies due to potential exis-
tence of private information. Under certain circumstances, momentum strategies may be
well-justified. For example, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) finds that momentum strategies
generate highest profit with small-cap stocks because of gradual information diffusion.
However, such momentum strategies are often applied without well-founded reasons. It
might be blind implementation of "technical analysis" or, in general, oversimplistic ex-
trapolation of past return patterns. Alternatively, momentum sentiment might be simply
out of investors' "irrational exuberance". Emerging markets, such as the Chinese stock
market, have seen tremendous holding demand from individidual investors after periods
of rapid rise in stock price. Anecdotal evidence suggests many investors bought stocks
simply after seeing their acquaintances make a fortune and hoped that the good returns
would continue. In this paper, we study the existence of imperfectly rational momentum
'For e.g. Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Vayanos (2001)
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traders, who suffer from "momentum bias" - their expectation of future return is higher
than the true one when past returns have been higher than usual.
In a market with momentum traders, it is interesting to study how a large investor would
trade optimally. Large investor has price impact. Price goes up when she buys and goes
down when she sells. Since momentum traders' expectation about future return and,
consequently, their current demand depend on prices in the past, the dynamic trading
behavior by a large investor with price impact is fundamentally different from when she
trades against rational traders without momentum bias. This paper considers an equi-
librium trading model in discrete time with infinte horizon. Shocks to dividend are i.i.d
over time. Thus, past returns and prices cannot forecast future shocks. There is no in-
formation asymmetry. Investors are risk-averse. There are two broad classes of investors:
a non-competitive large investor and competitive small investors. Competitive investors
can be fully rational or imperfectly rational with momentum bias. Large investor and
rational investors fully optimize dynamically. Imperfectly rational investors have a mo-
mentum bias in their expectation of future return that leads their trading strategy to
deviate from being fully optimal. To ensure that our results are not generated by peculiar
model assumptions, we keep everything endogeous except the form of momentum bias,
which is assumed to be a linear function of past realized excess returns.
We found several interesting behaviors by the large investor in the presence of momentum
investors. When trading towards a target holding position, a risk-averse large trader
will split her trade into smaller ones. If she trades against rational competitive investors
without momentum bias, the small orders are in the same direction and the order size
is decreasing over time. However, this is no longer the case when she trades against
momentum investors. The order size may not be monotonically decreasing. She may
slow down trading when momentum demand is driven up by her previous trades and
accelerate subsequently when momentum demand dies down. Depending on the strength
of momentum demand, the direction of her trades may start to alternate. She may engage
in round-trip trades with declining amplitude to profit from momentum demand before
settling towards the target level. Also, under certain circumstances, the large investor
engages in "reverse trading" that aims at manipulating the intertemporal demand curve.
For instance, when she plans to sell a large amount, she may buy a moderate amount
first to create high realized return. Momentum bias will push the demand curve up next
period when she sells. Her initial purchase might end up with a loss. But this is more than
compensated by the gain from demand curve shift when she sells a large amount later on.
Thirdly, a large investor tries to conserve the momentum demand by taking profit of it
less aggressively or even incurring a loss in the short-run so that the momentum cycles will
last longer with greater magnitude. And she benefits from more sustainable manipulation
of the momentum sentiment. In comparison, if we replace her with a group of competitive
rational investors, they will jump on the mispricing created by the momentum demand
and take profit aggressively. Momentum sentiment declines quickly. Finally, we find
that that the excess return process actually exhibits strong reversal in the presence of
momentum investors. Thus, momentum trading cannot be self-fulfilling in a rational
equilibrium framework with long-lived arbitrageurs.
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In addition, since we adopt a general equilibrium framework, the price impact function is
generated endogenously by demand of competitive investors. This contrasts with partial
equilibrium approach, which specifies price impact exogenously 2. The implications could
be very different. Several studies employed an exogenous price impact function and found
that when price volatility increases, the large investor's trading speed increases given
she is risk-averse. In our model, we find that price volatility does not affect the trading
speed because the endogenously generated price impact becomes larger due to competitive
investors' risk aversion, which cancels out the risk aversion effect on the large investor.
How large investors trade with price impact have been examined extensively before. In
an equilibrium framework, Kyle (1985) pioneers such studies with an information mo-
nopolist, who trades to minimize price impact. Vayanos (2001) studies how a risk-averse
large investor trades against rational competitive investors to reduce risk exposure with
asymmetric information about her holding position. Our setup is close to Vayanos (2001)
and the "trade splitting" effect is indeed similar. However, in both Kyle and Vayanos, the
investors, whom the large investor trades against, are fully rational. Our focus is on the
interaction between large investor and momentum investors. And the resulting behavior
of the large investor is very different. With exogenously given price impact function, Bert-
simas and Lo (1998) finds that a risk-neutral large investor should optimally divide her
trade into orders of equal size. Almgren and Chriss (2000), Stanzl and Huberman (2005)
extend to a large investor with risk-aversion and find that the order size should decrease
as the deviation from the desired holding level gets smaller, which is similar to our result
when the large investor trades against fully rational competitive investors. However, as
mentioned above, the price impact function in our study is generated endogenously rather
than exogenously given. Overall, these studies feature a large investor with genuine in-
formational or allocative trading motive, who engages in "benign" manipulation3 in the
sense that the large investor restricts quantities traded to seek better transaction prices.
More severe price manipulation schemes have also been proposed. Allen and Gale(1992)
classifies them into "information-based", "action-based" and "trade-based". "Information-
based" manipulation requires information asymmetry. Manipulator releases false signals
to mislead investors (Vila (1989), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Fishman and Hagerty
(1995) etc.). "Action-based" manipulation encompasses actions that change the actual
or perceived value of the underlying firms. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) studies a fake
take-over bid and Goldstein and Guebel (2008) analyzes how price manipulation can lead
firm managers to forgo positive NPV projects. "Trade-based" manipulation requires sim-
ply trading. Allen and Gale (1992) provides a classic example, in which an uninformed
manipulator pretends to be informed and takes advantange of the uninformed competitive
investors. Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) shows that a large investor can exploit behavorial
bias among competitive investors to generate positive manipulation profit. While they
study the disposition effect, our model focuses on the momentum sentiment.
There has been previous literature discussing the effect of momentum or positive-feedback
2For e.g. Almgren and Chriss (2000), Stanzl and Huberman (2005)
3See Kyle and Viswanathan (2008).
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trading. In particular, Delong et al (1990) studies the positive feedback traders in a 3-
period model. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) studies the "fund-switchers" who tend to
switch to funds that perform better in the past. In their studies, competitive rational
investors trade against imperfectly rational investors with momentum senitment. Our
model emphasizes on the presence of a large investor, who has ability to move price.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the model. In section 3, we
define the notion of equilibrium and outline the solution to the equilibrium. In section 4,
we analyze the equilbrium results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
We consider an economy in discrete-time setup with infinite horizon t - 0, 1, 2, ... There
is a single consumption good used as the numeraire. There are two broad classes of in-
vestors we shall consider. Namely, they are competitive small investors (called S-Investors)
and a non-competitive large investor (called L-Investor). S-Investors in general may have
a bias in their expectation of future returns due to momentum or "trend-chasing" senti-
ment. When S-Investors have non-zero bias, they are imperfectly rational investors (called
I-Investors). Otherwise, they are perfectly rational (called R-Investors). Behaviors of each
type of investors will be explained later on.
3.2.1 Investment Opportunities
1. A riskless asset with constant interest rate r > 0 per period. Denote the gross rate
of return as R = 1 + r.
2. A tradable stock that pays a dividend Dt per period. The dividend follows an AR(1)
process
Dt+1 = aDDt + etI with 0 < aD < 1 (3.1)
where et+1 are i.i.d idiosyncratic shocks. For simplicity, we assume that Et ~
N(0, ay2). Every investor has access to the stock market. The market for stock
trading is cleared in a Walrasian manner. Let the total suppy of the stock be 9 and,
without loss of generality, we can set 0 = 1. Also, the ex-dividend price of stock at
time t is Pt. Define the excess return of stock over the riskless security as
Qt =_ P + Dt - RPt_1 (3.2)
This is the extra gain of holding 1 share from period t - 1 to t relative to putting the
same amount of wealth in riskless asset. Define the fundamental value of a share to
be
Ft = Et ( D,+sR-) (3.3)
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, which is the present value of the future dividends discounted at the risk-free rate.
It can be easily shown that
Ft = aD where a -a (3.4)
R-aD
We can decompose the stock price Pt into Pt = Pt + Ft, where Pt is the risk discount of
the stock price relative to the fundamental value.
3.2.2 Investors
All investors maximize time-additive constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility
El K e e +8 where i = S, L
All of them have the same discount factor #. However, investor of type i has risk aversion
'. Define the effective risk aversion to be a' -
The expectation operator for the rational R-Investors and the non-competitive rational
L-Investor is the same as the true expectation operator E [.]. We use ES [-] to denote the
expectation operator for a general S-Investor, who may suffer from the momentum bias
and have an expectation different from the true one.
Competitive investors (S-Investors) are identical. They are infinitesimally small and form
a continuum indexed by i c [0, ws], where ws is the aggregate weight of small investors.
Without loss of generality, we can set ws = 1. Consequently, they are price takers, who
submit demand schedules competitively without having to consider their own impact on
price. Since they are exactly identical, we may treat them as a single investor who behaves
competitively. When S-Investors are fully rational, they are referred to as R-Investors and
their time-t expectation of excess return from time t to time t + 1 is the true expectation.
When S-Investors are imperfectlyly rational, they are referred to as I-Investors. They are
also competitive in the same way as R-Investors. However, they are imperfectly rational
in the sense that their expectation of Qt+1 at time t is biased due to irrational momentum
sentiment
Et [Qt+1] = Et [Qt+1] + Zt (3.5)
where Zt is the bias at period t. Thus, as we shall see, their demand will be the sum of
rational demand of R-Investors and the irrational component induced by the sentiment. In
general, we let Zt depend on the past realized excess returns: Z = Z (Qt_ 1, Qt_2, Q- 3, ...)
where _ = Qt-j -Q with Q being the long-run average of Qt. For simplicity, we assume
that Z (-) is linear and depends on k lags of Q'. Thus Zt = bQ where b is a 1 x k constant
matrix and Q ( Q I ... Q_ ) T. In particular, if all entries in b are greater than
0, we have so-called "trend-chasing" or "momentum trading". The true expectation of
Qt+1 is given by Et [Qt1)I, which is also what a fully rational investor expects. Suppose
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that, in a particular realization, Qt_1 - Q > 0. The excess return from t - 2 to t - 1 is
higher than usual. The S-Investors observe this and they expect the future excess return
for the next period (t to t + 1) will be high as well. However, in our setup, we do not
wish to let them be completely irrational. Thus, the expectation of the S-Investors still
keeps the rational expectation part Et [Qt+1]. On top of that, we introduce a momentum
or "trend-chasing" sentiment Zt. Loosely speaking, they buy when price in the past few
periods went up and sell when price went down. The strength and persistence of this
momentum demand is given by the length and magnitude of b. This is similar to the
positive feedback investors in Delong et al (1990), who have feedback demand on price
gain in a 3-period model with no dividend. Since our model is capable of dealing with
multiple lags of Q', it also covers a wide range of "technical rules" including momentum
strategies. Other than the sentiment bias that I-Investors have about expectation of Qt+1,
they are competely rational in all other aspects. They have correct belief about how Dt
evolves over time. Also, they have the right belief about the variance of excess return
Vart (Qt+1). Note that R-Investors are a special subgroup of S-Investors with b = 0.
Previous literature on momentum or feedback trading have assumed that demand of
momentum investors are exogeneously given by a + bQ 1 4, which is inelastic of price.
On the one hand, this greatly reduces the complexity. However, this may run into the
danger of oversimplification. Dramatic results in these models may not hold when the
momentum investors are still sensitive to price.
There is a single rational large investor (L-Investor). She is fully rational and her expec-
tation is the same as the true expectation. In contrast with S-Investors, who individually
consider themselves to be infinitesimally small, L-Investor is aware of the fact that she has
price impact: if she buys, the execution price of the current period will become higher; if
she sells, the execution price of the current period will become lower. Unlike competitive
S-Investors, she does not submit demand schedule. Instead, she submits a market de-
mand, which is inelastic of price. Given the demand schedule of the competitve investors,
the L-Investor is effectively setting the price. She has the ability to move the price to a
level that she desires.
3.2.3 Timeline of Trading
L-investor submit
stock demand sLt
Competitive Trading takes
Dt paid to investors submit place Agents choose
investors demand Pt seen by consumption ci
schedule A't(p) investors
t t+1/4 t+1/2 t+3/4 t
Events that take place during the period t to t + 1 follow the sequence below:
4 To be exact, a + b (P,_ - P1)
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1. At time t + 0, dividend Dt is paid and every investor observes it.
2. At time t + , the competitive investors submit demand schedule As (p) for the
stock. The L-Investor submits an inelastic demand sf' for the stock.
3. At time t + 1, trading takes place. Equilibrium price is determined so as to clear
the market.
4. At time t + , investors choose their consumption ci, i = S, L.
3.3 Equilibrium Definition and Solution
We shall solve the general S-Investors' dynamic optimization problem first, which gives
us their demand schedule As (p). Taking demand schedule as given, L-Investor can infer
the price impact function and choose the market demand that fully optimizes dynami-
cally. Given the infinite-horizon setup, we look for a stationary equilibrium, in which the
strategies of investors are time-invariant.
3.3.1 S-Investors' Problem
S-Investors are competitive. When they make trading decisions, they take the evolution of
investment opportunities as given. In particular, the large investor's holding strategy and
equilibrium price process are competely exogenous for them. Thus, they can formulate
the process of excess return Qti+ although their expectation is in general wrong5:
Et [Qt+1] = Et [Qt+1] + Z
Because each S-Investor is a price taker, she believes that she can buy or sell any amount
of stock in the market at the prevailing price. Thus, we can define her total wealth Wi"
as the sum of her wealth in the riskless asset Mjf and the "mark-to-market" value of her
holding in the risky stock sf Pt, where sf is the number of shares she holds. Her wealth
evolves as
W+1 = (WS - c!) R + sfQt+1 (3.6)
S-Investors solve the following optimization problem:
jS = max ESF- [#e~ "i (3.7)t cS 8 S _ (37
L t
s.t. W = (W; - ct) R + ss (Qt+1 + Zt)
,Only filly rational R-Investors' expectation is correct.
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The solution to this maximization problem is similar to Wang (1994). We can solve for
her optimal consumption cf, optimal holding sf of the risky stock under the equilibrium
price process as well as her optimal demand schedule As (p) as a function of price. At
time t + , she submits As (p) and, under equilibrium price Pt, she gets ss = A' (Pt)
number of shares.
3.3.2 L-Investor's Problem
L-Investor takes the demand schedule of competitive investors A' (p) as given. She can
solve for the clearing price Pt = Ft + Pt (str) as a function of her inelastic market demand
st from the market-clearing condition
As (p) ws + s (3.8)
From the L-Investor point of view, Ft is completely exgoenous but Pt is a function of her
demand sf. t (s) gives L-Investor the discount per share when demanding sL units.
Because of price impact, the L-Investor cannot mark the value of her stock holding to the
market price. However, we can mark her stock holding to the fundament value, which is
exogeneous of her trading decision, and define her total wealth to be
= M+ siKFt (3.9)
where AtL is her holding in riskless asset. We can interpret W as the sum of her wealth
in riskless asset and the fundamental value of her stock holding at time t+ 1 before trading4
takes place at t + 1. It can be shown that
W = (Wt c ) R - (sf - s- 1 ) RPt (sf) ± sf (1 + a) et+1 (3.10)
Thus, she solves the following optimization problem
00
Jf = max Et - Oe (3.11)L LI
S=t
s.t. W = (Wf - cf) R - (s - s-) RPt (sf) + sf (1 + a) Et-1
3.3.3 Solution of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium price process and the optimal policies can be expressed as functions of
the state vector 't. T t has finite dimension and, together with Wt for i = S, L, are
sufficient to characterize the state of the economy. With CARA utility, the investment
policies do not depend on wealth of both S- and L-Investors. This makes price process
independent of Wt. Thus, equilibrium price process and the optimal policies are function
of Wt only. Moreover, with proper choice of state variables and some augmentation, 'Pt
can be treated as Markov. We look for a stationary equilibrium given the horizon of
the problem is infinite. So Pt, cisi, i S, L and Af (p, D1) are functions of We only
and do not depend on t. We can write Pt = Ft + P ('t), ci = c' (Tt),s' = s (Tt) and
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A' = As (p, It). Given the CARA utility and Gaussian innovations we use, we strive to
look for a linear equilibrium, in which P (-), c' (.),si (-) and As (p, Dt, -) (for a fixed p) are
all linear functionals of 't. Formally, we have
Definition 1 A stationary linear equilibrium is defined to be the stock price process Pt =
Ft + P (.) and investor's' investment and consumption policies c' (.) (i = L, S), SL (-),
As (p, Dt, -) that are linear in Pt and independent of t , which satisfy
1. The investors' policies maximize their utility
2. The stock market clears
We choose the state vector to be T' = ( 1 sLI Lt Qti_ . Qt-k ) T where Lt = F +
Dt - RP-i is the fundamental excess return. 1 is included for convenience of expression.
The L-Investor's position before trading st_1 is included because L-Investor cannot adjust
her holding costlessly at the prevailing price. How much she already has before trading
is a piece of important information. Lt is the fundamental excess return. Qt = Lt +
Pt is determined by Lt, which is known at t, and Pt,, which is known at t + I after2
market-clearing price Pt is found. Qt is an important piece of information as it will
contribute to momentum sentiment bias going forward. Since Qt is not determined when
investors submit demand, we shall include the fundamental excess return Lt in Pt instead.
Qt-1, ... Qt-k are included since they determine the current momentum sentiment as well
as future momentum sentiment.
Suppose that the L-Investor strategy is sL = sIL W't and price Pt = aDt + PqP, for some
1 x (k + 3) vectors sL and Pq. Competitive investors can formulate the evolution of the
state vector as a Gauss-Markov process
t+1 = apAt + bqet+1 (3.12)
where ap is a (k + 3) x (k + 3) matrix and bp is a (k + 3) x 1 vector. Subsequently, they
can solve their dynamic programming problem.
Proposition 1 Given that sf = s' , and Pt = Ft + PPt, the solution to the S-Investor
optimization problem is as follows:
Value Punction: J; (W 8 , I') = -0e w t s* (3.13)
where as = rand vs is a symmetric square matrix depending on s', PP.
Optimal Consumption : cs = In ( (3.14)t ls "Ys VW
Optimal Stock Holding : ss = s pt (3.15)
Optimal Demand Schedule : As (p, Dt, Tt) = $ +P  p (p - aD,) (3.16)
where s, and # are 1 x (k + 3) vectors. p is a constant scalar.
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At time t,
- In (-Jf+1) = aSW i + 1 1T 0Sqj1 t+
= aSVVs+1 + -jai?)SapWt + aJa,vsbpetm + -bT eb+1 (3.17)
The first term is the log-utility due to wealth at t + 1. The other three terms give us
the log-utility due to future investment opportunities. In particular, the last term can be
absorbed into density of Et+1 by rescaling the variance. It can be shown that
Et (Jt+1] c -Et iee'swi, tT a v";retoe
such that et+1 ~ N (0, (1/o + bTvsbp) . So jIF aT vsapIt gives the deterministic
portion of investment opportunity and paTVsbpetei gives the stochastic portion, which
is linear in the shock et+1. Define the investment opportunity as Ot+1 iW TapvSaqxt +
t Ja.,oSb~jEt+1.
Proposition 2 The optimal stock holding of S-Investors can be rewritten as
s Et (Qt+1 + Zt) - Covt (Qt+i, Ot+1) (3.18)
t asVart (Qt+1)
where Cov and Var denotes the covariance and variance taken with rescaled distribution
of et+1.
Note that, when S-Investors are fully rational R-Investors, Zt = 0 and R-Investors' holding
is
R _ Et (Qt+1) - Covt (Qt+1, Ot+1)
asVart (Qt+i)
Es (l) _is the myopic demand, which reflects the trade-off between expected return
and risk. - represents the hedging component. For a general S-Investor
(possibly imperfectly rational), her demand is the sum of rational demand and irrational
demand arising from momentum sentiment:
s Ej (Qt+1 + Z ) - Govt (Qt+1, Ot+1)
st asV art (Qt+1)
Et (Qt+1) - Govt (Qt+1, Ot+1) Z
asVart (Qt+1) asVart (Qt+1)
Rational Demand Momentum Demand
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In the proof of Proposition 2, we also demonstrate the construction of competitive in-
vestors' optimal demand schedule as a function of price As (p, Dt, I'). This allows us to
calculate the L-Investor's price impact function from the market-clearing condition.
Proposition 3 A (s4) = 7rpit + As' where frp is a matrix of size 1 x (k + 3) and A is
a scalar representing the price impact.
A well-defined price impact function allows L-Investor to fully optimize
namically. Her optimal strategy is given by the proposition below.
Proposition 4 Given that price P = Ft + A (st) aDt +1 7rt + Asft.
the L-Investor optimization is
Value Function: JtL (W/L 't) = _
where aL = and v L is a symmetric square matrix depending on -Tcp andR
consumption is
her trades dy-
The solution to
(3.19)
A. Her optimal
L1 1 a8Jt
c = In
StL IYLBW
st = Te 
(3.20)
(3.21)
where sL is a 1 x (k + 3) vector depending on 1rp and A.
3.4 Equilibrium Results
We are interested in studying how the non-competitive L-Investor trades against compet-
itive S-Investors (with b # 0). As discussed earlier, S-Investors can be perfectly rational
R-Investors with b = 0 or imperfectly rational I-Investors with b $ 0. Also, to serve as
a contrast, we can replace L-Investor with a group of competitive R-Investors. Thus, we
have 4 cases to consider
1. Competitive R-Investors trading against competitive R-Investors
2. Competitive I-investors trading against competitive R-Investors
3. Competitive R-Investors trading against non-competitive L-Investor
4. Competitive I-Investors trading against non-competitive rational L-Investor
(1) is a special case of (2). (3) is a special case of (4). In the next 4 subsections, we shall
study the above 4 cases one by one.
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3.4.1 All Investors Are R-Investors
In this case, we have a group of R-Investors with total weight 2. Then, it is straight-
forward to show that
-t 0 ,R (1±+ a) D + al~t2r
SR _ 1_S 
Price consists of the fundamental value of dividend stream aDt and the risk discount
-a'(i+a)
2 02 wihidcsivsost od~sae2 which induces investors to hold shares given that investors are risk-averse.
Investors' holding is constant and, by symmetry, each agent should hold 1/2 since there
is total weight of 2. Dividend shock is accomodated by change in equilibrium price since
investors are homogeneous and there is no trading.
3.4.2 I-Investors Trading Against R-Investors
In this subsection, we shall study the case, in which general competitive S-Investors with
potential bias (b # 0) trade against perfectly rational R-Investors. Since both types are
competitive, we do not need to find out their demand schedule explicitly. Their holding
under equilibrium price will suffice. Thus, we can replace the fundamental excess return
Lt by excess return Qt in the state vector as, from the perspective of competitive investors,
they view Qt as determined rather than dependent on their holdings. In this case, the
state vector is
The equilibrium excess return process follows an AR process
Qt+1 = ft + yOQt + ... pkQt-k + EQ,t+1. (3.22)
For simplicity, we shall consider one-dimensional bias b. This implies that, when forming
expectation of Qt+1, I-Investors' momentum sentitment is only based on the first lag of the
deviation of realized excess return of last period from the unconditional mean, Qt_1 -- Q.
With b > 0, we have momentum sentiment. In Fig 3.1, we plot expected return E [Qt]
and conditional variance Vart [Qt+1] as b increases.
With momentum depending on 1 lag only, the conditional variance of excess return is
Vart [Qt+1] = [P11 ,L (1 + a) + (1 + a)]2 ' (3.23)
where Pp,L is the coefficient in Pq, on state variable Lt. As b increases, the momentum
sentiment is stronger. If the realized excess return of current period is unusually high,
the momentum demand next period will be large. The rational portion of I-Investors
and R-Investors' current demand would respond more aggressively to take advantage of
the anticipated momentum bias next period. This pushes up the price for current period
further. Thus, P,L increases in b, which amplifies the fundamental risk and increases
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Figure 3-1: E[Qt] and Vart[Qti] for I-Investors v.s. R-Investors
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the level of conditional variance of excess return as shown by the right panel of Fig 3.1.
To bear higher conditional variance associated with stronger momentum bias, risk-averse
investors require higher expected return to compensate the risk. This is illustrated by the
left panel of Fig 3.1.
Fig 3.2 shows the autocorrelation of Qt for 10 lags with the bias coefficient b = 0.3 and 0.6.
Stronger momentum sentiment (more positive b) leads to stronger reversal in actual excess
return in equilibrium. This result is expected. Suppose that the realized excess return of
last period was unusually high. This creates high momentum demand. To accomodate
the momentum demand, rational demand must be less to clear the market. In order to
induce rational demand to hold less of the risky security, the expected return for next
period must be low. Thus, high past return leads to low future return . Momentum
trading cannot be self-fulfilling in equilibrium in the presence of fully rational investors.
3.4.3 R-Investors 'Trading Against L-Investor
In this subsection, we shall introduce the non-competitive L-Investor, who trades against
fully rational R-Investors. If L-Investor were not to consider price impact, she would adjust
her stock holding to the desired level immediately. With a non-competitive L-Investor, the
situation is different. She will take her price impact into account and split her trading need
into smaller orders to be executed over time. As a result, before submitting her market
demand at time t, L-Investor will consider her previous period holding postion sL , which
comes into the state vector as mentioned earlier: WI' = ( 1 sf_1  Lt Qt_ ... Qt- )T.
Since all investors we consider here are rational (b = 0) and they understand that past
returns have no predictive power over future fundamental shocks, the coefficients on Lt
6 The adjacent excess returns are not correlated because momentum bias in expectation of Q1_ de-
pends on the excess return from time t - 2 to t - 1.
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Figure 3-2: Autocorrelation for I-Investors v.s. R-Investors
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and Qt-, .. , Qt-k, which are introduced by momentum bias, are 0 in equilibrium for Pq,
sR , s etc.
The L-Investor's trading strategy takes a simple form
sL = sL + s, with 0 < sL <1 (3.24)
St Sok1 ± 4jo q -,3.4
This implies that L-Investor trades gradually to reach the long-run equilibrium holding
SL -\ SL (SL wher y' 0
9: ( - 5) = se (s> - 5) where = '. s can be interpretted as the long run
equilibrium holding because lim_. (sL - ) = limt, (S4) (SL - = 0. L-Investor's
deviation from this long run limit at time t + 1 before trading is (s/_1 - &). So her strategy
is simply to hold sf such that her deviation fomr 3 will be a fraction s,, of her previous
deviation.
This suggests that L-Investor's orders are always in the same direction but the size de-
creases monotonically over time:
st - t s s s -sL LS
=- (1 - 4.,) (sfa s
(1 - S,,) (s )t1 (S - (3.25)
In the beginning, when her deviation from the long run equilibrium holding is large, she
submits large orders to quickly reduce the deviation. The large price impact incurred is
compensated by large trading need for optimal risk-return trade-off. This is similar to
what is found by Alrngren and Chriss (2000) and Vayanos (2001).
How fast she moves towards 9 depends on s,'. Smaller s, gives faster convergence. If
L-Investor were to behave competitively and ingore price impact, s,, = 0. She will move
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to the long-run equilibrium holding instantly. But given that she takes her price impact
into account, seS > 0.It takes many rounds of trading for her holding to reach this level
aymptotically. It can be shown that:
Proposition 5 sq, is pinned down by the root E [0,1] of the following equation
0 = R (s ,,)4 - ( ) - 1 + 2a R (s,,)2 +
1 + R + L Rs -R 2
aL aL (2
The speed of convergence to the long-run limit, #-, is decreasing in | and increasing in
interest rate r. Furtherore, the long-run equilibrium holding by the large investor is given
by
s = R-aL
fn-,ris the optimal risk-sharing holding of the stock regardless of whether L-Investor is
competitive or non-competitive. The more risk-averse L-Investor is, the faster she would
move towards to 9 as the cost of deviation from the risk-return optimal is larger. Since
there is no hedging demand for competitive investors in this case, their demand will simply
be
AfR (p) = Et (Pt+1 + Dt, 1 ) - (1 + r) p (3.27)
a oQ
The slope of the demand curve is 1'+= . Higher effective risk aversion aR causesdp 0,R Cr:,
the coefficient on p to be smaller and gives rise to an inelastic demand. The immediate
implication is that the price impact of L-Investor's trade is bigger. As a result, L-Investor
tends to move slower to the long-run equilibrium position. Higher interest rate will in-
crease the numerator directly and reduces the dividend risk in return o indirectly 7.
Both effects contribute to a more flatter demand curve, which leads to smaller price im-
pact and faster movement towards optimal risk sharing. Thus, the speed of convergence
is increasing in aL ,r and decreasing in aR
It is interesting to compare the price impact function generated from our equilibrium
framework with exogenously specified ones in Almgren and Chriss (2000) and Stanzl and
7 An upwards shock in dividend will increase current and expected future dividends. This. gives a
smaller shock to the fundamental value of stock Ff if the increases are discounted at a higher rate. Thus,
a2 is decreasing in r.
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Huberman (2005). In our framework, the price impact function is endogenously generated:
Pt(sf) = aDt It+Asf
= aDt + -rq/,1 + 7rqsf_1 + As+
t-1
= aD + 7r,1+ (7rp, + A) soL + E As) + Abs (3.28)
j=1
where As= s - sf 1 is the order at time-t. This resembles the exogeneously specified
price impact function in the sense that the impact of trade is additive and linear. However,
it is often assumed that there is a temporary price impact component due to transitory
demand/supply imbalance, which goes away later on. As a result, the permanent price
impact is, in general, smaller than the current period impact. In our equilibrium frame-
work, there is no transitory demand/supply imbalance because investors are assumed to
be always present. We find that the permanent price impact (wqs + A) is actually greater
than current period impact A since 7rq,, is positive. When L-Investor's pre-trading posi-
tion st_1 is high, R-Investors expect the L-Investor's holding for time-t to be high as well
since L-Investor trades gradually. Higher holding by L-Investor drives up expected price
Et [Pt+1i. As a result, their demand shifts upwards as represented by a positive irV,,.
Moreover, it is worth noting that, in equilibrium, the dividend volatility OD does not
affect the trading speed. On the one hand, more volatile dividend implies more volatile
price and excess return, which encourages L-Investor to trade more aggressively given that
she is risk-averse. On the other hand, this makes the demand curve by R-Investors more
inelastic, which increases the price impact. In equilibrium, these two effects cancel out
exactly and (D does not affect the trading speed of L-Investor. This contrasts with result
from Stanzl and Huberman (2005), which considers optimal trading in partial equilibrium
and finds that price volatility increases aggressiveness of a large investor. The fact that
demand curve becomes steeper and price impact becomes bigger is not captured in the
partial equilibrium analysis.
3.4.4 I-Investors Trading Against L-Investor
In this subsection, we allow for general b # 0. We study how L-Investor trades against
competitive S-Investors with irrational sentiment bias. We assume that with b = [bi b2
...bk], bj > 0 for j = 1, ... , k. In section 4.3, we find that L-Investors takes price impact
into consideration and trades gradually. Such gradual trading still carries over when
momentum bias is present. But we will observe certain behaviors that we do not see
when the other investors are fully rational.
Proposition. 6 When a stationary equillibrium solution exists, there is always an eigen-
vector 4I of ay with corresponding eigenvalue being 1 such that = E (Vp,). Absent from
further shocks, the system will converge to '1' asymptotically if started from some different
state.
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This shows that, in general, there is always a steady state til, at which the system will stay
unchanged if all future shocks realize to be 0. Furthermore, when the system deviates
from the steady state, there is a natural tendency to for it to move back to the steady
state absent of shocks.
L-Investor's trading strategy is sf = sL4't where sL = (sL", s , s L ,Q, ''-, S ,Q T.
L whc overP. T T1TQ .. lkse, is positive, which reflects the "gradual trading" effect carried over from the previous
analysis. The interesting coefficients are sA~L and s LQ,, which are all 0 when
L-Investor trades against fully rational R-Investors. sq,,L is positive and becomes larger
when b gets larger, which indicates greater effort by L-Investor to create momentum bias.
L LQ ... ,A ,are negative as L-Investor wishes to take advantage of the mispricing created
by the momentum bias. s QJ, ., become more negative as b's magnitude increases
initially. As b gets even larger, they turn around and become less negative. So their
dependence on b is non-monotonic. This contrasts with the fact that the coefficient on
the last lag of the realized excess return that is revelant for momentum demand, SQ,,
is always more negative when the magnitude of b increases. We will explain the reason
behind it later. The L-Investor's trading strategy is fully dynamically optimizing. It will
in general be hard to interpret why L-Investor trades in a certain way. Thus, we rely on
impulse response analysis when a coordinate of 'It is perturbed from the steady state.
Her response to such an isolated shock will reveal her optimal trading strategy. We start
with a scalar b, which allows the momentum bias to depend on the first lag of excess
return only.
Position Shock
Suppose that L-Investor's holding position is perturbed to be 0.1 share less than her steady
state level at t = 1. For different magnitudes of b, Fig 3.3 shows L-Investor's optimal
execution trajectories. When the bias coefficient b = 0, L-Investor's trading counterparties
are fully rational. We observe gradual trading in consideration of price impact as analyzed
in the section above. Her orders decline in size monotonically as deviation from desired
holding level gets smaller. And her trades are all in the same direction. When b > 0,
we see dramatic differences from this execution strategy. When b = 0.3, her order size
no longer declines monotonically over time. She slows down trading after buying for
2 periods. This is because her buying in the first two periods pushed up momentum
demand by I-Investors, which competes with her for buying the stock. L-Investor slows
down her trading in consideration of momentum demand to avoid high execution cost
and waits for momentum demand to decline. She then accelerates at t = 5 to continue
trading towards desired level. However, we need to note here, although the order size
is no longer monotonically decreasing, the direction of orders8 remains the same. When
b gets even stronger (b = 0.5, 0.8), we see round-trip trades along L-Investor's optimal
holding trajectory. The direction of her trading is no longer the same, which contrasts
with the cases when momentum bias b is small. She overbuys to pump up momentum
demand and sells against it later on to take profit. This occurs for many cycles with
declining amplitude until the momentum demand dies down. The price manipulation in
8i.e. buy or sell.
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the latter cases (b = 0.5, 0.8) is much more severe than in the case against rational R-
Investors, where L-Investor only behaves non-competitively in a passive manner to avoid
price impact and associated trading cost.
Figure 3-3: L-Investor's Holding Trajectories After A Position Shock
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If we replace the L-Investor with R-Investors, they do not consider their holding for the
last period when forming current period trading decision. They have no price impact
and neither could they create any momentum through their trading. Thus, their holding
returns to the steady state level immediately for all magnitudes of b as shown by Fig 3.4.
It is worth noting that oscillatory trading trajectory does not necessarily imply active
price manipuation. When we let dividend shocks to be fully stochastic, we will observe
oscillatory trading even when R-Investors trade with S-Investors. The distinction between
this case and the L-Investor case is that R-Investors trade to take advantage of the os-
cillating momentum demand whereas L-Investor creates the momentum demand actively
when bias coefficient is large. R-Investors' sell when price moves up due to positive mo-
mentum and buy when price goes down due to negative momentum. Thus, their trading
tends to be in the opposite direction of price change. To create momentum, L-Investor
exerts pressure on price and her trading tends to be in the same direction of price change.
To illustrate the difference, we plot the correlation between trade and price changes in
Fig 3.5 for both L-Investor and R-Investors trading against I-Investors. As we see from
Fig 3.5, the correlation for L-Investor case is positive for all b whereas the correlation
is negative for R-Investors. L-Investor contributes to the price changes on average. On
the contrary, R-Investors' trade collectively to take advantage of price changes. With
higher momentum coefficient b, R-Investors are more aggressive in taking advantage of
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Figure 3-4: R-Investor's Holding Trajectories After A Position Shock
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the mispricing and the correlation is more negative monotonically. In contrast, higher b
leads L-Investor to take advantage of mispricing more aggressively. This generates lower
correlation (albeit still positive) up to a level, beyond which correlation starts to increase
drastically. This reflects the desire of L-Investor to intentionally manipulate the price
when momentum strength is strong.
Figure 3-5: Corr(Tradet, APt)
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Dividend Shock
We shall next look at the effect of a dividend shock. Suppose, at t = 2, dividend shock
E2 = I for some realization and we let subsequent shocks be 0. For b = 0.85 and aD = 1,
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we have L-Investor's holding trajectory and equilibrium price path plotted in Fig 3.6. The
shock takes place at time t = 2. At t = 2, the momentum bias is still 0. So I-Investors
are still fully rational. At t = 3, the high realized excess return at t = 2 generated by
the shock will induce a positive momentum bias. However, price peaks at time t = 2
rather than t = 3. Since, in this case, the dividend process is a random walk with no
mean-reversion, there is no gradual return to 0 for the expected fundamental price. It
might look puzzling why price becomes lower when the momentum demand is high at
t = 3. This is due to the existence of rational demand. If the price were to rise further
at t = 3 due to the momentum demand, rational demand at t = 2 would not miss this
profitable opportunity and buy more at t = 2. In equilibrium, this would arbitrage away
the predictable rise in price and price peaks at t = 2.
Figure 3-6: Trajectories After A Dividend Shock, With L-Investor
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What is interesting is the fact that L-Investor buys at t = 2 and sells at t = 3 at a slighly
lower price while bearing the risk of holding on the stock and incurring price impact.
Indeed, if it were R-Investors, who traded against I-Investors, their holding would not
change at all at t = 2 since all market participants are still rational at t = 2. To clear
the market, the excess return from t = 2 to t = 3 must be Q and price at t = 2 must rise
enough to offset the high demand to take advantage of the predictable momentum bias
at t = 3. This is shown by Fig 3.7. L-Investor's purchase at time t = 2 pushes the price
up further to ensure a high realized excess return. This will induce higher momentum
demand at t = 3 and push the demand curve up at t = 3. L-Investor bears in mind that,
at t = 3, she will wish to sell a lot to I-Investors to profit on their momentum demand.
Thus, the shift in demand curve could benefit her tremendously with the large sale. The
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Figure 3-7: Trajectories After A Dividend Shock, With R-Investors
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benefit at t = 3 outweighs the small loss from her initial purchase at t = 2. Effectively,
she manipulates the intertemporal demand curve and benefits from such "reverse trading"
scheme. To corroborate this interpretation, we plot how SLL, the coefficient on Lt in L-
Investor's trading strategy, changes with respect to b in Fig 3.8. If there is a dividend
shock, the state variable it affects is Lt = (1 + a)Dt - RP-.1. We can see that as the bias
coefficient b increases, the coefficient on Lt rises at an increasing rate. Large coefficient on
Lt will lead L-Investor to buy more after the dividend shock. Reverse trading will become
more pronounced as b gets larger.
Figure 3-8: Coefficient on Lt in L-Investor's Strategy
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Besides, the system returns to steady state more quickly with R-Investors as they take
advantage of the momentum sentiment aggressively and the momentum sentiment dies
down fast. L-Investor is willing to take profit more moderately at each period. She aims
to sustain momentum sentiment for a longer horizon. Price swings with much bigger
magnitude and returns to the long-run stationary one at a slower speed, which presents
more profitable opportunities. This can be interpretted as a "fishing in a common pool"
problem. R-Investors are rational individuals. In equilibrium, they do not attempt to
conserve the momentum sentiment and, therefore, "overfish". L-Investor, as a single
large entity, tries to conserve the momentum sentiment and profits more.
Expected Return and Volatility
Figure 3-9: Expected Excess
Expected Excess Return
L-2Inetor
2.2 
-
-In rs
24
1.9
17
16
14
1.3 --- - ' - -
0 01 0.2 0.3 04 05 06 07 08 0.9
Bas b
Return and Conditional Variance
Cordbonal Variance of Excess Return
40
30 -
0 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 0,5 06 07 0 09
B 00as b
Parameters Used: r = 0.1,aD= 0 .9 , -0 - 1-- 7 L- (R 1 0.98
Fig 3.9 plots expected excess return and conditional variance of excess return for various
levels of bias b. The conditional variance is significantly higher with L-Investor than with
R-Investors. From (3.23), we know that conditional variance depends on PP,L, which
measures the responsiveness of risk discount to fundamental excess return. As L-Investor
exerts price pressure in the same direction of Lt to generate higher momentum bias, P,,L is
larger with L-Investor, which contributes to a higher conditional variance. The difference
in expected excess return is small relative to the difference in conditional variance.
Multiple Lags
Finally, we shall examine momentum bias that depends on multiple lags of historical
excess returns. The change of strategy coefficients on Qt-1,..,Qt-A as b gets larger is of
particular interest. Let us fix k = 2. We let b = ( b b ) and see how coefficients on Qti
and Qt-2 changes as b increases. As shown by Fig 3.10, first of all, notice that coefficients
are more negative for R-Investors than for L-Investor. This verifies our belief that R-
Investors are more aggressive in taking advantage of the bias, which is positively related
to past excess returns. Secondly, for R-Investors, both coefficients get more negative as b
increases. This reflects R-Investors' natural tendency to take advantage more aggressively
when the bias becomes stronger. The coefficient on Qt-2, sT, for L-Investor exhibits
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the same pattern. As Qt-2 will not contribute to the momentum in the future, L-Investor
takes more advantage of it when I is bigger. However, the coefficient on Qt-1, s$Q 0 , for
L-Investor is not monotonic. While L-Investor wishes to take advantage the bias due to
Qt-1, she also wants to conserve the bias for future periods since, unlike Qt-2, Qt-1 will
contribute to the momentum bias next period. As b gets larger, the latter effect becomes
stronger and the curve bends upwards.
Figure 3-10: Coeffients On Multiple Past Excess Returns
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the optimal trading behavior of a risk-averse large institutional in-
vestor with price impact especially in the presence of momentum investors. In particular,
we adopt a general equilibrium framework, which gives rise to endogenous price impact.
In general, the large investor will split her trading need into smaller market orders over
time. She trades more aggressively in the beginning when the deviation from her desired
holding level is large and move gradually to desired holding position. In contrast with
previous studies, we find price volatility does not increase her trading speed. This is
because price impact becomes larger as her trading counterparties are also risk-averse. In
the presence of momentum investors, the large investor engages in some interesting ma-
nipulation behaviors, which we do not observe without momentum demand. Depending
on the strength of momentum trading, she may trade at non-monotonic speed or even
engage in round-trip trades. Moreover, she conducts "reverse trading", by which she buys
(sells) before a planned large sale (buy) to manipulate intertemporal demand curve. In
addition, unlike competitive rational investors, who jump onto profitable mispricings pro-
duced by momentum aggressively, the large investor attempts to conserve the momentum
sentiment so that it will last for longer period and present more profitable opportunities.
Finally, our model suggests that momentum trading is not self-fulfilling. It leads to strong
reversal in excess return.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Define
The state vector is
(t = [Qt-I Qt-2 ... Qt-k]T
1
St-1
Lt
41t =
Notice that
(1 + a) Dt+1 - RP
(I 1 + a) D+1 - R (aD + a) DT)
- RPv TWe + (1 + a) ED,t+1
and
Qt = +Dt - RPt_1
(1 + a) Dt + PPI't - RPt-1
= Lt + Ppq
The evolution of q/e follows
/ e
L
s q
Wt+1 = -RP,
e3 + PP
\0
0
0
1+a
+ 0 Et+1
0
0
bev
e, = [0 0 ... 1 .. 0] (1 at jth entry)(e4
= 
e +
ek+29
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(3.29)
(3.30)
where
(3.31)
The Bellman's equation is
J (WfI 't)
s.t. Wi1+±
= max >3te~Y'c + Et [J+1 (Wj+ 1, 'Jft+1)]
= (W;5 c) R + sQ
Note that because of the bias
E' [Qt+1] = Et [Qt+1] + Zt
Zt = bQ,"
ek+3)
= Et [(aDt+1 + P.It+1)+ Dt+1 - R (aDt + P&Jt)] + Z&j!
= (Pp (av - RI) + Zp) Wt
(3.33)
Var8 [Qt+1] = Vart [Qt+1] = [Pp bq + (1 + a)]2 ,2 (3.34)
Conjecture that the value function takes the following form:
Jf (Ws, -sw) = 2s' (3.35)
Define v = aT vsaq, vs = bTVb, v aT1vs bp, QS = (E- 1 + v), pS - (bQSbS) ,
s -= e bS(svST ds (Qs)1 -1/2Q ab' . Then
= -dst+1 exp
-asR (W4rS - Ct) - aSrT gSs '+ (as) 2 (rs)-1 ()2 ]
F.O.C gives
s = Sf pe where fi = rsgs
S=+ES aSR 1 t MSct =E + (s + aSR st 2 ("Y + aSR) t~"9
where ES
= + aSR In acf3RdS}
m = V5 - vS QV + gSTpS Scaa b a
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(3.32)
= ZVqt
As a result,
Q TIt
E5 [Qt+il
(3.36)
(3.37)
Equating the two sides of the Belhnan's equation, we have
s
cts r-y E in (r,3d) (3.38)Ry 5 R
1 0 ... 0
s s 0 .. .. 0U - m 4 2 [Li5 8 + In (r/R)] ( (3.39)
0 ... ... 0
To get demand schedule by competitive investors, we simply need to replace the equi-
librium price Pt by p, the undetermined price level before market clearing. Define
A= p - aDt
0
s 0 0
Wi+1 = -Rek+ 4 J ) + 0 Et+1 (3.40)
e3 + ek+4
0 t
Note that in the above equation we have ey one dimension higher to accomodate A. Also,
ES [Qt+1] = (P Vde - Rek+ 4 +Z,4Z) 'Pt = sx t (3.41)
With vs calculated above already, we can find out competitive investors' demand schedule
following similar optimization process
As = ( 4 p ) i' (3.42)
Proof of Proposition 3:
Note that
CoV (Qt+1, Ot+1) = blQviT (3.43)
Vart (Qt+1) = (ps)-1 (3.44)
Thus,
Et (Qt+l + Zt) - Covt (Qt+1, Ot+1)
= - - --- - -- (3.45)
asVart (Qt+-1)
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Proof of Proposition 4:
From market clearing condition,
wSAS + S= 1 (3.46)
we get the price impact function for L-Investor
7rt (sL) = aD, + (e --w \ sI
wSp J w~p
= aDt + 7rI't + Asf (3.47)
where
eii?-oS$
1eoWS
Proof of Proposition 5:
For L-Investor, the evolution of her wealth is less straightforward. Unlike competitive
investors, who can mark their holding of risk assets to the market price, she has to
distinguish "paper wealth" and "liquidation wealth" as argued in Cherian and Jarrow
(1993). As defined in earlier section,
W; 1 = Mt+1 + staDt+1
= [Mt - CL - (sL - st_1) 7r (sr)|R + sLDt+1 + staDt+1
= (Mt +aDt -cL) R +(sLI _ -s) (irwt + AH) R
-sL (aRDt - (1 + a) aDDt - (1 + a) et+)
= (W _c )R+sr (1+a)et+1+
R (qite 2711Xit + Ae~itsaL - r&Jhsft - A (s )2
= (3.48)
where
w L = eiter + 7rTe
Q L+1 = -R (7rp - A-rq) q1t - RAs + (1 + a) et+1
pt + cLs + bet+1
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The state vector process q/t is endogenous of her control variable sL:
0
= -R7r, t',
7T + e3
\ d /
0
1
-RA
A
0
0
0
L 1+a
S 0 Ft+1
0
Sinax 
-#' fr + Et [J+1c ,H,
s.t. W+1
- (W-cL) R + LsQL + 1L jtt t t+ 2 t '
= aL qjt + cLsL + bLEt+,1
Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (WiL, Wet) = - t-#"/1- e~' '
De eL= LTVL L L L,1VLbL vL LTILL L =LT LL L LT LL L
Define v a To a , oV = bqv b, ok = C ~v c, o = a v vas o = civ a, v, =aa %b bb c T- L ab - L - 1 Vca/ L L
C LT vL bL )QL = (E-1 + VLj)>, dL =j -1Q2Lj1/ 2 ' 9 L = (aLe!$ + 7v - (aLb~ L +V) 2 LVLT
1L = [(aLbL +
Then
vL) QL (aLbL +V )T - 2aLc - 1
aLR (-L _cf) -gL iLsxL +
-d # exp
- tW (n v
sL= Lgqj
CL EL + aLR Lt 7L +aLR t
where
LLn C =LR
mn L VL_ L QLVLT + LwP + gLrpgL
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qt1 I
L
The Bellman's equation is
(3.49)
(3.50)
Therefore,
(T L1 (aL
(IL V 37
(s )2
t (3.51)
-
) L LT
ab ~~ab *+
2 (-y +aL)
(3.52)
(3.53)
L
(aLoRdL)
(Wt'+1'' ft+1)1
Et (Jt+1 (WL 1, xj twi))
Equating the two sides of the Bellman's equation, we have
a = , = In (rd) (3.54)
1 0 0
vL L +2 L + In (r/R)] . . (355)
0 ... ... 0
Proof of Proposition 6:
L-Investor's holding follows sL = S, + SLs and price follows: Pt = aDt + Pqi,o +
P,,st-1. Hence, state vector is
and it follows
f1 0+ t t (3.56)
which is deterministic.
Excess return for rational R-Investors is
Qt+1 = P L, ( s - rPp,o (sL, - R) ) We + (1 + a) Et+1 (3.57)
Since state vector at time t + 1 evolves deterministically, there is no hedging demand. It
is well-known, for CARA utility function, the optimal demand can be found through the
simple mean variance optimization.
Et (Qt+1) 
_ P+,a[P - rP, P, (s, - R)St (3.58)
aR 0.2 - R2 + R2
Their demand schedule as a function of p is
AfR (p) = #1 + 4,st-1 + p (p - aDt) (3.59)
where
P4 ,1 + PIaV P ,s1 R
Market clearing condition gives the price impact function
P (8L) = aDt +-7r,1+ 7rp,, -+ Asf (3.60)
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where
_41-1 $p, 1
7rW,1 , 7rp,, = ~-
P P P
Large investor "market-to-fundamental value" wealth
Wi+1 = (Wt - ct) R - (st - st-1) RP (st) + stEQ,t+1
Substitute this into L-Investor's value function
jL~ (uf1, =~3etVVIL~WT VLjpIi
Jt (W4,7,, k9t) = -,3a''w - 2it.
and take first order condition, we have L-Investor's optimal holding
L + vL aLR 7rP, -
s = -.2r((at,)2 + 12 2a_ _o a 2S Ra) L 2 (3.61)((j 2 2 o!LaR) 1, +2a ((a.L) 2 + 20eL VL t)
where v 12 ,v 22 satisfy
(-a R7r ,1v2) aL _ v _ R 2L
+ +R71(= Rv
a ((a)2 + 2aLCaR) - VL 12Q 2 2
(aR r - a, S R
+2a,- R7e , = RvL2Cr (a + 2aLaR) - 0'2
Market clearing requires
,Et (Qt+1I) 1 L
which gives us
aR2s
Ps,, --- se,,(3.62)
R L i
PL, = | Ls r,[R - se,
This yields
-r R (R a oQ (3.64)
Mr,1 s R_, aRa (3.65)R - SL, r Q
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These give rise to the following equation that pins down sL
-aLR (7L R lrp,, + 2aLRirq,8
= R Y2 ((aL 2 L R L
=1(c (()2a CeR) + CeLR ( Mp se ) (3.66)
After substitution of ir, and collecting the terms:
(e, - (s,) - (1 + 2p) R (S,,)2 + [(1 + 2p) R + p] Rs,, -pR2 = 0 (3.67)
where g = 9. Note that the equation above have 4 roots. However, we look for a k, such
that Ik., I 1. Otherwise, the large investor holding will go to infinity. Observe that when
0, LHS = -R 2 <0. When s = 1, LHS = pRr > 0. So there always exists a
root between 0 and 1. Moreover, notice that when -1 < s, < 0,
LHS = g(sIP' (s ,- 1)+[-(1 + 29) R (s9)2 +[(1+29)R+g]R, + (-gR2)
< -2s, + [- (1 + 22) 1? (se,)2 + [(1 + 2o) R + p] Rs,, + (-gR2 )
< 0 (3.68)
So there is no real root between -1 and 0.
The following equation pins down ,1:
Li RrPy,1 - se,1 - R (4 I = 0 (3.69)
This yields si = . (1 -
We can also show that s, is increasing in p: Rearranging the originial equation gives
p ((',)2 - (.)' - 2R (s,")2 + (2R + t) Rs%,, - R2 + R2 R (R )2 =0 (3.70)
implies - (s\%) 3 - 2R (s) 2 + (2R + 1) RS,, - R2 < 0 sinceg > 0 and R2
R (sL9) > 0 for 0 ! k, 5 1. If we raise g, LHS will be less than 0 evaluated at the
original root. Since RHS > 0 at 1, this suggests that root has shifted to the right.
We can also show that se,, is decreasing in R: Rearranging the original equation gives
p ((s4,8)" - (s,,)) + R (R - s,) [(1 + 2g) s,, - g] = 0 (3.71)
If we raise R , LHS will be greater than 0 evaluated at the original root. This is because
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(1 + 2g) S,, - 2 > 0 at original root (since p (, -(s < 0 and R (R - SL,))
and R (R - S,) is increasing in R at original root. So the new root has shifted to the
left. The above analysis also shows that k, >
Proof of Proposition 7:
Recall that Tt+1 = amw~t + bwet+-. Taking expectation, E [%+1] = awE [Tt). Hence,
'I = a&P. Therefore, 'I' is an eigenvector with associated eigenvalue 1. Furthermore, if
the system is stationary, the other eigenvalues should be less than 1. Absent from further
shocks, the system will converge to T.
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